Abu ʿAmer Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Abi ʿAmer al-Maʿafiri (Arabic: أبو عامر محمد بن عبد الله بن أبي عامر المعافري), nicknamed al-Manṣūr (Arabic: المنصور, "the Victorious"), which is often Latinized as Almanzor in Spanish, Almansor in Catalan and Almançor in Portuguese (c.
Born~Died 938 ~ Aug 9, 1010Last edited Oct 15, 2026, 2:50 PM
Abu ʿAmer Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Abi ʿAmer al-Maʿafiri (Arabic: أبو عامر محمد بن عبد الله بن أبي عامر المعافري), nicknamed al-Manṣūr (Arabic: المنصور, "the Victorious"),1 which is often Latinized as Almanzor in Spanish, Almansor in Catalan and Almançor in Portuguese (c. 938 – 8 August 1002),2 was a Muslim ArabAndalusi military leader and statesman. As the chancellor of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba and hajib (chamberlain) for Caliph Hisham II, Almanzor was effectively ruler of Islamic Iberia.
Born in Turrush to a family of Yemeni Arab origin with some juridical ancestors, ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for Córdoba when still young to be trained as a faqīh.3 After a few humble beginnings, he joined the court administration and soon gained the confidence of Subh, mother of the children of Caliph Al-Hakam II.4 Thanks to her patronage and his own efficiency, he quickly expanded his role.5
During the caliphate of Al-Hakam II, he held several important administrative positions, including director of the mint (967), administrator for Subh and her children, administrator for intestate inheritances, and quartermaster for the army of General (973). The death of the caliph in 976 marked the beginning of the domination of the Caliphate by this functionary, which continued beyond his death with the government of two of his sons, and , up to 1009. As chamberlain of the caliphate (from 978), he exercised extraordinary power in the al-Andalus state, throughout the and in part of the , while Caliph Hisham II was reduced to near-figurehead status.
This page is based on “Almanzor” from English Wikipedia, (r1380201274) CC BY-SA 4.0 used under the license. The original authors are listed in its page history.
His portentous rise to power has been explained by an insatiable thirst for dominance, but historian Eduardo Manzano Moreno warns that "it must be understood within the framework of the complex internal struggles that developed within the Umayyad administration."9 Deeply religious, he received the pragmatic support of Muslim authorities for his control of political power, though not without periodic tensions between them.10 The basis of his power was his defense of jihad,11 which he proclaimed in the name of the Caliph.12 His image as a champion of Islam served to justify his assumption of governmental authority.11
Having monopolized political dominance in the caliphate, he carried out profound reforms in both foreign and domestic politics.13 He made numerous victorious campaigns in both the Maghreb and Iberia.14 On the peninsula, his bloody and very destructive incursions against the Christian kingdoms temporarily halted their advance southward.14
Origins and youth
Although there are doubts about the exact date of his birth, everything seems to indicate that it occurred around the year 939.2151617 He was born into an Arab landowning family1 of Yemeni origin,181920 belonging to the al-Ma'afir tribe.1720 They had been established since the conquest of Visigothic Iberia in Torrox, a farm by the mouth of the Guadiaro river,1621222320 belonging to the cora (territorial subdivision) of al-Jazīrah (governed from al-Jazīrah al-Khaḍrāʾ الجزيرة الخضراء, the site of modern Algeciras).1719 His family had received lands there from Tariq ibn Ziyad as reward to an ancestor, Abd al-Malik, who had distinguished itself in the taking of Carteia during the Umayyad conquest of Hispania.1620222324
Some of the family had served as Qadis and jurists.120 The family's position improved significantly with the appointment of ibn Abi ʿĀmir's paternal grandfather as Qadi of Seville and his marriage to the daughter of a vizier, governor of Badajoz and doctor to Caliph Abd al-Rahman III.25 ibn Abi ʿĀmir's father, Abd Allah, was described as a pious, kind and ascetic man,26 who died in Tripoli20 while returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca.2728 His mother, Burayha, also belonged to an Arab family.20 Even so, the family was middle class, modest29 and provincial.30
Ascent in the Caliphal Court
Though still very young, Ibn Abi ʿAmir moved to Córdoba,31 where he developed his studies in law and letters under the tutelage of his maternal uncle.19202632 This training was intended to facilitate entering the state administration,19 because the opportunities for advancement in the military were limited to Arabs.29 Like many other youth from wealthy families, he received training in interpretation of the Quran, prophetic tradition and application of Sharia, thus completing his education as a faqīh,33 with the intention of becoming a judge,31 and from this time he retained his taste for literature.28 Instructed by renowned masters of Islamic legal tradition and letters, he showed talent in these studies.34
The death of his father and the bad family situation led him to abandon his studies and take the profession of scrivener.4 After occupying a modest position as a scribe along the alcázar and mosque of Córdoba – close to the offices of the Administration – to earn his livelihood,19 the youth soon stood out for his talent and ambition119 and he began his political career as a clerk in the audience chamber of the capital's chief Qadi, Muhammed ibn al-Salim,41934 an important advisor to the Caliph Al-Hakam II despite the fact that his positions were exclusively religious and not political.4 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir soon caught the attention of Vizier Ja'far al-Mushafi,35 head of the civil administration, who would introduce him to caliphal court, probably on the recommendation of Ibn al-Salim.19363738 Already noted for his knowledge and professional competence, he began to accumulate positions in the Administration.39 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, in his thirties,32 was one of the young functionaries who took part in a generational turnover of the court at the beginning of Al-Hakam's reign.37
In late February of 967,1940 he was given charge of Abd al-Rahman, son and heir of Al-Hakam II by his favorite,294142 the Basque43Subh (Aurora),144 a slave with very diverse training, from singing to Islamic jurisprudence to poetry, who owed her power to her ascendancy over the caliph as the mother of his children.40 With her, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir established a privileged relationship extremely beneficial for his career.36454647 Although his role was probably secondary,46 his responsibility managing the estates of the heir to the throne and those of his mother granted Ibn Abi ʿĀmir close proximity to the reigning family,48 and he quickly began to accumulate important positions.4950 Seven months after his first appointment, and thanks to the intercession of the royal favorite,47 he became director of the mint,474951 and in December 968,51 he was named treasurer of the vacant inheritances.36515253 The following year he was promoted to Qadi of Seville and Niebla,4754 one of the most important in the state, and at the death of his charge Abd al-Rahman in 970,46 he was placed in the same role for the young heir, Hisham.3641424652 By this time he had married the sister of the head of the caliphal guard, a client of the new heir,55 and began to accumulate wealth. A residence was built in al-Rusafa,56 near the former palace of Abd al-Rahman I, and he began to make sumptuous gifts to the Caliph's harem.57 He was accused of embezzlement4756 and removed from his post as head of the mint in March 972,58 but was helped financially to cover the alleged embezzlement.5657 He obtained a police command5659 and he retained his responsibility for the heir and intestate estates.60
In 973, he undertook the logistical, administrative and diplomatic aspects of the caliphal campaign against the Idrisids in the Maghreb,4661 with the official position of High Qadi of the Umayyad possessions in North Africa.56 The importance of the fleet in the campaign and its dependence on Seville, where Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was Qadi and therefore had responsibility for its facilities, and the confidence of the caliph himself and his chamberlain,62 facilitated his acquisition of this appointment.61 The commission brought with it authority over civilians and military personnel and, in practice, the supervision of the campaign.63 A primary responsibility of his role was to obtain the submission of the notables of the region by giving them formal gifts, the acceptance of which indicated their acceptance of the Caliph's authority and a promise of loyalty.46566264 Along with military victories, this undermined the enemy's position.6165
Achieving victory against the Idrisids, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir returned sick to the Cordoban court in September 974,64 intending to recover and resume his duties.66 He never returned to North Africa.64 His experience as a supervisor of the enlisted troops for the Maghreb campaign gave him an appreciation for their possible political utility if he gained control.66 It also allowed him to establish relations with the tribal leaders of the area67 and with his future powerful father-in-law, Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman,3546 who had led the military aspects of the operation.56666869 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's ability to manage organizational and economic aspects of the campaign was widely recognized,465668 and rewarded months before with his reappointment as head of the mint,68 and was the beginning of his political success.66 In the last months of Al-Hakam's illness, he appointed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir inspector of professional troops,56 which included the bulk of the Berbers brought from the Maghreb by the caliph to try to form a force loyal to his person, which guaranteed him access to the throne of the Caliph's young son.70
Taking power
Elimination of pretenders and formation of triumvirate
The death of Caliph Al-Hakam II on 1 October 97667717273 and the proclamation of his son Hisham as his successor inaugurated a new period in the political career of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,354674 and also represented a pivotal event in the history of the Caliphate, which thereafter was marked by his tenure75 and by the gradual withdrawal of the third Caliph.76 Al-Andalus went through a serious succession crisis at this time, because the designated successor, Hisham, born in 965, was too young to rule.7577 He had been only eight or nine years old in 974 when his father first introduced him to the process of government,78 and was still a minor when his father died.7980 This was an extraordinary situation because neither the emirate nor caliphate had previously been in the hands of a child.4681 Some schools of Islamic jurisprudence rejected the possibility of a minor becoming Caliph,75 but the Umayyad Al-Andalus tradition had secured the inheritance from parent to child,82 while the case of Abd al-Rahman III set a precedent for primogeniture.83 Faced with this situation, and despite the efforts of Al-Hakam during the last years of his reign to ensure the succession of his son by associating him with the tasks of government,4678848586 there was division on the succession.8788 Some favored the appointment of a regent, the chamberlain al-Mushafi, while others preferred to give the caliphal title to one of the brothers of the deceased Caliph, the twenty-seven-year-old al-Mughira,899091 who was the favorite younger son of Abd al-Rahman III.92
Two prominent Eastern European slaves (saqaliba) occupying important court positions – one, the uncle of the new Caliph93 – who were present at Al-Hakam's death decided to take action before this division was more widely known.9472 They moved to place al-Mughira on the throne,9596 with the condition that he name his nephew Hisham as his heir,97 and to remove the chamberlain, al-Mushafi,72987499100 thereby giving them ascendance at court over the faction supporting Hisham.9472 The two, who would nonetheless occupy prominent places in the ceremony proclaiming Hisham once their plan was thwarted,93101 had the support of the thousand saqalibas of the court and control of the palace guard.72100 The chamberlain, who was the real center of political power after the death of al-Hakam102 and even in the last years of his reign,19 had pretended to support the conspirators, only to subvert them thanks to the support of Berber troops.7297100103 He quickly broke up the plot with the help of Subh, and instructed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,728990104 then a senior official and member of the court with privileged access to the young Caliph and his mother, to murder the pretender.7496 The support of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, the right hand of Subh,105 for the young caliph was crucial to his rise to power.30
A reluctant but obedient102 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir surrounded al-Mughira's residence with a detachment of one hundred soldiers,106 broke in and notified al-Mughira of the death of al-Hakam and the enthronement of Hisham II.7299107 The young uncle of Hisham expressed his loyalty, and in the face of Almanzor's doubts, demanded compliance with the order for his own assassination.72104106107108 Al-Mughira was then strangled in front of his family101106 in the living room of his house, and hung on a beam of the roof of an adjacent structure as if he had committed suicide.107108 Al-Mushafi and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir thus fulfilled the wishes of their late master to ensure the accession of Hisham.104 The young Caliph's supporters relied on the Berber guard, created by al-Hakam for his son,70 to face the saqalibas, more than eight hundred of which were expelled from the palace as a result of the crisis.105
Hisham II was invested as caliph on or about Monday, 1 October 976,90109 with the title of al-Mu'ayyad bi-llah,75 ("one who receives the assistance of God").110 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir participated in the ceremony, recording in the minutes the oaths of fidelity the attendees made before the cadí.99101110111 A week later, 8 October 976, Hisham named al-Mushafi hajib71 – chamberlain or prime minister – and made the 36-year-old Ibn Abi ʿĀmir the vizier8699112 and delegate of the hajib.7489101113 The latter thus maintained a position of singular importance as the link between the new Caliph's mother, in practice representing the government during the minority of Hisham, and the administration headed by al-Mushafi.113 The power was effectively in the hands of a triumvirate formed by chamberlain al-Mushafi, the vizier Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and General Ghalib. Subh, who had been associated with them in the past and now ruled in a way on their behalf; this triumvirate reported all important matters to her and consulted her and acted with her permission. They knew very well that without her support they could not win and stay in power in the uncertain and dangerous political spiral of the court, so they tried very hard to please her.1 To boost the popularity of the new Caliph among the population, and strengthen their own positions, they abolished the unpopular oil tax.101
Ruin of al-Mushafi
While the alliance between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and al-Mushafi had undermined the traditional power of the court slaves,105106114 relations between the two soon deteriorated.115 The Chamberlain's failure to address the loss of prestige due to the succession intrigue and Christian incursions114116117118 that in 976 almost reached the capital89 allowed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir to gain control of army troops in the capital of the Caliphate46106112119120121 after assuring Subh of his ability to restore that military prestige.114115 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, unlike the chamberlain, was inclined towards the military response to Christian incursions and was willing to command a retaliatory strike.89118121 Al-Mushafi, however, had advocated a defensive strategy,118 that, despite Cordoban military power, had conceded the territories north of the Guadiana to the Christian states.116117 At the same time, and also thanks to the influence of Subh, Ghalib obtained the government of the Lower March and command of the border armies.112
In February 977,106120114122123124 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left the capital for his first campaigning season in Salamanca, following the strategy of containment of the Christian states maintained during the previous reign.115 His appointment as warden – head of an army – of the capital's troops drew him into alliance with Ghalib – the warden of the border armies – and brought about the end of the triumvirate that the two had formed with al-Mushafi.124125 In his first campaign, lasting nearly two months,122126 he plundered the outskirts of the baths at Baños de Ledesma.35127126116128 and brought two thousand captured prisoners to Córdoba, but failed to take any fortresses.89124 In autumn, he attacked Salamanca.35129130
Ibn Abi ʿĀmir won military prestige by repulsing Christian forces and attacking Cuéllar during a second 977 campaign,123124131 and Salamanca in the autumn of the same year,132133 not for conquest, but to weaken the enemy and gain domestic popularity.131 This new prestige allowed him to apply for the post of prefect of Córdoba, a role until then filled by a son of al-Mushafi.106125134135 The new military reputation of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, with the support of the harem and of Ghalib, allowed him to obtain the position without the chamberlain's consent.125134135136 This led to open confrontation between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, hitherto an apparent faithful and efficient servant of the chamberlain, and al-Mushafi.137136 The latter owed his power to the support of the previous caliph,126138 and lacked firm support, being considered an upstart by the leading families in Córdoba's governing administration.106126 He tried to counter the alliance between the other two members of the triumvirate by marrying another of his sons to Ghalib's daughter, Asma.112125134139137140 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who had won the favor of the cunning mother of the Caliph, of Ghalib, and of major families of the civil service,118 skillfully intervened, using the intercession of Subh and directly addressing Ghalib to encourage him to withdraw his initial approval112137138141 and instead allow Ibn Abi ʿĀmir himself to wed Ghalib's daughter.131136139142143 The magnificent wedding143 was held in the spring of 978,144 eight months after the signing of the marriage contract sealed the alliance between Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and marked the decline of the power of the chamberlain.131142 A few days after the wedding, Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for a new campaign targeting Salamanca.144145142143 Military successes increased the power of the two allies and further undermined the chamberlain at court.142 The two wardens received new titles as reward for their victories, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was named 'double vizier',143145146 for Interior and Defense, the two most important vizierships.147 Ghalib had been given the title of chamberlain at the end of 977 – an unprecedented situation as there had never been two chamberlains at the same time – depriving al-Mushafi of most of his duties,143 and al-Mushafi was subsequently dismissed131141139145148 and imprisoned.147 His relatives and supporters in positions of the Administration were arrested and his possessions confiscated.145147149 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir succeeded the defeated al-Mushafi as a second chamberlain for the Caliphate.144145150 The most important supporting positions were held by trusted people, in some cases family members.149 The elimination of the old chamberlain reduced the visibility of the Caliph, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir gradually became the intermediary between his lord and the rest of the world.151149 Aware that his power emanated from Hisham, Mansur was careful, however, to continue to maintain the appearance of the minor's sovereignty.152
Dissatisfaction with the royal minority and the regency fueled a new rebellion organized by prominent members of the court at the end of 978.153154 The conspirators intended to replace Hisham with one of his cousins,153154 a grandson of Abd al-Rahman III.108145155 An improvised attempt to stab the Caliph to death failed154155 and led to the brutal repression of the conspirators at the insistence of Subh and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, not without overcoming the resistance of major legal advisors.156157158 This ended attempts to replace the Caliph with another member of the Umayyad dynasty,159 resulting in the flight of any possible pretender from the capital,160 the close surveillance of members of the Umayyad family, and the construction139 the following year161 of a new fortified residence for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, Medina Alzahira162163 (the "Resplendent City"),164 work that went on until 989.157165 This new residence, located east of Córdoba,139161 housed troops loyal to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and the governmental administration139161166 and was the center of a sumptuous court.167 In addition, to calm the malaise among the faqīh caused by the repression of the conspirators against Hisham's legitimacy, in which some had colluded, he established a commission to expunge Al-Hakam's library.168
As a chamberlain, in the summer he had directed a new campaign that lasted more than two months, this time in the northeast against Pamplona and Barcelona.150169170 In the fall he made a new incursion into Ledesma lasting just over a month.133150 In May the following year, he directed a new campaign in this region.133171 The next incursion, during the summer, marched to Sepulveda.150172 In September 979,172 he sent troops from Algeciras to the aid of Ceuta, threatened by the victorious campaign of Buluggin ibn Ziri, supported by the Fatimids, against Umayyad clients in the Western Maghreb.173 Later, the city became the center of Algerian Maghreb politics.174
Showdown with Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman
Having crushed the opposition at court, the two co-leaders soon clashed.167175 The old general resented prostrating before Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,176177178 who had devoted himself to strengthening his power and controlling access to the caliph.179 Ghalib believed the maneuvers of his ally, including the construction of his new palatial residence, the reinforcement of the Berber military units, and his increasing control over the Caliph,179178 would eventually damage the dynasty.176 For his part, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir viewed his father-in-law's continued military prestige as obscuring his own military prowess, despite successive victorious campaigns.175 After several joint raids into Christian lands, mainly led by the veteran Ghalib despite the growing military experience of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, a confrontation erupted in the spring of 980,180181 over a campaign around Atienza.176177178182183 Betrayed by Ghalib and wounded, his life only saved through the intercession of the Qadi of Medinaceli,182 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir reacted by immediately attacking the fortress177184 where his father-in-law's family was,181 and looted it once taken.176183185 Almanzor continued north, but the confrontation with Ghalib, fortified in Atienza, ended the larger campaign, intended to be his second against Castile since 975.177180181 Ghalib was forced into exile in Christian territory.176183 In the fall, Mansur led a new offensive against 'Almunia', which is unidentified.186187 Then in 981, a year of great martial activity for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, he sent five military campaigns north, the first in February and March.186
After several clashes between the co-leaders that ended favorably for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,187 in April of 981, Ghalib, allied with Castile and Pamplona, defeated him.176183 In May, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir counterattacked after having united Berber troops, his own Cordoban men, and some of the border units that his enemy had long commanded.183185188189 Ghalib, meanwhile, had the backing of another part of the Caliphate's border forces and his Castilian and Navarese allies.188189190191192 On the verge of achieving victory over his son-in-law on in the Battle of Torrevicente on 10 July 981,193190179 Ghalib was found dead in a ravine without signs of violence.194195 He may have died of natural causes, being almost eighty years old.192 The troops of his rival, disconcerted by the death of their leader,179 largely passed to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's flag.190195 Ghalib's body was severely mutilated,191 first by his own troops at the direction of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who wanted to prove his enemy's death,190 and then exposed in Córdoba.196197 Several of his main allies were also killed in the battle,179 which gave the winner the nickname, Almanzor,198199 ("the Victorious"30196179191) by which he is known to history.200201 The passing of Ghalib made him sole chamberlain and allowed him to eliminate any possible opponents at court,202 although his legitimacy came only from his position as regent202 and the tolerance of the Caliph's mother.203 With the elimination of Ghalib, the power of the Caliph became concentrated in his person.20235188194
That same year, he looted Zamora and its surroundings in September.204205 A month later, he attacked Portuguese lands, probably Viseu.204206
Alliance with the queen mother and troubled government
For twenty years, until the breakup of his alliance with the caliph's powerful mother in 996,207 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir acted in part as her representative, advisor, treasurer, mediator, informant, and her commander of the armies and the police.208 It was she who made most of the decisions, in consultation with her son's regents. She was aware of all the political developments of the government and the court and was a dominant force in factional struggles. Subh had a lot of trust and affection for Almanzor, and her support for him was so obvious to everyone that it caused rumors that they were in love. From the reign of Caliph Al-Hakam II to the new Caliph Hisham, it was Subh's patronage, apart from his own ability, that promoted him and removed his opponents from the court.208
Despite years of competition at court for power and administration by others, however, the Caliph, upon reaching his majority, made no move to assume control,208 possibly due to some kind of illness or other inability to carry out the responsibilities of his position.209 The historian, Al-Dhahabi, attributes Almanzor's locking up the Caliph to the latter being "feeble minded, believing what can't be true".210 For example, someone brought him a piece of rock, saying it is from Jerusalem's site of the prophet's ascent to heaven. The Caliph rewarded him with a lot of gold. In another instance, someone presented him with a donkey's hoof, claiming it is Uzair's donkey, and he was also rewarded. Yet another person brought him hair, claiming it is the prophet's.211
Almanzor not only assumed the caliphal power, but also roles as guardian of the incapacitated Caliph and guarantor of dynastic power.209 The fact that he merely controlled the administration and army on behalf of Hisham, however, made him expendable, so he took steps to strengthen his position.212 The capital was placed in the hands of a cousin of his, who controlled it tightly,212 and he elevated a series of supporters, generally unpopular and considered despotic,213 who managed to gain control of various Taifas after the disintegration of the Caliphate.214 He also allied himself with important border lords.213
In 988 and 989 he had to face a double threat: a long drought215 that caused famine and forced him to apply some social measures to alleviate the shortage (delivery of bread or rescission of taxes, among others) and the emergence of a new rebellion against him in which his eldest 216 son sought to replace him.155199217218219 Almanzor managed to disrupt the conspiracy,220 which had been joined by the governor of Zaragoza, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muhammad of the Banu Tujib,220 and that of Toledo,219 an Umayyad descendant of Caliph Al-Hakam I,221 'Abd Allah bin Abd al-'Aziz al-Marwanid220 also known as Abdullah Piedra Seca,155199218222223 but his efforts to get his son to submit proved fruitless.224225226 The latter took refuge with the Castilians after the arrest of his fellow conspirators.227228226 Almanzor launched a successful campaign against Castile and took custody of his wayward son, who was tried and beheaded at dawn on 8 September 990.220217218225229230231232 Almanzor, still reeling from his eldest son's betrayal, disowned him,231 while also ordering those who had killed him at Almanzor's command to themselves be executed.221225233 The governor of Zaragoza would be executed in his presence while he spared the life of Piedra Seca—perhaps because Almanzor did not want to stain his hands with Umayyad blood.220
Almanzor also clashed with some of his enemy's satirical poets, including Abu Yafar al Mushafi (d. 982) and Yûsuf ibn Hârûn al-Ramâdî (d. 1012–3), known as Abû Ceniza. Persecuted and subsequently forgiven, Abû Ceniza went to Barcelona in 986. Ibrahim ibn Idrís al-Hassani also paid for his satire of Almanzor with exile in Africa. Almanzor threw the poet Abu Marwan al-Jaziri in prison, where he died in 1003.234
Almanzor, leader of al-Andalus
Rupture with Subh and concentration of political power
With Ghalib eliminated and Hisham unable to perform his duties as Caliph, Almanzor began to weigh preparing for the succession, and even the possibility of officially taking power.235 In 989, he tried unsuccessfully to have the faqīhs accept his home, Medina Alzahara, as a major mosque.165 From 991 he positioned his son Abd al-Malik in a similar way as Al-Hakam had done with Hisham, appointing him chamberlain198 and supreme warden of the Caliphate's armies, although Almanzor did not step aside from those roles himself.235 At the same time, he discreetly presented to the faqīhs who advised the senior Qadi the possibility that he himself might replace the Caliph236 because Hisham was incapable and no one else in the state could hold the position.235 The regency, formerly founded on Hisham's minority, could no longer be justified by his mere inability to carry out his functions.235 The opinion of the faqīhs, however, was negative:236 if not Hisham, according to the legal experts, power should devolve to another member of the tribe of Muhammad.17237 Almanzor reluctantly accepted the decision, and in the following years he gradually assumed even greater powers, corresponding to those of the Caliph: he confirmed the official appointments with his own seal rather than that of the Caliph, in spite of nominally acting on his behalf,238 he appointed a new mint official, appropriated new titles239 and moved part of the administration to Medina Alzahira.237 He also had his name mentioned after that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and maintained a court parallel to that of the sovereign at al-Zahira.30 In 991, under pressure from the chamberlain, the council of faqīhs changed their unfavorable opinion as to the conversion of Medina Alzahira into a major mosque,240 although its use continued to be frowned upon by many notable Cordobans.241
His attempts to seize power ended the long alliance between Almanzor and Subh in 996.229238242243 After twenty years as a representative of Subh, Almanzor confronted the Caliph's mother and her supporters. After the collapse of the alliance, Subh tried with all her might to eliminate Almanzor and united with all his opponents and enemies and divided the court into two factions, a group supporting Almanzor and the survival of his power and another group supporting Subh whose goal was to take over the government by her son.242243 The clash between the two cliques was triggered by Subh withdrawing eighty thousand dinars from the royal treasury to finance an uprising against the chamberlain.244245 Almanzor discovered this thanks to his agents in the palace,223242246 and he reacted by successfully petitioning the council of viziers and Faqīhs to transfer the treasury to his residence, Medina Alzahira, characterizing Subh's theft as a robbery by the harem.223242247 With Almanzor sick, Subh took over the palace and tried in vain to block the transfer.247248Abd al-Malik, Almanzor's son, won the support of the viziers. The Caliph repudiated the rebellion of his mother in late May 996, and Abd al-Malik took custody of both him and the treasure.248249250 Though the rebellion she headed on the peninsula lost steam due to loss of funding and the rapid defeat of its few supporters,251 the money she had previously taken allowed Subh to finance a rebellion in the Maghreb.243248252 Although Almanzor had not yet managed to quell this revolt by fall 997, it failed to gain any support on the peninsula.253
To reinforce his image and that of his son and successor, Almanzor organized a parade223 with the Caliph and his mother.243253254255 The gesture served to dispel any doubts about the support of the Caliph for Almanzor, and thus refuted the allegations of Ziri ibn Atiyya, launched from the Maghreb.255 After the procession, Hisham was locked up – with all the comforts but without power – in Medina Alzahira,253 where his mother was probably also imprisoned.207 Having lost her confrontation with her former ally, she died shortly thereafter in 999.207 Almanzor, who had renewed his oath of allegiance to the Caliph with the proviso that he delegate223239 his powers to his family,256 was strengthened. He sent his son to fight the North African rebellion,255256 and took charge of all administrative power.17253257 He counted on the approval of the religious leadership who, fearing possible civil war, supported Almanzor's position as guarantor of stability and of the throne of the impotent Hisham.207 State power was divided in two: with Almanzor blocking exercise of the symbolic and legitimate power of the Caliph, while that of the chamberlain and his successors, devoid of legitimacy for being Yemeni Mofarite and not of the Prophet's blood, controlled the Caliphate's policy.17
Reform of army and administration
The separation between the temporal power, held by Almanzor, and the spiritual, in the hands of Hisham as Caliph, increased the importance of military force, a symbol – along with the new majesty of the chamberlain's court, rival of that of the caliph himself – of the power of Almanzor, and an instrument to guarantee the payment of taxes.258
Almanzor successfully continued the military reforms begun by Al-Hakam259 and his predecessors,260 covering many aspects.261 On one hand, he increased the professionalization of the regular army,260 necessary both to guarantee his military power in the capital and to ensure the availability of forces for his numerous campaigns, one of the sources of his political legitimacy.261 This policy de-emphasized levies and other non-professional troops, which he replaced with taxes used to support the professional troops—often saqalibas260 or Maghrebis—which freed the natives of al-Andalus from military service.14261262 Recruitment of saqalibas and Berbers was not new, but Almanzor expanded it.260263264 On the other hand, he created new units, unlike the regular army of the Caliphate, that were faithful primarily to himself263 and served to control the capital.261 Emir Abd al-Rahman I had already used Berbers and saqalibas for a permanent army of forty thousand to end the conflicts that hitherto had plagued the emirate.265 At the time of Emir Muhammad I, the army reached thirty-five to forty thousand combatants, half of them Syrian military contingents.266 This massive hiring of mercenaries and slaves meant that, according to Christian chroniclers, "ordinarily the Saracen armies amount to 30, 40, 50, or 60,000 men, even when in serious occasions they reach 100, 160, 300 and even 600,000 fighters." 267 In fact, it has been argued that, in Almanzor's time, the Cordovan armies could muster six hundred thousand laborers and two hundred thousand horses "drawn from all provinces of the empire."268
In order to eliminate a possible threat to his power and to improve military efficiency, Almanzor abolished the system of tribal units30269270 that had been in decline due to lack of Arabs and institution of pseudo-feudalism on the frontiers,271 in which the different tribes each had their own commander and that had caused continuous clashes, and replaced it with mixed units272 without clear loyalty under orders from Administration officials.273 The nucleus of the new army, however, was formed increasingly by Maghrebi Berber forces.262264271 The ethnic rivalries among Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Andalusi army were skillfully used by Almanzor to maintain his own power264—for example, by ordering that every unit of the army consist of diverse ethnic groups so that they would not unite against him;274 and thus preventing the emergence of possible rivals.275 However, once their centralizing figure disappeared, these units were one of the main causes of the 11th-century civil war called the Fitna of al-Andalus.275 Berber forces were also joined by contingents of well-paid Christian mercenaries,276 who formed the bulk of Almanzor's personal guard and participated in his campaigns in Christian territories.277 Almanzor's completion of this reform, begun by his predecessors, fundamentally divided the population into two unequal groups: a large mass of civilian taxpayers and a small professional military caste, generally from outside the peninsula.278
The increase in military forces and their partial professionalization led to an increase in financial expenses to sustain them.260 This represented an additional incentive to carry out campaigns, which produced loot and land with which to pay the troops.277 These lands, when handed over to the soldiers as payment, were thereafter subject to tribute and ceased to operate under a system of border colonization.279280 The Caliphal army was funded by the taxpaying farmers in exchange for military exemptions, and consisted of local recruits as well as foreign mercenaries – Berber militias, Slav and Black slaves, mercenary Christian companies and jihadi volunteers.281 At that time al-Andalus was known as Dar Jihad, or "country of jihad", and attracted many volunteers, and though these were relatively few compared to the total army, their zeal in combat more than compensated for this.282
According to modern studies, these mercenary contingents made it possible to increase the total size of the Caliphal army from thirty or fifty thousand troops in the time of Abd al-Rahman III to fifty or ninety thousand.266283284 Others, like Évariste Lévi-Provençal, argue that the Cordoban armies in the field with the Almanzor were between thirty-five thousand and seventy or seventy-five thousand soldiers.281285 Contemporary figures are contradictory: some accounts claim that their armies numbered two hundred thousand horsemen and six hundred thousand foot soldiers, while others talk about twelve thousand horsemen, three thousand mounted Berbers and two thousand sūdān, African light infantry.214 According to the chronicles, in the campaign that swept Astorga and León, Almanzor led twelve thousand African and five thousand Al Andalus horsemen, and forty thousand infantry.268 It is also said that, in his last campaigns, he mobilized forty-six thousand horsemen, while another six hundred guarded the train, twenty-six thousand infantry, two hundred scouts or 'police' and one hundred and thirty drummers.286 or that the garrison of Cordoba consisted of 10,500 horsemen and many others kept the northern border in dispersed detachments.276 However, it is much more likely that the leader's armies, even in their most ambitious campaigns, may not have exceeded twenty thousand men.276 It can be argued that until the eleventh century no Muslim army on campaign exceeded thirty thousand troops, while during the eighth century the trans-Pyrenean expeditions totaled ten thousand men and those carried out against Christians in the north of the peninsula were even smaller.266
In the time of Emir Al-Hakam I, a palatine guard of 3000 riders and 2000 infantry was created, all Slavic slaves.287 This proportion between the two types of troops was maintained until Almanzor's reforms. The massive incorporation of North African horsemen relegated the infantry to sieges and fortress garrisons.288 This reform led to entire tribes, particularly Berber riders, being moved to the peninsula.289
The main weapon of the peninsular campaigns, which required speed and surprise, was the light cavalry.270 To try to counteract them, the Castilians created the role of "villain knights" – ennobling those free men who were willing to keep a horse to increase the mounted units – through the Fuero de Castrojeriz of 974.270 For similar reasons, the Barcelonan count Borrell II created the figure of the homes of paratge- who obtained privileged military status by fighting against the Cordobans armed on horseback – after losing their capital in the fall of 985.290 In contrast to the prominent role the navy had played in previous decades under Abd al-Rahman III,291 under Almanzor it served only as a means of transporting ground troops,292 such as between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, or Alcácer do Sal's ships in the campaign against Santiago de Compostela in 997.292
During this time, military industry flourished in factories around Córdoba.282 It was said to be able to produce a thousand bows and twenty thousand arrows monthly,282284 and 1300 shields282 and three thousand campaign stores annually.282284
As for the fleet, its network of ports was reinforced with a new base in the Atlantic, in Alcácer do Sal, which protected the area of Coimbra, recovered in the 980s, and served as the origin of the units that participated in the campaign against Santiago.279 On the Mediterranean shore, the naval defense was centered at the base of al-Mariya, now Almería.293 The dockyards of the fleet had been built in Tortosa in 944.294
Initially the maritime defense of the Caliphate was led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Rumahis, a veteran admiral who had served Al-Hakam II and was Qadi of Elvira159 and Pechina.293 He repulsed raids by al-Magus (idolaters) or al-Urdumaniyun ('men of the north', vikings),295 in the west of al-Andalus in mid-971;296 at the end of that year, when they tried to invade Al Andalus,297 the admiral left Almería and defeated them off the coast of Algarve.298 In April 973, he transported the army of Ghalib from Algeciras299 to subdue the rebellious tribes of the Maghreb and end Fatimid ambitions in that area.300 To ensure control of the military, Almanzor eliminated the main figures who could have opposed his reforms:279 in addition to the death of Ghalib, the participation of the governor of Zaragoza in the plot of his eldest son served as a justification to replace him155 with another, more amenable, member of the same clan, the Banu Tujib.226301 The admiral of the fleet,302 who maintained a significant budget, was poisoned303 in January 980304 and replaced by a man faithful to Almanzor.159301
As in the Army he encouraged the recruitment of Berbers faithful to him, so in the Administration he favored the saqalibas to the detriment of native officials, again with the aim of surrounding himself with personnel loyal only to him.14
Land transport routes were dotted with strongholds,282 since ancient Al Andalus dignitaries sought to control communications.305 Messengers were bought in Sudan and specially trained to handle Almanzor's messages and to transmit the official reports that his foreign ministries wrote about the annual campaigns.305
The Caliphate ruled by Almanzor was a rich and powerful state. According to Colmeiro, it is estimated that in a pre-industrial society, for every million inhabitants, ten thousand soldiers could be mustered. Even assuming the chronicles exaggerated tenfold the real numbers – these speak of eight hundred thousand soldiers – the caliphate could have had eight million inhabitants.268 Those who use more bullish criteria estimate between seven306 and ten307 million, but the population was probably much fewer.306268 Traditionally speaking, around the year 1000, the caliphate occupied four hundred thousand square kilometers and was populated by three million souls.308 By comparison, the Iberian Christian states comprised one hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers and half a million people.309 By the 10th century, 75% of the population under the Umayyads had converted to Islam, a number reaching 80% two centuries later.310 By comparison, at the time of the Muslim invasion, Spain had about four million inhabitants, although there is no shortage of historians who would raise that estimate to seven or eight million.310
His realm also had large cities like Córdoba, which surpassed one hundred thousand inhabitants; Toledo, Almería and Granada, which were around thirty thousand; and Zaragoza, Valencia and Málaga, all above fifteen thousand.306 This contrasted sharply with the Christian north of the peninsula, which lacked large urban centers.311
Defense of religious orthodoxy and legitimation of power
One of the instruments Almazor used to strengthen his power was his court,30 at which writers and poets celebrated his virtues—praise that was used as propaganda among the people.312
The stability and prosperity of the regime and its rigorous defense of Islam, which Almanzor showed through various pious gestures, gave him popular support.278 Also numbered among these gestures were copying a Koran that he took with him during his campaigns,145313 and the expansion of the mosque of Cordoba (987–990).278314 The political ambitions of the chamberlain had important repercussions on culture and religion, which he was forced to support.312 His image as Islam's leader led to the censorship of some sciences considered non-Islamic, and to the purging from Al-Hakam's important library of works considered heretical.145168278315316 His political interests required him to ingratiate himself with the lawyers when his power was still unsteady, and led him to censure logic, philosophy and astrology, despite his appreciation for culture.317 His meddling in religious matters led to the appointment of his own uncle, himself a veteran qadi, as the principal qadi after the death of the hostile Ibn Zarb, who had opposed some of his proposals.318 The main expression of his defense of religion, however, was his military campaigns against the Christian states, a method of legitimization that the caliphs had used before but which Almanzor took to extremes.278 Successive victories, despite their transient benefits to the realm, had a great propaganda effect,319 both in the Caliphate and in the enemy states of the north.320 To each crisis of his political career, he responded with large and/or multiple military campaigns.319
The campaigns also had a beneficial economic effect because of the loot – especially abundant slaves – obtained by them and because of the security they granted to the borders.321
The Maghreb campaigns
The meager Cordoban cereal production forced the Umayyads to obtain stocks from the Maghreb, and, thus, to oppose Fatimid expansion in the region, which jeopardized their supply.322 At stake was commercial control of the western Mediterranean.323 Unlike his campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula and with the exception of the one carried out jointly with Ghalib at the beginning of his career, Almanzor did not take a personal role in the fighting in the Maghreb, but simply a supervisory one.313 The effective direction of the fight was in the hands of subordinates, whom he would ceremonially accompany to Algeciras to see off the troops as they crossed the strait.313
Abd al-Rahman III had conquered Ceuta and Tangier and fortified them in 951, but he had not been able to prevent the Fatimids from taking control of the Maghreb in 958–959, after burning the Umayyad fleet in Almería in 955.323 In 971, Umayyad clients suffered another heavy defeat.324 The Fatimid march to Egypt around 972 benefitted the Umayyads, who were left facing a Fatimid client, the Sanhaja Berber Buluggin ibn Ziri.323324
The Caliphate's strategy began by the fortification of Ceuta, manned by a large garrison.325 In May of 978,326 the Zenata tribes seized the city of Sijilmasa, at the northern end of the trans-Saharan gold, salt and textile trading routes, and where they founded a pro-Córdoba principality ruled by Jazrun ibn Fulful,325 the city's conqueror.327328 The success of the Umayyad political machine, continued by Almanzor,325 allowed him to concentrate the offensive power of the Berber tribes on the expansion of the regions that recognized his legitimacy and limited clashes among those accepting Córdoba's protection.327 This conquest, which gave great prestige to Hisham and Almanzor—and affronted the Fatimids because it was the city where its founder had appeared before the Berber Kutama tribe329—allowed them to counteract the influence of the Fatimids who, after moving to Egypt, had left these regions under the control of the Zirid dynasty.330 Ibn Ziri launched a victorious campaign that temporarily disrupted the Zenata and allowed him to recover much of the Western Maghreb before besieging Ceuta.303331 The refugees there asked for help from Almanzor, who sent a large army that he accompanied as far as Algeciras, to repulse Ibn Ziri, who decided to retire303 although he continued harassing Umayyad supporters until his death in 984.331 The effects of Ibn Ziri's inroads, however, were transient: at his death most of the tribes of the region once again accepted Cordoban religious authority.304
In 985, before the Idrisid Al-Hasan ibn Kannun, who had proclaimed himself Caliph, returned from his refuge in the Fatimid court in Egypt, Almanzor saw off a new army that crossed the Maghreb to confront him under command of his cousin.303332333334 Reinforcements were later dispatched, commanded by the eldest son of Almanzor, and his father-in-law, the governor of Zaragoza.303332333 Overwhelmed, the Idrisid negotiated his surrender and proceeded to the Cordoban court,332 but Almanzor had him assassinated on his way to the city, and later executed335 his cousin who had granted safe conduct to the rebel.303333336
The disagreements among the various tribal leaders loyal to the Umayyads did produce one crisis: the favor shown by Almanzor to Ziri ibn Atiyya of the Maghrawa Berbers upset other chiefs, who ended up rising in arms. They defeated the Cordoban governor of Fez, who died in combat, and Ibn Atiyya in April 991.335337 After this defeat, Almanzor understood the need to grant control of the region to local Berber leaders instead of trying to govern through Iberian delegates.338 This strategy aimed to attract the support of local tribes to the Umayyads.338 Fundamentally, the fate of the campaigns depended on the changing loyalties of the various tribal leaders, although, in general, the Zenata supported the Umayyads while the Sanhaja supported the Fatimids.330338 Almanzor unsuccessfully attempted to divide the territory between Ibn Attiya and another tribal chief who had abandoned the Fatimids—the uncle of al-Mansur ibn Buluggin, son and successor of Buluggin ibn Ziri.335338339 So, Almanzor gave all lands controlled by the Caliphate to Ibn Atiyya,340320 who managed to defeat the rebels and supporters of the Fatimids in 994,340341 and founded a small principality centered on Oujda.320340341
The crisis between Almanzor and the royal family in 996–998 caused a confrontation between him and Ibn Atiyya,251342 who considered Almanzor's attitude towards the Caliph to be disrespectful.341343 Seeing in Ibn Atiyya a threat to his power, Almanzor dismissed him330344 and sent forces to combat him.251340342345 The Banu Maghrawa, the Banu Ifran and Banu Miknasa joined the Al Andalus forces landing at Tangier,340 soon receiving reinforcements commanded by the Almanzor's son,344346 already chamberlain.345 At the beginning of August 998, Almanzor himself went to Algeciras with the numerous reinforcements destined to participate in the campaign.256347 In October 998, Abd al-Malik managed to defeat Ibn Atiyya and put him to flight,345348 although Almanzor still sought local support for the Umayyad administration.349 Until his death, however, the territorial government remained in the hands of successive Iberian officials.348
The campaigns in the Maghreb also had an important consequence for Iberian politics: Almanzor brought Berber troops and warlords to the peninsula,330 both to form his personal troops and as contingents in the campaigns against Christian territories.349 Some of these leaders were even named viziers, which did not prevent their occasional fall from grace.349
Campaigns against Christians
Raids
General characteristics
Since the death of Ramiro II of León in 950, his kingdom along with the kingdom of Pamplona and the county of Barcelona had been forced to recognize Cordoba's sovereignty through an annual tribute, with default resulting in reprisal campaigns.350 Almanzor began carrying these out in 977 and he continued to do so until his death in 1002,351 although most were concentrated in his later years when he was most powerful.350 In parallel with the Maghreb campaigns, Almanzor was devoted to the war against the Christian kingdoms of Iberia. Although the various sources are in conflict on the precise details, it is estimated that he made about fifty-six campaigns,352353354 twenty of these being in the first period from 977 to 985.355 In these offensives, Almanzor balanced attacks on centers of political and economic power with those against sites of religious importance.356 The famous raids, cavalry strikes and aceiphas, literally "summer campaigns" and called by the Christians cunei, had as their tactical and economic objective the taking of captives and cattle from the enemy; strategically they sought to generate a state of permanent insecurity that prevented Christians from developing an organized life outside of castles, fortified cities or their immediate vicinity.357 Their main feature was the short duration of the campaigns and the remoteness of the points reached by them.356 In spite of the military success of the many incursions, they failed to prevent in the long term ruin of the state.320358 Although they halted the advance of Christian repopulation and dismantled important fortresses and cities, they failed to significantly alter the boundaries359 because Almanzor rarely occupied the territories he plundered.360361
The region most affected and vulnerable to the campaigns was the Douro valley.362 This was the destination for Christian settlers who were driven to repopulate it due to demographic pressure in Asturias,363 the heartland of the kingdom. This area was protected by the Cantabrian Mountains, a narrow strip of land364 that nonetheless could defend itself—unlike Leon or Galicia, which were more vulnerable to Moorish cavalry raids.365 In fact, Almanzor's campaigns reached all of Christian Spain with the exception of the Cantabrian coast, and contributed to León and Galicia coming more solidly under the sovereignty of the Asturian Crown,365 but still with great autonomy, due to the weakness of the kingdom's expansion.364
First campaigns with Ghalib
The first eight campaigns were carried out with the support of his father-in-law Ghalib.366 Among them were three in the Salamanca lands (two in 977 and one in 978), another against Cuéllar (the same year), one against Pamplona and Barcelona (the long summer campaign of 978), one against Zamora (or maybe Ledesma, according to other authors, in the spring of 979) and one against Sepúlveda (in the summer of 979, which he could not take, although he razed its surroundings).367 The eighth was one in which he accompanied to Algeciras the forces destined to Maghreb, between September 979 and early 980.368
The ninth campaign, in the spring of 980, was that during which the rupture between Almanzor and Ghalib took place and is known as "the one of betrayal" for Ghalib's surprise assault on Almanzor's son-in-law at Atienza.369 The confrontation followed a short raid through Castilla.369 The next four offensives (one in the fall of 980, two in the spring370 of the following year and one in the summer371) took place during the conflict between the two rivals.372 During the last campaign – that of Almanzor's victory over Ghalib, he regained control of the fortresses of Atienza and Calatayud, held by partisans of his rival.373
Weakening of León and harassment of the Castilian border
As a result of the defeat of Ghalib in the summer of 981, Almanzor's forces continued their advance, looting and destroying the lands around Zamora374375 at the end of the summer.373 Later, they defeated Pamplona, León and Castile at the Battle of Rueda376377 (or Roa378) and recovered Simancas,377 which was razed.355379380381 The loss of Simancas disrupted the Christian defensive line along the Duero, which later campaigns eventually dismantled.382 These losses, along with Almanzor's support for rivals to the Leonine crown, first Bermudo383384 against the weakened Ramiro III355 and later rival counts, one of which briefly took the throne, plunged León into a political crisis that it submitted to Almanzor for arbitration.382385 In general, Almanzor supported the noble families opposed to the monarch of the moment to take advantage of intra-Leonese squabbles.386 From 977, he launched attacks into León's territories almost annually.378
The Galician and Portuguese counts, hostile to Ramiro III as they had been to his father, sought to appease Almanzor after the Trancoso and Viseu campaign387 of the beginning of the winter of 981387 and for this they sought to impose a new king, Bermudo II,388 crowned in October 982389 in Santiago while Almanzor pillaged380390 the outskirts of León.391 Castile and León, continually exposed to Cordoban assaults, on the other hand, supported Ramiro.383 In 983, Almanzor plundered the area surrounding Salamanca in the fall, after failing to take it,382 and Sacramenia at the beginning of winter,383388392393 slaughtering the men and taking the rest of the population captive.394 In his attempt to halt the Christian advance south of the Duero, he continued assailing the Leonese and Castilian positions in this area and the most important points of repopulation, such as Zamora (984)395388 or Sepúlveda the same year,396 razed before he fell on Barcelona.397398 The destruction of Sepúlveda forced Ramiro to submit to Córdoba in 985, the year of his death389 due to natural causes, as Bermudo had done before.399 Bermudo's submission had been accompanied by that of other Portuguese and Galician counts.400 This imposed the presence of Cordoban forces on the Leonese kingdom, as a protectorate, which it remained until 987.389
In 982, he launched the "campaign of the three nations' possibly against Castile, Pamplona and the GironaFranks,408409 that forced the king of Pamplona, Sancho II to give to Almanzor a daughter,204410411 who would take the name Abda.320384 This union would produce the last of Almanzor's political dynasty, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo.204231320384410412 In 985, exploiting the subjugation of León and Castile, he attacked Barcelona,381408413 which he managed to take in early July, treating it harshly.400414 Almanzor had previously attacked the region in the summer of 978,169 when for several months he ravaged the plains of Barcelona and parts of Tarragona, conquered by the Barcelona counts some decades earlier.415 In an almost three-month-long campaign,396 he captured the city with the help of the fleet, imprisoned Viscount Udalard I and Archdeacon Arnulf and sacked the monasteries of Sant Cugat del Vallés and Sant Pere de les Puelles.414
New campaigns against León and Castile
In 987, he made two campaigns against Coimbra, conquering it during the second on 28 June.381404416417 Unlike previous offensives, focused on looting and destruction, this time he repopulated the area with Muslims, who held the area until 1064.418 In 988 and 989, he again ravaged the Leonese Duero valley.381418 He assaulted Zamora, Toro, León381 and Astorga, which controlled access to Galicia,419 and forced Bermudo to take refuge among the Galician counts.420
After concentrating most of his attacks on León, he went on to launch his forces against Castile from 990, previously the object of only four of thirty-one campaigns.222 The west of León would, however, suffer one last attack in December 990, in which Montemor-o-Velho and Viseu, on the defensive line of the Mondego River, were surrendered, probably as punishment for the asylum that Bermudo had granted to the Umayyad "Piedra Seca".421 The failed collusion of his son Abd Allah and the governors of Toledo and Zaragoza triggered a change of objective.222 Fearing his father's anger over his participation in the plot along with the arrested governor of Zaragoza, Abd Allah had fled to take refuge with count García Fernández of Castile.422 As punishment and to force the surrender of his son, the chamberlain took and armed Osma381 in August.218226423 The broad raid achieved its goal and on 8 September, the Castilian count returned to Abdullah to his father424 in return for a two-year truce.425 Moving on from Castile, the following year he attacked the kingdom of Pamplona.198426 Sancho II tried to appease the Cordoban leader with a visit to the capital of the Caliphate410 at the end of 992,231426427428 but this failed to prevent his lands from being subject to a new foray in 994.429430431432 The last half of the decade saw general submission of Pamplona to the Caliphate along with its repeated attempts to avoid any punitive Cordoban campaigns.433
In 993 Almanzor attacked Castile again, for unknown reasons, but failed to take San Esteban de Gormaz,434 simply looting its surroundings.431435 He succeeded in taking it the following year, along with Clunia.381434435436 The loss of San Esteban dismantled Castilian defenses along the Douro, while the taking of Clunia endangered lands south of the Arlanza.437
At the end of 994, on the occasion of the wedding between Bermudo II and a daughter of the Castilian count,438 Almanzor took León437 and Astorga,381 the Leonese capital since 988, and devastated the territory, perhaps also intending to facilitate a future campaign against Santiago de Compostela.439 In May 995,440 the Castilian Count Garcia Fernandez was wounded and taken prisoner381427441 in a skirmish near the Duero and, despite the care of his captors, he died in Medinaceli.438442443 He was succeeded by his prudent son Sancho,444 who had fought with Córdoba against his father427445 and managed to maintain an informal truce444 with the Caliphate between 995 and 1000.438446 The ties between Castile and the chamberlain were sealed with delivery of one of the new count's sisters to Almanzor as a wife or concubine.438 Urraca Sanchez, nicknamed "the Basque", adopted the Arabic name Abda after being given to Almanzor by her father Sancho II of Pamplona. Urraca and Almanzor had a single son, named Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo that became chief minister of Hisham II, Caliph of Córdoba. As retribution for the support of the former count by the Banu Gómez, counts of Saldaña and former allies of Córdoba, their seat of Carrión was attacked in a raid that reached the monastery of San Román de Entrepeñas.447 At the end of 995, a new incursion against Aguiar,448 southeast of Porto, forced Bermudo II to return the former Umayyad conspirator "Piedra Seca."447448
Santiago de Compostela and his later campaigns
In 996, he again launched a raid on León and destroyed Astorga439 to force them to resume the tribute payments.447449 In the summer of 997, he devastated Santiago de Compostela,381386450 after the Bishop, Pedro de Mezonzo, evacuated the city.451 In a combined operation involving his own land troops, those of Christian allies452 and the fleet,453 Almanzor's forces reached the city in mid-August.451 They burned the pre-Romanesque temple dedicated to the apostle James the Great,453 and said to contain his tomb.19381386451 The prior removal of the saint's relics allowed the continuity of the Camino de Santiago, a pilgrimage route that had begun to attract pilgrims in the previous century.454 The campaign was a great triumph for the chamberlain at a delicate political moment, as it coincided with the breakdown of his long alliance with Subh.386 The Leonese setback was so great that it allowed Almanzor to settle a Muslim population in Zamora on his return from Santiago,451 while the bulk of the troops in Leonese territory remained in Toro.455 He then imposed peace terms on the Christian magnates that allowed him to forego campaigning in the north in 998, the first year this happened since 977.455
In 999, he made his last foray to the eastern borderlands, where, after passing through Pamplona,347 he sacked Manresa and the plains of Bages.456457 In April he attacked the County of Pallars,347 governed by the kin of the mother of count Sancho García of Castile.458 It is suggested that the attacks could have been triggered by the Pamplonan king and Catalan counts ceasing to pay tribute to Córdoba, taking advantage of Almanzor's distraction in crushing Ziri ibn Atiyya.457
Also in 999, the death of Bermudo II in September produced a new minority in León through the ascent to the throne of Alfonso V,347459 but this did not prevent the formation of a broad anti-Córdoba alliance that united not just the people of Pamplona and Castile,427460 but also the ancient Christian clients of Almanzor.356 Sancho of Castile, until then a faithful ally who had managed to avoid the incursions of Córdoba into his territory, joined the alliance459 and provoked Almanzor into launching an attack.461 To his great surprise, the Castilian Count assembled a large force bringing together his own troops and those of his allies,459462 who intercepted the Córdoban units north of Clunia463 in a strong defensive position.461 In the hard-fought battle of Cervera427 (29 July 1000),356460464465 Almanzor's side gained the victory,465466 after the rout of much of his army462463 through the intervention of eight hundred cavalry.467468
After the victory, at the end of the year Almanzor made another strike at the western border, where he took Montemor-o-Velho on December 2, 1000,469470 after overcoming fierce resistance.471 For its part, the kingdom of Pamplona suffered several attacks after the defeat of Cervera,472 in 1000 and again in 1001 and 1002.473 After Cervera, Almanzor accelerated the number of strikes, despite being sick462468 and needing to be carried on a litter at times.473
His last campaign, also victorious, was made in 1002,381468 when he was mortally ill, having suffered from gouty arthritis for twenty years.354472474 He aimed to avenge the quasi-rout of Cervera and punish the Castilian count Sancho, architect of the alliance that almost defeated him.475San Millán de la Cogolla, dedicated to the patron saint of Castile and in the territory of Pamplona, allied with Sancho, was sacked and burned; in Pamplona, Almanzor ordered a retreat due to his worsening health,381476 and he died en route to Córdoba before reaching the capital.354381472
The victorious campaigns of Almanzor were due to his skills as a military tactician and the army he commanded, which was a highly professionalized force of a size that dwarfed any counterattack that the Christian kings and counts could mount to meet him: "rarely above 1000 knights or 2000 or 3000 men in total." They had few weeks in spring or summer to gather what was often no more than a few hundred knights and men.477 "The most frequent average seems to have been a knight for every two or three auxiliary riders (squires and others) and one of these for every two or three peons."478 In those days an army of ten or fifteen thousand men – a third knights and the rest peons – was the maximum concentration of forces that a medieval ruler could muster when presenting battle.479 For example, Muslim campaigns had formations of only one thousand to ten thousand men.357 "An army of ten or fifteen thousand men is considered in every way exceptional and few historians would be willing to admit that on some occasion that number was actually reached by a host during a battle."479
In his campaigns Almanzor emphasized cavalry operations, so much so that he had reserved the islands of the Guadalquivir for horse breeding.283274 These marshes around Seville, Huelva and Cádiz had suitable pastures for raising horses.284480 Mules were imported from the Balearic Islands and camels from Africa, the latter raised in the semi-desert area between Murcia and Lorca.284 According to Vallvé, "Normally participating in his campaigns were twelve thousand horsemen, enrolled in the military hierarchy and provided, in addition to that customarily due the usual soldier, with a horse with their harnesses, weapons, accommodation, payments and bonuses for various expenses, and fodder for their horses, based on their role."286
Loot and slaves
Almanzor's campaigns were a continuation of a policy from emirate times: the capture of numerous contingents of Christian slaves, the famous esclavos or francos, in ArabicSaqtïliba or Saqáliba (plural of Siqlabi, "slave").481 These were the most lucrative part of the loot, and constituted an excellent method of paying the troops, so much so that many campaigns were little more than slave raids.482 From these came many eunuchs who were essential elements for handling harems; others were purchased already castrated in Verdun and disembarked in Pechina or Almería according to Liutprand of Cremona.483 However, the most valuable take was the beautiful girls, selected according to "the predilection they had for the blonde and redhead Galicians, Basques and Franks,"484 usually also described as having blue eyes, large breasts, wide hips, thick legs and perfect teeth485 that "the gynaecea of the royal families and the aristocracy supplied as concubines and legitimate wives."483 As in the case of the eunuchs, some slaves were bought from pirates attacking the Mediterranean coast, others came from Slavic or Germanic populations passing through several hands from Vikings, and there were also blacks imported from Sudan.486 Most of these slaves, however, were children who would be Islamized and assigned to work at court, including the work of eunuchs.483 Jews and, to a lesser extent, Muslims were involved in this lucrative trade, thanks to their ability as interpreters and ambassadors.483
During the rule of Almanzor's Amirí regime, the already-rich Al-Andalus slave market reached unprecedented proportions. For example, the Moorish chronicles mention that after destroying Barcelona in July 985, Almanzor brought seventy thousand chained Christians to the great market of Córdoba321 and, after destroying Simancas in July 983, he captured seventeen thousand women379 and imprisoned ten thousand nobles.378 Obviously, these figures must be carefully evaluated, but likewise given the enormity this type of trade reached during his tenure, Almanzor is described as "the slave importer".321 The commoners of Córdoba even asked his successor to stop the trade since, to get a good husband for their daughters they had to raise the dowries to exorbitant levels because the young Christian slaves were so numerous and cheap that many men preferred to buy them instead of marrying Muslims.487
Death and succession
Almanzor died on August 9, 1002472 of illness at the age of about sixty-five488489490 in Medinaceli.491 During his last days, the dying chamberlain commended the government of the caliphate to his son, who hurried to Córdoba after his death to take his father's position and avoid any fickle opposition from the supporters of the family of the Caliph.491 The Historia silense says:492
But, at last, divine piety took pity on such ruin and allowed Christians to lift their heads because, in the thirteenth year of his kingdom, after many and horrible massacres of Christians, he was taken away in Medinaceli, a great city, by the devil, who had possessed him in life, and buried in hell.
His body was covered with the linen shroud that his daughters had woven with their own hands from raw material derived from the income of the estate inherited from their ancestors in Torrox, seat of their lineage.278493 His remains were interred in the courtyard of the palace, covered by the dust278472 his servants had shaken from their clothes after each battle against the Christians.354488490493494 According to the Arab historian Ibn 'Idhari, the following verses were carved in marble as an epitaph:354472494
His exploits will teach you about him,
as if you saw it with your own eyes.
No one like him will ever given by God to the world again,
nor will anyone to defend the frontiers who compare with him.
The dynasty Almanzor founded continued with his son Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar,495 and then his other son, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo,496 who was unable to preserve the inherited power, and was murdered in 1009.7 The fall of the Amiris set off the Fitna of al-Andalus, a civil war that resulted in the disintegration of the centralized Caliphate into regional taifa kingdoms.7
Later, the legend of a defeat immediately prior to his death in a Battle of Calatañazor appeared first in the Estoria de España and was later adorned in other documents.497498499 Tradition holds that "in Calatañazor Almanzor lost the drum" (en Calatañazor Almanzor perdió el tambor) a term indicating that he there lost his joy because of the defeat that was inflicted.500501
Bibliography
Allen, William Edward David; ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, ʻAlī Ḥajjī (2002). González Campo, Mariano (ed.). Al-Ghazal y la embajada hispano-musulmana a los vikingos en el siglo IX. Madrid: Miraguano ediciones. p. 238. ISBN 9788478132386.
Arié, Rachel (1984). Historia de España. España Musulmana: siglos VIII-XV. Tomo III. Labor. p. 558. ISBN 9788433594235.
Ávila, María Luisa; Marín, Manuela (1997). Biografías y género biográfico en el Occidente Islámico. publisher CSIC – CSIC Press. p. 460. ISBN 9788400076450.
Bariani, Laura (2003). Almanzor. Nerea. p. 298. ISBN 9788489569850.
Baró Pazos, Juan; Serna Vallejo, Margarita (2002). El Fuero de Laredo en el octavo centenario de su concesión. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria. p. 605. ISBN 9788481023039.
Beladiez Navarro, Emilio (1959). Almanzor: un César andaluz. Madrid: Escelicer. p. 182.
De Bordejé Morencos, Federico Fernando (1992). "El Islam, la España musulmana y la mar". Revista de historia naval (39): 97–114. ISSN0212-467X.
Cardaillac, Louis (2002). Santiago Apóstol: El santo de los dos mundos. El Colegio de Jalisco. p. 371. ISBN 9789686255683.
Castellanos Gómez, Juan (2002). Geoestrategia en la España musulmana: las campañas militares de Almanzor. Ministerio de Defensa. p. 199. ISBN 9788478239672.
Colmeiro y Penido, Manuel (1863). Historia de la economía política en España. Tomo I. Madrid: Imprenta de Cipriano López. p. 508.
Cruz Hernández, Miguel (1992). El islam de Al-Ándalus: historia y estructura de su realidad social. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe. p. 654. ISBN 9788472326354.
Fletcher, Richard A. (1999). El Cid. Nerea. Traducido por Javier Sánchez García-Gutiérrez. p. 248. ISBN 9788489569294.
Fletcher, Richard (2000). La España mora. Translated by Julio Rodríguez Puértolas. Nerea. p. 213. ISBN 9788489569409.
Frers, Ernesto (2008). Más allá del legado pirata. Historia y leyenda de la piratería. La fabulosa aventura de los bandoleros del mar. Barcelona: Ediciones Robinbook. ISBN 978-84-7927-963-9.
Isla Frez, Amancio (2010). Ejército, sociedad y política en la Península Ibérica entre los siglos VII y XI (in Spanish). Madrid: Editorial CSIC. p. 245. ISBN 978-84-9781-574-1.
Jiménez Losantos, Federico (1999). Los nuestros: cien vidas en la historia de España. Barcelona: Planeta. p. 437. ISBN 978-84-08-03304-2.
Kennedy, Hugh (1996). Muslim Spain and Portugal: a political history of al-Andalus. Longman. p. 342. ISBN 978-0-582-49515-9.
Lirola Delgado, Jorge (1993). El poder naval de Al-Ándalus en la época del califato omeya. Granada: Universidad de Granada. p. 498. ISBN 978-84-338-1797-6.
Manzano Moreno, Eduardo (2018). Épocas medievales. Vol. 2 de la Historia de España, dirigida por Josep Fontana y Ramón Villares. Barcelona-Madrid: Crítica/Marcial Pons. ISBN 978-84-9892-808-2.
Martínez Enamorado, Virgilio; Torremocha Silva, Antonio (2001). Almanzor y su época: al-Ándalus en la segunda mitad del siglo X. Málaga: publisher Sarriá. p. 197. ISBN 978-84-95129-55-0.
Marín Guzmán, Roberto (2006). Sociedad, política y protesta popular en la España musulmana. publisher Universidad de Costa Rica. p. 611. ISBN 9789968936965.
Martínez Enamorado, Virgilio; Torremocha Silva, Antonio (2003). Almanzor y su época: al-Ándalus en la segunda mitad del siglo X. publisher Sarrià. p. 197. ISBN 9788495129550.
Matés Baco, Juan Manuel; Agustín González, Enciso (2006). Historia económica de España. Barcelona: publisher Ariel. p. 1020. ISBN 9788434445345.
Menéndez Bueyes, Luis Ramón (2006). Reflexiones críticas sobre el origen del reino de Asturias. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. p. 271. ISBN 9788478009336.
Mitre Fernández, Emilio (1979). La España medieval: sociedades, estados, culturas. Ediciones Akal. p. 392. ISBN 9788470900945.
Montaner Frutos, Alberto; Boix Jovaní, Alfredo (2005). Guerra en Šarq Al'andalus: las batallas cidianas de Morella (1084) y Cuarte (1094). Instituto de Estudios Islámicos y del Oriente Próximo. p. 342. ISBN 9788495736048.
Morales Romero, Eduardo (2004). Historia de los vikingos en España: ataques e incursiones contra los reinos cristianos y musulmanes de la Península Ibérica en los siglos IX-XI. Madrid: Miraguano Ediciones. p. 238. ISBN 978-84-7813-270-6.
Ríu Ríu, Manuel (1988). Historia de España: Edad Media (711–1500). Tomo II. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. Edición de José María Blázquez. p. 630. ISBN 978-84-239-5090-4.
Russell, Peter Edward; Carr, Raymond (1982). Introducción a la cultura hispánica: Historia, arte, música. Barcelona: publisher Crítica. p. 361. ISBN 978-84-7423-186-1.
Sánchez Candeira, Alfonso (1999). Rosa Montero Tejada (ed.). Castilla y León en el siglo XI, estudio del reinado de Fernando I (in Spanish). Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia. ISBN 978-84-8951241-2.
Suárez Fernández, Luis (1976). Historia de España: Antigua y Media. Tomo I. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp. p. 729. ISBN 978-84-321-1882-1.
Tapia Garrido, José Ángel (1976). Almería musulmana: hasta la conquista de Almería por Alfonso VII (711-1147 de J. C.). Tomo II. Almería: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Almería. p. 512.
Vallvé Bermejo, Joaquín (1992). El Califato de Córdoba. Madrid: publisher Mapfre. Edición de Elena Romero. p. 351. ISBN 978-8-47100-406-2.
Vara, Carlos (2012). Las Navas de Tolosa. Barcelona; Buenos Aires: Parkstone International. ISBN 978-84-350-4582-7.
Vernet Ginés, Juan (1979). Estudios sobre la historia de la ciencia medieval. Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. p. 508.
Weiner, Jack (2001). El Poema de mio Cid: el patriarca Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar trasmite sus genes. Kassel: Reichenberger. p. 172. ISBN 978-3-935004-38-1.
Manzano Moreno 2018, p. 245"Nuestro hombre no realizó su escalada hacia el poder en solitario, sino apoyado por una compleja red de relaciones familiares y políticas en las que se agrupaban algunas de las grandes familias de dignatarios que durante generaciones habían ostentado los principales cargos de la administración omeya. (…) Tan pronto como desapareció al-Halkam II, las grandes familias de la administración cordobesa decidieron resarcirse apoyando el encumbramiento de Almanzor. Su dominio puso fin a la influencia que los funcionarios eunucos y eslavos habían desarrollado hasta entonces" ↩
The abundance of place names derived from Arabic Turrux in Andalusia- mainly in the provinces of Málaga and Granada – has led several cities to mistakenly be designated as the birthplace of the Al-Andalus general.24↩
According to the law, the goods of those who died intestate and lacking a male relative or clear heir passed to the public treasury. The position held by Ibn Abi ʿĀmir had responsibility for supervising this. Given the complexity of Islamic inheritance law, it required detailed knowledge.53↩
His charge was the 'middle police' (as-surta al-wusta), probably responsible for the punishment of crimes that did not have a clear penalty in the Quran and the sunnah, as well as the spy service.58↩
Bariani places the death of the Caliph on the night of 30 September.72 The difference may be due to the fact that the Muslim day lasts from one evening to the next and thus does not coincide with the solar day.73↩
Castellanos Gómez disagrees with the identification of the targets of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's first two campaigns and indicates that the first attacked Baños de Montemayor and the second, La Muela, near Calatañazor.124↩
Ballestín Navarro indicates that the dismissal took place on March 26, 978, ten days after Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's wedding.140 Lévi Provençal gives a similar date, March 29.141↩
Vallvé Bermejo 1992, p. 125: "Normalmente participaban en sus aceifas doce mil hombres de a caballo, inscritos en la escalilla militar y a los que, además de la acostumbrada soldada, se les proporcionaban una caballería con sus arreos, armas, alojamiento, pagas y gratificaciones para diversos gastos, y forraje para las caballerías, según su categoría." ↩↩2
He did disrupt, albeit temporarily, the Leonese repopulation effort south of the Duero. In the Portuguese portion, the Leonese lost Viseu, Lamego and Coimbra and further east, the repopulated land around the Tormes. At the eastern end of the Duero, Almanzor seized a series of important fortresses such as Gormaz, Osma, Clunia (San Esteban) and finally the Castilian outpost of Sepúlveda. ↩
Maíllo Salgado, Felipe (1993). "Sobre la presencia de los muslimes en Castilla la Vieja en las Edades Medias". Seminario, repoblación y reconquista: actas del III Curso de Cultura Medieval. Aguilar de Campoo: Centro de Estudios del Románico, septiembre de 1991. Coordinación por José Luis Hernando Garrido & Miguel Ángel García Guinea, pp. 17–22, ISBN 84-600-8664-X. ↩
García Fitz, Francisco (2014). "La batalla de Las Navas de Tolosa: el impacto de un acontecimiento extraordinario"". In Patrice Cressier; Vicente Salvatierra Cuenca (eds.). Las Navas de Tolosa 1212–2012: miradas cruzadas. Universidad de Jaén. pp. 11–36. ISBN 978-84-8439-830-1. ↩
Montaner Frutos & Boix Jovaní 2005, p. 143: "La media más frecuente parece haber sido un caballero por cada dos o tres jinetes auxiliares (escuderos y otros) y de uno de estos por cada dos o tres peones." ↩
Montaner Frutos & Boix Jovaní 2005, p. 144: "Un ejército de diez o quince mil hombres se considera de todo punto excepcional y pocos historiadores estarían dispuestos a admitir que en alguna ocasión ese número fuera realmente alcanzado por una hueste durante una batalla." ↩↩2
Vallvé Bermejo 1992, p. 61: ". . . surtían los gineceos de la familia real y de la aristocracia como concubinas y esposas legítimas." ↩↩2↩3↩4
Holgado Cristeto, Belén (2010). "Tras las huellas de las mujeres cristianas de al-Ándalus". En Actas del Congreso Conocer Al-Ándalus: perspectivas desde el siglo XXI. Edición de María Mercedes Delgado Pérez & Gracia López Anguita. Sevilla: Alfar, pp. 110. ISBN 978-84-7898-338-4. ". . . la predilección que tenían por las rubias y pelirrojas gallegas, vasconas y francas." ↩
Bellido Bello, Juan Félix (2006). "El cuerpo de la mujer en la literatura andalusí". En Sin carne: representaciones y simulacros del cuerpo femenino: tecnología, comunicación y poder. Barcelona: ArCiBel, pp. 342. Edición de Mercedes Arriaga Flórez, Rodrigo Browne Sartori, José Manuel Estévez Saá y Víctor Silva Echeto. ISBN 978-84-935374-2-5. ↩
Martínez Díez 2005, p. 581Pero, al fin, la divina piedad se compadeció de tanta ruina y permitió alzar cabeza a los cristianos pues, en el año decimotercero de su reino, después de muchas y horribles matanzas de cristianos, fue arrebatado en Medinaceli, gran ciudad, por el demonio, que le había poseído en vida, y sepultado en el infierno. ↩
Abu ʿAmer Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Abi ʿAmer al-Maʿafiri (Arabic: أبو عامر محمد بن عبد الله بن أبي عامر المعافري), nicknamed al-Manṣūr (Arabic: المنصور, "the Victorious"),1 which is often Latinized as Almanzor in Spanish, Almansor in Catalan and Almançor in Portuguese (c. 938 – 8 August 1002),2 was a Muslim ArabAndalusi military leader and statesman. As the chancellor of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba and hajib (chamberlain) for Caliph Hisham II, Almanzor was effectively ruler of Islamic Iberia.
Born in Turrush to a family of Yemeni Arab origin with some juridical ancestors, ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for Córdoba when still young to be trained as a faqīh.3 After a few humble beginnings, he joined the court administration and soon gained the confidence of Subh, mother of the children of Caliph Al-Hakam II.4 Thanks to her patronage and his own efficiency, he quickly expanded his role.5
During the caliphate of Al-Hakam II, he held several important administrative positions, including director of the (967), administrator for Subh and her children, administrator for intestate inheritances, and quartermaster for the army of General (973). The death of the caliph in 976 marked the beginning of the domination of the Caliphate by this functionary, which continued beyond his death with the government of two of his sons, and , up to 1009. As chamberlain of the caliphate (from 978), he exercised extraordinary power in the al-Andalus state, throughout the and in part of the , while Caliph Hisham II was reduced to near-figurehead status.
His portentous rise to power has been explained by an insatiable thirst for dominance, but historian Eduardo Manzano Moreno warns that "it must be understood within the framework of the complex internal struggles that developed within the Umayyad administration."9 Deeply religious, he received the pragmatic support of Muslim authorities for his control of political power, though not without periodic tensions between them.10 The basis of his power was his defense of jihad,11 which he proclaimed in the name of the Caliph.12 His image as a champion of Islam served to justify his assumption of governmental authority.11
Having monopolized political dominance in the caliphate, he carried out profound reforms in both foreign and domestic politics.13 He made numerous victorious campaigns in both the Maghreb and Iberia.14 On the peninsula, his bloody and very destructive incursions against the Christian kingdoms temporarily halted their advance southward.14
Origins and youth
Although there are doubts about the exact date of his birth, everything seems to indicate that it occurred around the year 939.2151617 He was born into an Arab landowning family1 of Yemeni origin,181920 belonging to the al-Ma'afir tribe.1720 They had been established since the conquest of Visigothic Iberia in Torrox, a farm by the mouth of the Guadiaro river,1621222320 belonging to the cora (territorial subdivision) of al-Jazīrah (governed from al-Jazīrah al-Khaḍrāʾ الجزيرة الخضراء, the site of modern Algeciras).1719 His family had received lands there from Tariq ibn Ziyad as reward to an ancestor, Abd al-Malik, who had distinguished itself in the taking of Carteia during the Umayyad conquest of Hispania.1620222324
Some of the family had served as Qadis and jurists.120 The family's position improved significantly with the appointment of ibn Abi ʿĀmir's paternal grandfather as Qadi of Seville and his marriage to the daughter of a vizier, governor of Badajoz and doctor to Caliph Abd al-Rahman III.25 ibn Abi ʿĀmir's father, Abd Allah, was described as a pious, kind and ascetic man,26 who died in Tripoli20 while returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca.2728 His mother, Burayha, also belonged to an Arab family.20 Even so, the family was middle class, modest29 and provincial.30
Ascent in the Caliphal Court
Though still very young, Ibn Abi ʿAmir moved to Córdoba,31 where he developed his studies in law and letters under the tutelage of his maternal uncle.19202632 This training was intended to facilitate entering the state administration,19 because the opportunities for advancement in the military were limited to Arabs.29 Like many other youth from wealthy families, he received training in interpretation of the Quran, prophetic tradition and application of Sharia, thus completing his education as a faqīh,33 with the intention of becoming a judge,31 and from this time he retained his taste for literature.28 Instructed by renowned masters of Islamic legal tradition and letters, he showed talent in these studies.34
The death of his father and the bad family situation led him to abandon his studies and take the profession of scrivener.4 After occupying a modest position as a scribe along the alcázar and mosque of Córdoba – close to the offices of the Administration – to earn his livelihood,19 the youth soon stood out for his talent and ambition119 and he began his political career as a clerk in the audience chamber of the capital's chief Qadi, Muhammed ibn al-Salim,41934 an important advisor to the Caliph Al-Hakam II despite the fact that his positions were exclusively religious and not political.4 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir soon caught the attention of Vizier Ja'far al-Mushafi,35 head of the civil administration, who would introduce him to caliphal court, probably on the recommendation of Ibn al-Salim.19363738 Already noted for his knowledge and professional competence, he began to accumulate positions in the Administration.39 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, in his thirties,32 was one of the young functionaries who took part in a generational turnover of the court at the beginning of Al-Hakam's reign.37
In late February of 967,1940 he was given charge of Abd al-Rahman, son and heir of Al-Hakam II by his favorite,294142 the Basque43Subh (Aurora),144 a slave with very diverse training, from singing to Islamic jurisprudence to poetry, who owed her power to her ascendancy over the caliph as the mother of his children.40 With her, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir established a privileged relationship extremely beneficial for his career.36454647 Although his role was probably secondary,46 his responsibility managing the estates of the heir to the throne and those of his mother granted Ibn Abi ʿĀmir close proximity to the reigning family,48 and he quickly began to accumulate important positions.4950 Seven months after his first appointment, and thanks to the intercession of the royal favorite,47 he became director of the mint,474951 and in December 968,51 he was named treasurer of the vacant inheritances.36515253 The following year he was promoted to Qadi of Seville and Niebla,4754 one of the most important in the state, and at the death of his charge Abd al-Rahman in 970,46 he was placed in the same role for the young heir, Hisham.3641424652 By this time he had married the sister of the head of the caliphal guard, a client of the new heir,55 and began to accumulate wealth. A residence was built in al-Rusafa,56 near the former palace of Abd al-Rahman I, and he began to make sumptuous gifts to the Caliph's harem.57 He was accused of embezzlement4756 and removed from his post as head of the mint in March 972,58 but was helped financially to cover the alleged embezzlement.5657 He obtained a police command5659 and he retained his responsibility for the heir and intestate estates.60
In 973, he undertook the logistical, administrative and diplomatic aspects of the caliphal campaign against the Idrisids in the Maghreb,4661 with the official position of High Qadi of the Umayyad possessions in North Africa.56 The importance of the fleet in the campaign and its dependence on Seville, where Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was Qadi and therefore had responsibility for its facilities, and the confidence of the caliph himself and his chamberlain,62 facilitated his acquisition of this appointment.61 The commission brought with it authority over civilians and military personnel and, in practice, the supervision of the campaign.63 A primary responsibility of his role was to obtain the submission of the notables of the region by giving them formal gifts, the acceptance of which indicated their acceptance of the Caliph's authority and a promise of loyalty.46566264 Along with military victories, this undermined the enemy's position.6165
Achieving victory against the Idrisids, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir returned sick to the Cordoban court in September 974,64 intending to recover and resume his duties.66 He never returned to North Africa.64 His experience as a supervisor of the enlisted troops for the Maghreb campaign gave him an appreciation for their possible political utility if he gained control.66 It also allowed him to establish relations with the tribal leaders of the area67 and with his future powerful father-in-law, Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman,3546 who had led the military aspects of the operation.56666869 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's ability to manage organizational and economic aspects of the campaign was widely recognized,465668 and rewarded months before with his reappointment as head of the mint,68 and was the beginning of his political success.66 In the last months of Al-Hakam's illness, he appointed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir inspector of professional troops,56 which included the bulk of the Berbers brought from the Maghreb by the caliph to try to form a force loyal to his person, which guaranteed him access to the throne of the Caliph's young son.70
Taking power
Elimination of pretenders and formation of triumvirate
The death of Caliph Al-Hakam II on 1 October 97667717273 and the proclamation of his son Hisham as his successor inaugurated a new period in the political career of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,354674 and also represented a pivotal event in the history of the Caliphate, which thereafter was marked by his tenure75 and by the gradual withdrawal of the third Caliph.76 Al-Andalus went through a serious succession crisis at this time, because the designated successor, Hisham, born in 965, was too young to rule.7577 He had been only eight or nine years old in 974 when his father first introduced him to the process of government,78 and was still a minor when his father died.7980 This was an extraordinary situation because neither the emirate nor caliphate had previously been in the hands of a child.4681 Some schools of Islamic jurisprudence rejected the possibility of a minor becoming Caliph,75 but the Umayyad Al-Andalus tradition had secured the inheritance from parent to child,82 while the case of Abd al-Rahman III set a precedent for primogeniture.83 Faced with this situation, and despite the efforts of Al-Hakam during the last years of his reign to ensure the succession of his son by associating him with the tasks of government,4678848586 there was division on the succession.8788 Some favored the appointment of a regent, the chamberlain al-Mushafi, while others preferred to give the caliphal title to one of the brothers of the deceased Caliph, the twenty-seven-year-old al-Mughira,899091 who was the favorite younger son of Abd al-Rahman III.92
Two prominent Eastern European slaves (saqaliba) occupying important court positions – one, the uncle of the new Caliph93 – who were present at Al-Hakam's death decided to take action before this division was more widely known.9472 They moved to place al-Mughira on the throne,9596 with the condition that he name his nephew Hisham as his heir,97 and to remove the chamberlain, al-Mushafi,72987499100 thereby giving them ascendance at court over the faction supporting Hisham.9472 The two, who would nonetheless occupy prominent places in the ceremony proclaiming Hisham once their plan was thwarted,93101 had the support of the thousand saqalibas of the court and control of the palace guard.72100 The chamberlain, who was the real center of political power after the death of al-Hakam102 and even in the last years of his reign,19 had pretended to support the conspirators, only to subvert them thanks to the support of Berber troops.7297100103 He quickly broke up the plot with the help of Subh, and instructed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,728990104 then a senior official and member of the court with privileged access to the young Caliph and his mother, to murder the pretender.7496 The support of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, the right hand of Subh,105 for the young caliph was crucial to his rise to power.30
A reluctant but obedient102 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir surrounded al-Mughira's residence with a detachment of one hundred soldiers,106 broke in and notified al-Mughira of the death of al-Hakam and the enthronement of Hisham II.7299107 The young uncle of Hisham expressed his loyalty, and in the face of Almanzor's doubts, demanded compliance with the order for his own assassination.72104106107108 Al-Mughira was then strangled in front of his family101106 in the living room of his house, and hung on a beam of the roof of an adjacent structure as if he had committed suicide.107108 Al-Mushafi and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir thus fulfilled the wishes of their late master to ensure the accession of Hisham.104 The young Caliph's supporters relied on the Berber guard, created by al-Hakam for his son,70 to face the saqalibas, more than eight hundred of which were expelled from the palace as a result of the crisis.105
Hisham II was invested as caliph on or about Monday, 1 October 976,90109 with the title of al-Mu'ayyad bi-llah,75 ("one who receives the assistance of God").110 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir participated in the ceremony, recording in the minutes the oaths of fidelity the attendees made before the cadí.99101110111 A week later, 8 October 976, Hisham named al-Mushafi hajib71 – chamberlain or prime minister – and made the 36-year-old Ibn Abi ʿĀmir the vizier8699112 and delegate of the hajib.7489101113 The latter thus maintained a position of singular importance as the link between the new Caliph's mother, in practice representing the government during the minority of Hisham, and the administration headed by al-Mushafi.113 The power was effectively in the hands of a triumvirate formed by chamberlain al-Mushafi, the vizier Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and General Ghalib. Subh, who had been associated with them in the past and now ruled in a way on their behalf; this triumvirate reported all important matters to her and consulted her and acted with her permission. They knew very well that without her support they could not win and stay in power in the uncertain and dangerous political spiral of the court, so they tried very hard to please her.1 To boost the popularity of the new Caliph among the population, and strengthen their own positions, they abolished the unpopular oil tax.101
Ruin of al-Mushafi
While the alliance between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and al-Mushafi had undermined the traditional power of the court slaves,105106114 relations between the two soon deteriorated.115 The Chamberlain's failure to address the loss of prestige due to the succession intrigue and Christian incursions114116117118 that in 976 almost reached the capital89 allowed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir to gain control of army troops in the capital of the Caliphate46106112119120121 after assuring Subh of his ability to restore that military prestige.114115 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, unlike the chamberlain, was inclined towards the military response to Christian incursions and was willing to command a retaliatory strike.89118121 Al-Mushafi, however, had advocated a defensive strategy,118 that, despite Cordoban military power, had conceded the territories north of the Guadiana to the Christian states.116117 At the same time, and also thanks to the influence of Subh, Ghalib obtained the government of the Lower March and command of the border armies.112
In February 977,106120114122123124 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left the capital for his first campaigning season in Salamanca, following the strategy of containment of the Christian states maintained during the previous reign.115 His appointment as warden – head of an army – of the capital's troops drew him into alliance with Ghalib – the warden of the border armies – and brought about the end of the triumvirate that the two had formed with al-Mushafi.124125 In his first campaign, lasting nearly two months,122126 he plundered the outskirts of the baths at Baños de Ledesma.35127126116128 and brought two thousand captured prisoners to Córdoba, but failed to take any fortresses.89124 In autumn, he attacked Salamanca.35129130
Ibn Abi ʿĀmir won military prestige by repulsing Christian forces and attacking Cuéllar during a second 977 campaign,123124131 and Salamanca in the autumn of the same year,132133 not for conquest, but to weaken the enemy and gain domestic popularity.131 This new prestige allowed him to apply for the post of prefect of Córdoba, a role until then filled by a son of al-Mushafi.106125134135 The new military reputation of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, with the support of the harem and of Ghalib, allowed him to obtain the position without the chamberlain's consent.125134135136 This led to open confrontation between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, hitherto an apparent faithful and efficient servant of the chamberlain, and al-Mushafi.137136 The latter owed his power to the support of the previous caliph,126138 and lacked firm support, being considered an upstart by the leading families in Córdoba's governing administration.106126 He tried to counter the alliance between the other two members of the triumvirate by marrying another of his sons to Ghalib's daughter, Asma.112125134139137140 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who had won the favor of the cunning mother of the Caliph, of Ghalib, and of major families of the civil service,118 skillfully intervened, using the intercession of Subh and directly addressing Ghalib to encourage him to withdraw his initial approval112137138141 and instead allow Ibn Abi ʿĀmir himself to wed Ghalib's daughter.131136139142143 The magnificent wedding143 was held in the spring of 978,144 eight months after the signing of the marriage contract sealed the alliance between Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and marked the decline of the power of the chamberlain.131142 A few days after the wedding, Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for a new campaign targeting Salamanca.144145142143 Military successes increased the power of the two allies and further undermined the chamberlain at court.142 The two wardens received new titles as reward for their victories, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was named 'double vizier',143145146 for Interior and Defense, the two most important vizierships.147 Ghalib had been given the title of chamberlain at the end of 977 – an unprecedented situation as there had never been two chamberlains at the same time – depriving al-Mushafi of most of his duties,143 and al-Mushafi was subsequently dismissed131141139145148 and imprisoned.147 His relatives and supporters in positions of the Administration were arrested and his possessions confiscated.145147149 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir succeeded the defeated al-Mushafi as a second chamberlain for the Caliphate.144145150 The most important supporting positions were held by trusted people, in some cases family members.149 The elimination of the old chamberlain reduced the visibility of the Caliph, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir gradually became the intermediary between his lord and the rest of the world.151149 Aware that his power emanated from Hisham, Mansur was careful, however, to continue to maintain the appearance of the minor's sovereignty.152
Dissatisfaction with the royal minority and the regency fueled a new rebellion organized by prominent members of the court at the end of 978.153154 The conspirators intended to replace Hisham with one of his cousins,153154 a grandson of Abd al-Rahman III.108145155 An improvised attempt to stab the Caliph to death failed154155 and led to the brutal repression of the conspirators at the insistence of Subh and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, not without overcoming the resistance of major legal advisors.156157158 This ended attempts to replace the Caliph with another member of the Umayyad dynasty,159 resulting in the flight of any possible pretender from the capital,160 the close surveillance of members of the Umayyad family, and the construction139 the following year161 of a new fortified residence for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, Medina Alzahira162163 (the "Resplendent City"),164 work that went on until 989.157165 This new residence, located east of Córdoba,139161 housed troops loyal to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and the governmental administration139161166 and was the center of a sumptuous court.167 In addition, to calm the malaise among the faqīh caused by the repression of the conspirators against Hisham's legitimacy, in which some had colluded, he established a commission to expunge Al-Hakam's library.168
As a chamberlain, in the summer he had directed a new campaign that lasted more than two months, this time in the northeast against Pamplona and Barcelona.150169170 In the fall he made a new incursion into Ledesma lasting just over a month.133150 In May the following year, he directed a new campaign in this region.133171 The next incursion, during the summer, marched to Sepulveda.150172 In September 979,172 he sent troops from Algeciras to the aid of Ceuta, threatened by the victorious campaign of Buluggin ibn Ziri, supported by the Fatimids, against Umayyad clients in the Western Maghreb.173 Later, the city became the center of Algerian Maghreb politics.174
Showdown with Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman
Having crushed the opposition at court, the two co-leaders soon clashed.167175 The old general resented prostrating before Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,176177178 who had devoted himself to strengthening his power and controlling access to the caliph.179 Ghalib believed the maneuvers of his ally, including the construction of his new palatial residence, the reinforcement of the Berber military units, and his increasing control over the Caliph,179178 would eventually damage the dynasty.176 For his part, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir viewed his father-in-law's continued military prestige as obscuring his own military prowess, despite successive victorious campaigns.175 After several joint raids into Christian lands, mainly led by the veteran Ghalib despite the growing military experience of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, a confrontation erupted in the spring of 980,180181 over a campaign around Atienza.176177178182183 Betrayed by Ghalib and wounded, his life only saved through the intercession of the Qadi of Medinaceli,182 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir reacted by immediately attacking the fortress177184 where his father-in-law's family was,181 and looted it once taken.176183185 Almanzor continued north, but the confrontation with Ghalib, fortified in Atienza, ended the larger campaign, intended to be his second against Castile since 975.177180181 Ghalib was forced into exile in Christian territory.176183 In the fall, Mansur led a new offensive against 'Almunia', which is unidentified.186187 Then in 981, a year of great martial activity for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, he sent five military campaigns north, the first in February and March.186
After several clashes between the co-leaders that ended favorably for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,187 in April of 981, Ghalib, allied with Castile and Pamplona, defeated him.176183 In May, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir counterattacked after having united Berber troops, his own Cordoban men, and some of the border units that his enemy had long commanded.183185188189 Ghalib, meanwhile, had the backing of another part of the Caliphate's border forces and his Castilian and Navarese allies.188189190191192 On the verge of achieving victory over his son-in-law on in the Battle of Torrevicente on 10 July 981,193190179 Ghalib was found dead in a ravine without signs of violence.194195 He may have died of natural causes, being almost eighty years old.192 The troops of his rival, disconcerted by the death of their leader,179 largely passed to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's flag.190195 Ghalib's body was severely mutilated,191 first by his own troops at the direction of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who wanted to prove his enemy's death,190 and then exposed in Córdoba.196197 Several of his main allies were also killed in the battle,179 which gave the winner the nickname, Almanzor,198199 ("the Victorious"30196179191) by which he is known to history.200201 The passing of Ghalib made him sole chamberlain and allowed him to eliminate any possible opponents at court,202 although his legitimacy came only from his position as regent202 and the tolerance of the Caliph's mother.203 With the elimination of Ghalib, the power of the Caliph became concentrated in his person.20235188194
That same year, he looted Zamora and its surroundings in September.204205 A month later, he attacked Portuguese lands, probably Viseu.204206
Alliance with the queen mother and troubled government
For twenty years, until the breakup of his alliance with the caliph's powerful mother in 996,207 Ibn Abi ʿĀmir acted in part as her representative, advisor, treasurer, mediator, informant, and her commander of the armies and the police.208 It was she who made most of the decisions, in consultation with her son's regents. She was aware of all the political developments of the government and the court and was a dominant force in factional struggles. Subh had a lot of trust and affection for Almanzor, and her support for him was so obvious to everyone that it caused rumors that they were in love. From the reign of Caliph Al-Hakam II to the new Caliph Hisham, it was Subh's patronage, apart from his own ability, that promoted him and removed his opponents from the court.208
Despite years of competition at court for power and administration by others, however, the Caliph, upon reaching his majority, made no move to assume control,208 possibly due to some kind of illness or other inability to carry out the responsibilities of his position.209 The historian, Al-Dhahabi, attributes Almanzor's locking up the Caliph to the latter being "feeble minded, believing what can't be true".210 For example, someone brought him a piece of rock, saying it is from Jerusalem's site of the prophet's ascent to heaven. The Caliph rewarded him with a lot of gold. In another instance, someone presented him with a donkey's hoof, claiming it is Uzair's donkey, and he was also rewarded. Yet another person brought him hair, claiming it is the prophet's.211
Almanzor not only assumed the caliphal power, but also roles as guardian of the incapacitated Caliph and guarantor of dynastic power.209 The fact that he merely controlled the administration and army on behalf of Hisham, however, made him expendable, so he took steps to strengthen his position.212 The capital was placed in the hands of a cousin of his, who controlled it tightly,212 and he elevated a series of supporters, generally unpopular and considered despotic,213 who managed to gain control of various Taifas after the disintegration of the Caliphate.214 He also allied himself with important border lords.213
In 988 and 989 he had to face a double threat: a long drought215 that caused famine and forced him to apply some social measures to alleviate the shortage (delivery of bread or rescission of taxes, among others) and the emergence of a new rebellion against him in which his eldest 216 son sought to replace him.155199217218219 Almanzor managed to disrupt the conspiracy,220 which had been joined by the governor of Zaragoza, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muhammad of the Banu Tujib,220 and that of Toledo,219 an Umayyad descendant of Caliph Al-Hakam I,221 'Abd Allah bin Abd al-'Aziz al-Marwanid220 also known as Abdullah Piedra Seca,155199218222223 but his efforts to get his son to submit proved fruitless.224225226 The latter took refuge with the Castilians after the arrest of his fellow conspirators.227228226 Almanzor launched a successful campaign against Castile and took custody of his wayward son, who was tried and beheaded at dawn on 8 September 990.220217218225229230231232 Almanzor, still reeling from his eldest son's betrayal, disowned him,231 while also ordering those who had killed him at Almanzor's command to themselves be executed.221225233 The governor of Zaragoza would be executed in his presence while he spared the life of Piedra Seca—perhaps because Almanzor did not want to stain his hands with Umayyad blood.220
Almanzor also clashed with some of his enemy's satirical poets, including Abu Yafar al Mushafi (d. 982) and Yûsuf ibn Hârûn al-Ramâdî (d. 1012–3), known as Abû Ceniza. Persecuted and subsequently forgiven, Abû Ceniza went to Barcelona in 986. Ibrahim ibn Idrís al-Hassani also paid for his satire of Almanzor with exile in Africa. Almanzor threw the poet Abu Marwan al-Jaziri in prison, where he died in 1003.234
Almanzor, leader of al-Andalus
Rupture with Subh and concentration of political power
With Ghalib eliminated and Hisham unable to perform his duties as Caliph, Almanzor began to weigh preparing for the succession, and even the possibility of officially taking power.235 In 989, he tried unsuccessfully to have the faqīhs accept his home, Medina Alzahara, as a major mosque.165 From 991 he positioned his son Abd al-Malik in a similar way as Al-Hakam had done with Hisham, appointing him chamberlain198 and supreme warden of the Caliphate's armies, although Almanzor did not step aside from those roles himself.235 At the same time, he discreetly presented to the faqīhs who advised the senior Qadi the possibility that he himself might replace the Caliph236 because Hisham was incapable and no one else in the state could hold the position.235 The regency, formerly founded on Hisham's minority, could no longer be justified by his mere inability to carry out his functions.235 The opinion of the faqīhs, however, was negative:236 if not Hisham, according to the legal experts, power should devolve to another member of the tribe of Muhammad.17237 Almanzor reluctantly accepted the decision, and in the following years he gradually assumed even greater powers, corresponding to those of the Caliph: he confirmed the official appointments with his own seal rather than that of the Caliph, in spite of nominally acting on his behalf,238 he appointed a new mint official, appropriated new titles239 and moved part of the administration to Medina Alzahira.237 He also had his name mentioned after that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and maintained a court parallel to that of the sovereign at al-Zahira.30 In 991, under pressure from the chamberlain, the council of faqīhs changed their unfavorable opinion as to the conversion of Medina Alzahira into a major mosque,240 although its use continued to be frowned upon by many notable Cordobans.241
His attempts to seize power ended the long alliance between Almanzor and Subh in 996.229238242243 After twenty years as a representative of Subh, Almanzor confronted the Caliph's mother and her supporters. After the collapse of the alliance, Subh tried with all her might to eliminate Almanzor and united with all his opponents and enemies and divided the court into two factions, a group supporting Almanzor and the survival of his power and another group supporting Subh whose goal was to take over the government by her son.242243 The clash between the two cliques was triggered by Subh withdrawing eighty thousand dinars from the royal treasury to finance an uprising against the chamberlain.244245 Almanzor discovered this thanks to his agents in the palace,223242246 and he reacted by successfully petitioning the council of viziers and Faqīhs to transfer the treasury to his residence, Medina Alzahira, characterizing Subh's theft as a robbery by the harem.223242247 With Almanzor sick, Subh took over the palace and tried in vain to block the transfer.247248Abd al-Malik, Almanzor's son, won the support of the viziers. The Caliph repudiated the rebellion of his mother in late May 996, and Abd al-Malik took custody of both him and the treasure.248249250 Though the rebellion she headed on the peninsula lost steam due to loss of funding and the rapid defeat of its few supporters,251 the money she had previously taken allowed Subh to finance a rebellion in the Maghreb.243248252 Although Almanzor had not yet managed to quell this revolt by fall 997, it failed to gain any support on the peninsula.253
To reinforce his image and that of his son and successor, Almanzor organized a parade223 with the Caliph and his mother.243253254255 The gesture served to dispel any doubts about the support of the Caliph for Almanzor, and thus refuted the allegations of Ziri ibn Atiyya, launched from the Maghreb.255 After the procession, Hisham was locked up – with all the comforts but without power – in Medina Alzahira,253 where his mother was probably also imprisoned.207 Having lost her confrontation with her former ally, she died shortly thereafter in 999.207 Almanzor, who had renewed his oath of allegiance to the Caliph with the proviso that he delegate223239 his powers to his family,256 was strengthened. He sent his son to fight the North African rebellion,255256 and took charge of all administrative power.17253257 He counted on the approval of the religious leadership who, fearing possible civil war, supported Almanzor's position as guarantor of stability and of the throne of the impotent Hisham.207 State power was divided in two: with Almanzor blocking exercise of the symbolic and legitimate power of the Caliph, while that of the chamberlain and his successors, devoid of legitimacy for being Yemeni Mofarite and not of the Prophet's blood, controlled the Caliphate's policy.17
Reform of army and administration
The separation between the temporal power, held by Almanzor, and the spiritual, in the hands of Hisham as Caliph, increased the importance of military force, a symbol – along with the new majesty of the chamberlain's court, rival of that of the caliph himself – of the power of Almanzor, and an instrument to guarantee the payment of taxes.258
Almanzor successfully continued the military reforms begun by Al-Hakam259 and his predecessors,260 covering many aspects.261 On one hand, he increased the professionalization of the regular army,260 necessary both to guarantee his military power in the capital and to ensure the availability of forces for his numerous campaigns, one of the sources of his political legitimacy.261 This policy de-emphasized levies and other non-professional troops, which he replaced with taxes used to support the professional troops—often saqalibas260 or Maghrebis—which freed the natives of al-Andalus from military service.14261262 Recruitment of saqalibas and Berbers was not new, but Almanzor expanded it.260263264 On the other hand, he created new units, unlike the regular army of the Caliphate, that were faithful primarily to himself263 and served to control the capital.261 Emir Abd al-Rahman I had already used Berbers and saqalibas for a permanent army of forty thousand to end the conflicts that hitherto had plagued the emirate.265 At the time of Emir Muhammad I, the army reached thirty-five to forty thousand combatants, half of them Syrian military contingents.266 This massive hiring of mercenaries and slaves meant that, according to Christian chroniclers, "ordinarily the Saracen armies amount to 30, 40, 50, or 60,000 men, even when in serious occasions they reach 100, 160, 300 and even 600,000 fighters." 267 In fact, it has been argued that, in Almanzor's time, the Cordovan armies could muster six hundred thousand laborers and two hundred thousand horses "drawn from all provinces of the empire."268
In order to eliminate a possible threat to his power and to improve military efficiency, Almanzor abolished the system of tribal units30269270 that had been in decline due to lack of Arabs and institution of pseudo-feudalism on the frontiers,271 in which the different tribes each had their own commander and that had caused continuous clashes, and replaced it with mixed units272 without clear loyalty under orders from Administration officials.273 The nucleus of the new army, however, was formed increasingly by Maghrebi Berber forces.262264271 The ethnic rivalries among Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Andalusi army were skillfully used by Almanzor to maintain his own power264—for example, by ordering that every unit of the army consist of diverse ethnic groups so that they would not unite against him;274 and thus preventing the emergence of possible rivals.275 However, once their centralizing figure disappeared, these units were one of the main causes of the 11th-century civil war called the Fitna of al-Andalus.275 Berber forces were also joined by contingents of well-paid Christian mercenaries,276 who formed the bulk of Almanzor's personal guard and participated in his campaigns in Christian territories.277 Almanzor's completion of this reform, begun by his predecessors, fundamentally divided the population into two unequal groups: a large mass of civilian taxpayers and a small professional military caste, generally from outside the peninsula.278
The increase in military forces and their partial professionalization led to an increase in financial expenses to sustain them.260 This represented an additional incentive to carry out campaigns, which produced loot and land with which to pay the troops.277 These lands, when handed over to the soldiers as payment, were thereafter subject to tribute and ceased to operate under a system of border colonization.279280 The Caliphal army was funded by the taxpaying farmers in exchange for military exemptions, and consisted of local recruits as well as foreign mercenaries – Berber militias, Slav and Black slaves, mercenary Christian companies and jihadi volunteers.281 At that time al-Andalus was known as Dar Jihad, or "country of jihad", and attracted many volunteers, and though these were relatively few compared to the total army, their zeal in combat more than compensated for this.282
According to modern studies, these mercenary contingents made it possible to increase the total size of the Caliphal army from thirty or fifty thousand troops in the time of Abd al-Rahman III to fifty or ninety thousand.266283284 Others, like Évariste Lévi-Provençal, argue that the Cordoban armies in the field with the Almanzor were between thirty-five thousand and seventy or seventy-five thousand soldiers.281285 Contemporary figures are contradictory: some accounts claim that their armies numbered two hundred thousand horsemen and six hundred thousand foot soldiers, while others talk about twelve thousand horsemen, three thousand mounted Berbers and two thousand sūdān, African light infantry.214 According to the chronicles, in the campaign that swept Astorga and León, Almanzor led twelve thousand African and five thousand Al Andalus horsemen, and forty thousand infantry.268 It is also said that, in his last campaigns, he mobilized forty-six thousand horsemen, while another six hundred guarded the train, twenty-six thousand infantry, two hundred scouts or 'police' and one hundred and thirty drummers.286 or that the garrison of Cordoba consisted of 10,500 horsemen and many others kept the northern border in dispersed detachments.276 However, it is much more likely that the leader's armies, even in their most ambitious campaigns, may not have exceeded twenty thousand men.276 It can be argued that until the eleventh century no Muslim army on campaign exceeded thirty thousand troops, while during the eighth century the trans-Pyrenean expeditions totaled ten thousand men and those carried out against Christians in the north of the peninsula were even smaller.266
In the time of Emir Al-Hakam I, a palatine guard of 3000 riders and 2000 infantry was created, all Slavic slaves.287 This proportion between the two types of troops was maintained until Almanzor's reforms. The massive incorporation of North African horsemen relegated the infantry to sieges and fortress garrisons.288 This reform led to entire tribes, particularly Berber riders, being moved to the peninsula.289
The main weapon of the peninsular campaigns, which required speed and surprise, was the light cavalry.270 To try to counteract them, the Castilians created the role of "villain knights" – ennobling those free men who were willing to keep a horse to increase the mounted units – through the Fuero de Castrojeriz of 974.270 For similar reasons, the Barcelonan count Borrell II created the figure of the homes of paratge- who obtained privileged military status by fighting against the Cordobans armed on horseback – after losing their capital in the fall of 985.290 In contrast to the prominent role the navy had played in previous decades under Abd al-Rahman III,291 under Almanzor it served only as a means of transporting ground troops,292 such as between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, or Alcácer do Sal's ships in the campaign against Santiago de Compostela in 997.292
During this time, military industry flourished in factories around Córdoba.282 It was said to be able to produce a thousand bows and twenty thousand arrows monthly,282284 and 1300 shields282 and three thousand campaign stores annually.282284
As for the fleet, its network of ports was reinforced with a new base in the Atlantic, in Alcácer do Sal, which protected the area of Coimbra, recovered in the 980s, and served as the origin of the units that participated in the campaign against Santiago.279 On the Mediterranean shore, the naval defense was centered at the base of al-Mariya, now Almería.293 The dockyards of the fleet had been built in Tortosa in 944.294
Initially the maritime defense of the Caliphate was led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Rumahis, a veteran admiral who had served Al-Hakam II and was Qadi of Elvira159 and Pechina.293 He repulsed raids by al-Magus (idolaters) or al-Urdumaniyun ('men of the north', vikings),295 in the west of al-Andalus in mid-971;296 at the end of that year, when they tried to invade Al Andalus,297 the admiral left Almería and defeated them off the coast of Algarve.298 In April 973, he transported the army of Ghalib from Algeciras299 to subdue the rebellious tribes of the Maghreb and end Fatimid ambitions in that area.300 To ensure control of the military, Almanzor eliminated the main figures who could have opposed his reforms:279 in addition to the death of Ghalib, the participation of the governor of Zaragoza in the plot of his eldest son served as a justification to replace him155 with another, more amenable, member of the same clan, the Banu Tujib.226301 The admiral of the fleet,302 who maintained a significant budget, was poisoned303 in January 980304 and replaced by a man faithful to Almanzor.159301
As in the Army he encouraged the recruitment of Berbers faithful to him, so in the Administration he favored the saqalibas to the detriment of native officials, again with the aim of surrounding himself with personnel loyal only to him.14
Land transport routes were dotted with strongholds,282 since ancient Al Andalus dignitaries sought to control communications.305 Messengers were bought in Sudan and specially trained to handle Almanzor's messages and to transmit the official reports that his foreign ministries wrote about the annual campaigns.305
The Caliphate ruled by Almanzor was a rich and powerful state. According to Colmeiro, it is estimated that in a pre-industrial society, for every million inhabitants, ten thousand soldiers could be mustered. Even assuming the chronicles exaggerated tenfold the real numbers – these speak of eight hundred thousand soldiers – the caliphate could have had eight million inhabitants.268 Those who use more bullish criteria estimate between seven306 and ten307 million, but the population was probably much fewer.306268 Traditionally speaking, around the year 1000, the caliphate occupied four hundred thousand square kilometers and was populated by three million souls.308 By comparison, the Iberian Christian states comprised one hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers and half a million people.309 By the 10th century, 75% of the population under the Umayyads had converted to Islam, a number reaching 80% two centuries later.310 By comparison, at the time of the Muslim invasion, Spain had about four million inhabitants, although there is no shortage of historians who would raise that estimate to seven or eight million.310
His realm also had large cities like Córdoba, which surpassed one hundred thousand inhabitants; Toledo, Almería and Granada, which were around thirty thousand; and Zaragoza, Valencia and Málaga, all above fifteen thousand.306 This contrasted sharply with the Christian north of the peninsula, which lacked large urban centers.311
Defense of religious orthodoxy and legitimation of power
One of the instruments Almazor used to strengthen his power was his court,30 at which writers and poets celebrated his virtues—praise that was used as propaganda among the people.312
The stability and prosperity of the regime and its rigorous defense of Islam, which Almanzor showed through various pious gestures, gave him popular support.278 Also numbered among these gestures were copying a Koran that he took with him during his campaigns,145313 and the expansion of the mosque of Cordoba (987–990).278314 The political ambitions of the chamberlain had important repercussions on culture and religion, which he was forced to support.312 His image as Islam's leader led to the censorship of some sciences considered non-Islamic, and to the purging from Al-Hakam's important library of works considered heretical.145168278315316 His political interests required him to ingratiate himself with the lawyers when his power was still unsteady, and led him to censure logic, philosophy and astrology, despite his appreciation for culture.317 His meddling in religious matters led to the appointment of his own uncle, himself a veteran qadi, as the principal qadi after the death of the hostile Ibn Zarb, who had opposed some of his proposals.318 The main expression of his defense of religion, however, was his military campaigns against the Christian states, a method of legitimization that the caliphs had used before but which Almanzor took to extremes.278 Successive victories, despite their transient benefits to the realm, had a great propaganda effect,319 both in the Caliphate and in the enemy states of the north.320 To each crisis of his political career, he responded with large and/or multiple military campaigns.319
The campaigns also had a beneficial economic effect because of the loot – especially abundant slaves – obtained by them and because of the security they granted to the borders.321
The Maghreb campaigns
The meager Cordoban cereal production forced the Umayyads to obtain stocks from the Maghreb, and, thus, to oppose Fatimid expansion in the region, which jeopardized their supply.322 At stake was commercial control of the western Mediterranean.323 Unlike his campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula and with the exception of the one carried out jointly with Ghalib at the beginning of his career, Almanzor did not take a personal role in the fighting in the Maghreb, but simply a supervisory one.313 The effective direction of the fight was in the hands of subordinates, whom he would ceremonially accompany to Algeciras to see off the troops as they crossed the strait.313
Abd al-Rahman III had conquered Ceuta and Tangier and fortified them in 951, but he had not been able to prevent the Fatimids from taking control of the Maghreb in 958–959, after burning the Umayyad fleet in Almería in 955.323 In 971, Umayyad clients suffered another heavy defeat.324 The Fatimid march to Egypt around 972 benefitted the Umayyads, who were left facing a Fatimid client, the Sanhaja Berber Buluggin ibn Ziri.323324
The Caliphate's strategy began by the fortification of Ceuta, manned by a large garrison.325 In May of 978,326 the Zenata tribes seized the city of Sijilmasa, at the northern end of the trans-Saharan gold, salt and textile trading routes, and where they founded a pro-Córdoba principality ruled by Jazrun ibn Fulful,325 the city's conqueror.327328 The success of the Umayyad political machine, continued by Almanzor,325 allowed him to concentrate the offensive power of the Berber tribes on the expansion of the regions that recognized his legitimacy and limited clashes among those accepting Córdoba's protection.327 This conquest, which gave great prestige to Hisham and Almanzor—and affronted the Fatimids because it was the city where its founder had appeared before the Berber Kutama tribe329—allowed them to counteract the influence of the Fatimids who, after moving to Egypt, had left these regions under the control of the Zirid dynasty.330 Ibn Ziri launched a victorious campaign that temporarily disrupted the Zenata and allowed him to recover much of the Western Maghreb before besieging Ceuta.303331 The refugees there asked for help from Almanzor, who sent a large army that he accompanied as far as Algeciras, to repulse Ibn Ziri, who decided to retire303 although he continued harassing Umayyad supporters until his death in 984.331 The effects of Ibn Ziri's inroads, however, were transient: at his death most of the tribes of the region once again accepted Cordoban religious authority.304
In 985, before the Idrisid Al-Hasan ibn Kannun, who had proclaimed himself Caliph, returned from his refuge in the Fatimid court in Egypt, Almanzor saw off a new army that crossed the Maghreb to confront him under command of his cousin.303332333334 Reinforcements were later dispatched, commanded by the eldest son of Almanzor, and his father-in-law, the governor of Zaragoza.303332333 Overwhelmed, the Idrisid negotiated his surrender and proceeded to the Cordoban court,332 but Almanzor had him assassinated on his way to the city, and later executed335 his cousin who had granted safe conduct to the rebel.303333336
The disagreements among the various tribal leaders loyal to the Umayyads did produce one crisis: the favor shown by Almanzor to Ziri ibn Atiyya of the Maghrawa Berbers upset other chiefs, who ended up rising in arms. They defeated the Cordoban governor of Fez, who died in combat, and Ibn Atiyya in April 991.335337 After this defeat, Almanzor understood the need to grant control of the region to local Berber leaders instead of trying to govern through Iberian delegates.338 This strategy aimed to attract the support of local tribes to the Umayyads.338 Fundamentally, the fate of the campaigns depended on the changing loyalties of the various tribal leaders, although, in general, the Zenata supported the Umayyads while the Sanhaja supported the Fatimids.330338 Almanzor unsuccessfully attempted to divide the territory between Ibn Attiya and another tribal chief who had abandoned the Fatimids—the uncle of al-Mansur ibn Buluggin, son and successor of Buluggin ibn Ziri.335338339 So, Almanzor gave all lands controlled by the Caliphate to Ibn Atiyya,340320 who managed to defeat the rebels and supporters of the Fatimids in 994,340341 and founded a small principality centered on Oujda.320340341
The crisis between Almanzor and the royal family in 996–998 caused a confrontation between him and Ibn Atiyya,251342 who considered Almanzor's attitude towards the Caliph to be disrespectful.341343 Seeing in Ibn Atiyya a threat to his power, Almanzor dismissed him330344 and sent forces to combat him.251340342345 The Banu Maghrawa, the Banu Ifran and Banu Miknasa joined the Al Andalus forces landing at Tangier,340 soon receiving reinforcements commanded by the Almanzor's son,344346 already chamberlain.345 At the beginning of August 998, Almanzor himself went to Algeciras with the numerous reinforcements destined to participate in the campaign.256347 In October 998, Abd al-Malik managed to defeat Ibn Atiyya and put him to flight,345348 although Almanzor still sought local support for the Umayyad administration.349 Until his death, however, the territorial government remained in the hands of successive Iberian officials.348
The campaigns in the Maghreb also had an important consequence for Iberian politics: Almanzor brought Berber troops and warlords to the peninsula,330 both to form his personal troops and as contingents in the campaigns against Christian territories.349 Some of these leaders were even named viziers, which did not prevent their occasional fall from grace.349
Campaigns against Christians
Raids
General characteristics
Since the death of Ramiro II of León in 950, his kingdom along with the kingdom of Pamplona and the county of Barcelona had been forced to recognize Cordoba's sovereignty through an annual tribute, with default resulting in reprisal campaigns.350 Almanzor began carrying these out in 977 and he continued to do so until his death in 1002,351 although most were concentrated in his later years when he was most powerful.350 In parallel with the Maghreb campaigns, Almanzor was devoted to the war against the Christian kingdoms of Iberia. Although the various sources are in conflict on the precise details, it is estimated that he made about fifty-six campaigns,352353354 twenty of these being in the first period from 977 to 985.355 In these offensives, Almanzor balanced attacks on centers of political and economic power with those against sites of religious importance.356 The famous raids, cavalry strikes and aceiphas, literally "summer campaigns" and called by the Christians cunei, had as their tactical and economic objective the taking of captives and cattle from the enemy; strategically they sought to generate a state of permanent insecurity that prevented Christians from developing an organized life outside of castles, fortified cities or their immediate vicinity.357 Their main feature was the short duration of the campaigns and the remoteness of the points reached by them.356 In spite of the military success of the many incursions, they failed to prevent in the long term ruin of the state.320358 Although they halted the advance of Christian repopulation and dismantled important fortresses and cities, they failed to significantly alter the boundaries359 because Almanzor rarely occupied the territories he plundered.360361
The region most affected and vulnerable to the campaigns was the Douro valley.362 This was the destination for Christian settlers who were driven to repopulate it due to demographic pressure in Asturias,363 the heartland of the kingdom. This area was protected by the Cantabrian Mountains, a narrow strip of land364 that nonetheless could defend itself—unlike Leon or Galicia, which were more vulnerable to Moorish cavalry raids.365 In fact, Almanzor's campaigns reached all of Christian Spain with the exception of the Cantabrian coast, and contributed to León and Galicia coming more solidly under the sovereignty of the Asturian Crown,365 but still with great autonomy, due to the weakness of the kingdom's expansion.364
First campaigns with Ghalib
The first eight campaigns were carried out with the support of his father-in-law Ghalib.366 Among them were three in the Salamanca lands (two in 977 and one in 978), another against Cuéllar (the same year), one against Pamplona and Barcelona (the long summer campaign of 978), one against Zamora (or maybe Ledesma, according to other authors, in the spring of 979) and one against Sepúlveda (in the summer of 979, which he could not take, although he razed its surroundings).367 The eighth was one in which he accompanied to Algeciras the forces destined to Maghreb, between September 979 and early 980.368
The ninth campaign, in the spring of 980, was that during which the rupture between Almanzor and Ghalib took place and is known as "the one of betrayal" for Ghalib's surprise assault on Almanzor's son-in-law at Atienza.369 The confrontation followed a short raid through Castilla.369 The next four offensives (one in the fall of 980, two in the spring370 of the following year and one in the summer371) took place during the conflict between the two rivals.372 During the last campaign – that of Almanzor's victory over Ghalib, he regained control of the fortresses of Atienza and Calatayud, held by partisans of his rival.373
Weakening of León and harassment of the Castilian border
As a result of the defeat of Ghalib in the summer of 981, Almanzor's forces continued their advance, looting and destroying the lands around Zamora374375 at the end of the summer.373 Later, they defeated Pamplona, León and Castile at the Battle of Rueda376377 (or Roa378) and recovered Simancas,377 which was razed.355379380381 The loss of Simancas disrupted the Christian defensive line along the Duero, which later campaigns eventually dismantled.382 These losses, along with Almanzor's support for rivals to the Leonine crown, first Bermudo383384 against the weakened Ramiro III355 and later rival counts, one of which briefly took the throne, plunged León into a political crisis that it submitted to Almanzor for arbitration.382385 In general, Almanzor supported the noble families opposed to the monarch of the moment to take advantage of intra-Leonese squabbles.386 From 977, he launched attacks into León's territories almost annually.378
The Galician and Portuguese counts, hostile to Ramiro III as they had been to his father, sought to appease Almanzor after the Trancoso and Viseu campaign387 of the beginning of the winter of 981387 and for this they sought to impose a new king, Bermudo II,388 crowned in October 982389 in Santiago while Almanzor pillaged380390 the outskirts of León.391 Castile and León, continually exposed to Cordoban assaults, on the other hand, supported Ramiro.383 In 983, Almanzor plundered the area surrounding Salamanca in the fall, after failing to take it,382 and Sacramenia at the beginning of winter,383388392393 slaughtering the men and taking the rest of the population captive.394 In his attempt to halt the Christian advance south of the Duero, he continued assailing the Leonese and Castilian positions in this area and the most important points of repopulation, such as Zamora (984)395388 or Sepúlveda the same year,396 razed before he fell on Barcelona.397398 The destruction of Sepúlveda forced Ramiro to submit to Córdoba in 985, the year of his death389 due to natural causes, as Bermudo had done before.399 Bermudo's submission had been accompanied by that of other Portuguese and Galician counts.400 This imposed the presence of Cordoban forces on the Leonese kingdom, as a protectorate, which it remained until 987.389
In 982, he launched the "campaign of the three nations' possibly against Castile, Pamplona and the GironaFranks,408409 that forced the king of Pamplona, Sancho II to give to Almanzor a daughter,204410411 who would take the name Abda.320384 This union would produce the last of Almanzor's political dynasty, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo.204231320384410412 In 985, exploiting the subjugation of León and Castile, he attacked Barcelona,381408413 which he managed to take in early July, treating it harshly.400414 Almanzor had previously attacked the region in the summer of 978,169 when for several months he ravaged the plains of Barcelona and parts of Tarragona, conquered by the Barcelona counts some decades earlier.415 In an almost three-month-long campaign,396 he captured the city with the help of the fleet, imprisoned Viscount Udalard I and Archdeacon Arnulf and sacked the monasteries of Sant Cugat del Vallés and Sant Pere de les Puelles.414
New campaigns against León and Castile
In 987, he made two campaigns against Coimbra, conquering it during the second on 28 June.381404416417 Unlike previous offensives, focused on looting and destruction, this time he repopulated the area with Muslims, who held the area until 1064.418 In 988 and 989, he again ravaged the Leonese Duero valley.381418 He assaulted Zamora, Toro, León381 and Astorga, which controlled access to Galicia,419 and forced Bermudo to take refuge among the Galician counts.420
After concentrating most of his attacks on León, he went on to launch his forces against Castile from 990, previously the object of only four of thirty-one campaigns.222 The west of León would, however, suffer one last attack in December 990, in which Montemor-o-Velho and Viseu, on the defensive line of the Mondego River, were surrendered, probably as punishment for the asylum that Bermudo had granted to the Umayyad "Piedra Seca".421 The failed collusion of his son Abd Allah and the governors of Toledo and Zaragoza triggered a change of objective.222 Fearing his father's anger over his participation in the plot along with the arrested governor of Zaragoza, Abd Allah had fled to take refuge with count García Fernández of Castile.422 As punishment and to force the surrender of his son, the chamberlain took and armed Osma381 in August.218226423 The broad raid achieved its goal and on 8 September, the Castilian count returned to Abdullah to his father424 in return for a two-year truce.425 Moving on from Castile, the following year he attacked the kingdom of Pamplona.198426 Sancho II tried to appease the Cordoban leader with a visit to the capital of the Caliphate410 at the end of 992,231426427428 but this failed to prevent his lands from being subject to a new foray in 994.429430431432 The last half of the decade saw general submission of Pamplona to the Caliphate along with its repeated attempts to avoid any punitive Cordoban campaigns.433
In 993 Almanzor attacked Castile again, for unknown reasons, but failed to take San Esteban de Gormaz,434 simply looting its surroundings.431435 He succeeded in taking it the following year, along with Clunia.381434435436 The loss of San Esteban dismantled Castilian defenses along the Douro, while the taking of Clunia endangered lands south of the Arlanza.437
At the end of 994, on the occasion of the wedding between Bermudo II and a daughter of the Castilian count,438 Almanzor took León437 and Astorga,381 the Leonese capital since 988, and devastated the territory, perhaps also intending to facilitate a future campaign against Santiago de Compostela.439 In May 995,440 the Castilian Count Garcia Fernandez was wounded and taken prisoner381427441 in a skirmish near the Duero and, despite the care of his captors, he died in Medinaceli.438442443 He was succeeded by his prudent son Sancho,444 who had fought with Córdoba against his father427445 and managed to maintain an informal truce444 with the Caliphate between 995 and 1000.438446 The ties between Castile and the chamberlain were sealed with delivery of one of the new count's sisters to Almanzor as a wife or concubine.438 Urraca Sanchez, nicknamed "the Basque", adopted the Arabic name Abda after being given to Almanzor by her father Sancho II of Pamplona. Urraca and Almanzor had a single son, named Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo that became chief minister of Hisham II, Caliph of Córdoba. As retribution for the support of the former count by the Banu Gómez, counts of Saldaña and former allies of Córdoba, their seat of Carrión was attacked in a raid that reached the monastery of San Román de Entrepeñas.447 At the end of 995, a new incursion against Aguiar,448 southeast of Porto, forced Bermudo II to return the former Umayyad conspirator "Piedra Seca."447448
Santiago de Compostela and his later campaigns
In 996, he again launched a raid on León and destroyed Astorga439 to force them to resume the tribute payments.447449 In the summer of 997, he devastated Santiago de Compostela,381386450 after the Bishop, Pedro de Mezonzo, evacuated the city.451 In a combined operation involving his own land troops, those of Christian allies452 and the fleet,453 Almanzor's forces reached the city in mid-August.451 They burned the pre-Romanesque temple dedicated to the apostle James the Great,453 and said to contain his tomb.19381386451 The prior removal of the saint's relics allowed the continuity of the Camino de Santiago, a pilgrimage route that had begun to attract pilgrims in the previous century.454 The campaign was a great triumph for the chamberlain at a delicate political moment, as it coincided with the breakdown of his long alliance with Subh.386 The Leonese setback was so great that it allowed Almanzor to settle a Muslim population in Zamora on his return from Santiago,451 while the bulk of the troops in Leonese territory remained in Toro.455 He then imposed peace terms on the Christian magnates that allowed him to forego campaigning in the north in 998, the first year this happened since 977.455
In 999, he made his last foray to the eastern borderlands, where, after passing through Pamplona,347 he sacked Manresa and the plains of Bages.456457 In April he attacked the County of Pallars,347 governed by the kin of the mother of count Sancho García of Castile.458 It is suggested that the attacks could have been triggered by the Pamplonan king and Catalan counts ceasing to pay tribute to Córdoba, taking advantage of Almanzor's distraction in crushing Ziri ibn Atiyya.457
Also in 999, the death of Bermudo II in September produced a new minority in León through the ascent to the throne of Alfonso V,347459 but this did not prevent the formation of a broad anti-Córdoba alliance that united not just the people of Pamplona and Castile,427460 but also the ancient Christian clients of Almanzor.356 Sancho of Castile, until then a faithful ally who had managed to avoid the incursions of Córdoba into his territory, joined the alliance459 and provoked Almanzor into launching an attack.461 To his great surprise, the Castilian Count assembled a large force bringing together his own troops and those of his allies,459462 who intercepted the Córdoban units north of Clunia463 in a strong defensive position.461 In the hard-fought battle of Cervera427 (29 July 1000),356460464465 Almanzor's side gained the victory,465466 after the rout of much of his army462463 through the intervention of eight hundred cavalry.467468
After the victory, at the end of the year Almanzor made another strike at the western border, where he took Montemor-o-Velho on December 2, 1000,469470 after overcoming fierce resistance.471 For its part, the kingdom of Pamplona suffered several attacks after the defeat of Cervera,472 in 1000 and again in 1001 and 1002.473 After Cervera, Almanzor accelerated the number of strikes, despite being sick462468 and needing to be carried on a litter at times.473
His last campaign, also victorious, was made in 1002,381468 when he was mortally ill, having suffered from gouty arthritis for twenty years.354472474 He aimed to avenge the quasi-rout of Cervera and punish the Castilian count Sancho, architect of the alliance that almost defeated him.475San Millán de la Cogolla, dedicated to the patron saint of Castile and in the territory of Pamplona, allied with Sancho, was sacked and burned; in Pamplona, Almanzor ordered a retreat due to his worsening health,381476 and he died en route to Córdoba before reaching the capital.354381472
The victorious campaigns of Almanzor were due to his skills as a military tactician and the army he commanded, which was a highly professionalized force of a size that dwarfed any counterattack that the Christian kings and counts could mount to meet him: "rarely above 1000 knights or 2000 or 3000 men in total." They had few weeks in spring or summer to gather what was often no more than a few hundred knights and men.477 "The most frequent average seems to have been a knight for every two or three auxiliary riders (squires and others) and one of these for every two or three peons."478 In those days an army of ten or fifteen thousand men – a third knights and the rest peons – was the maximum concentration of forces that a medieval ruler could muster when presenting battle.479 For example, Muslim campaigns had formations of only one thousand to ten thousand men.357 "An army of ten or fifteen thousand men is considered in every way exceptional and few historians would be willing to admit that on some occasion that number was actually reached by a host during a battle."479
In his campaigns Almanzor emphasized cavalry operations, so much so that he had reserved the islands of the Guadalquivir for horse breeding.283274 These marshes around Seville, Huelva and Cádiz had suitable pastures for raising horses.284480 Mules were imported from the Balearic Islands and camels from Africa, the latter raised in the semi-desert area between Murcia and Lorca.284 According to Vallvé, "Normally participating in his campaigns were twelve thousand horsemen, enrolled in the military hierarchy and provided, in addition to that customarily due the usual soldier, with a horse with their harnesses, weapons, accommodation, payments and bonuses for various expenses, and fodder for their horses, based on their role."286
Loot and slaves
Almanzor's campaigns were a continuation of a policy from emirate times: the capture of numerous contingents of Christian slaves, the famous esclavos or francos, in ArabicSaqtïliba or Saqáliba (plural of Siqlabi, "slave").481 These were the most lucrative part of the loot, and constituted an excellent method of paying the troops, so much so that many campaigns were little more than slave raids.482 From these came many eunuchs who were essential elements for handling harems; others were purchased already castrated in Verdun and disembarked in Pechina or Almería according to Liutprand of Cremona.483 However, the most valuable take was the beautiful girls, selected according to "the predilection they had for the blonde and redhead Galicians, Basques and Franks,"484 usually also described as having blue eyes, large breasts, wide hips, thick legs and perfect teeth485 that "the gynaecea of the royal families and the aristocracy supplied as concubines and legitimate wives."483 As in the case of the eunuchs, some slaves were bought from pirates attacking the Mediterranean coast, others came from Slavic or Germanic populations passing through several hands from Vikings, and there were also blacks imported from Sudan.486 Most of these slaves, however, were children who would be Islamized and assigned to work at court, including the work of eunuchs.483 Jews and, to a lesser extent, Muslims were involved in this lucrative trade, thanks to their ability as interpreters and ambassadors.483
During the rule of Almanzor's Amirí regime, the already-rich Al-Andalus slave market reached unprecedented proportions. For example, the Moorish chronicles mention that after destroying Barcelona in July 985, Almanzor brought seventy thousand chained Christians to the great market of Córdoba321 and, after destroying Simancas in July 983, he captured seventeen thousand women379 and imprisoned ten thousand nobles.378 Obviously, these figures must be carefully evaluated, but likewise given the enormity this type of trade reached during his tenure, Almanzor is described as "the slave importer".321 The commoners of Córdoba even asked his successor to stop the trade since, to get a good husband for their daughters they had to raise the dowries to exorbitant levels because the young Christian slaves were so numerous and cheap that many men preferred to buy them instead of marrying Muslims.487
Death and succession
Almanzor died on August 9, 1002472 of illness at the age of about sixty-five488489490 in Medinaceli.491 During his last days, the dying chamberlain commended the government of the caliphate to his son, who hurried to Córdoba after his death to take his father's position and avoid any fickle opposition from the supporters of the family of the Caliph.491 The Historia silense says:492
But, at last, divine piety took pity on such ruin and allowed Christians to lift their heads because, in the thirteenth year of his kingdom, after many and horrible massacres of Christians, he was taken away in Medinaceli, a great city, by the devil, who had possessed him in life, and buried in hell.
His body was covered with the linen shroud that his daughters had woven with their own hands from raw material derived from the income of the estate inherited from their ancestors in Torrox, seat of their lineage.278493 His remains were interred in the courtyard of the palace, covered by the dust278472 his servants had shaken from their clothes after each battle against the Christians.354488490493494 According to the Arab historian Ibn 'Idhari, the following verses were carved in marble as an epitaph:354472494
His exploits will teach you about him,
as if you saw it with your own eyes.
No one like him will ever given by God to the world again,
nor will anyone to defend the frontiers who compare with him.
The dynasty Almanzor founded continued with his son Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar,495 and then his other son, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo,496 who was unable to preserve the inherited power, and was murdered in 1009.7 The fall of the Amiris set off the Fitna of al-Andalus, a civil war that resulted in the disintegration of the centralized Caliphate into regional taifa kingdoms.7
Later, the legend of a defeat immediately prior to his death in a Battle of Calatañazor appeared first in the Estoria de España and was later adorned in other documents.497498499 Tradition holds that "in Calatañazor Almanzor lost the drum" (en Calatañazor Almanzor perdió el tambor) a term indicating that he there lost his joy because of the defeat that was inflicted.500501
Bibliography
Allen, William Edward David; ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, ʻAlī Ḥajjī (2002). González Campo, Mariano (ed.). Al-Ghazal y la embajada hispano-musulmana a los vikingos en el siglo IX. Madrid: Miraguano ediciones. p. 238. ISBN 9788478132386.
Arié, Rachel (1984). Historia de España. España Musulmana: siglos VIII-XV. Tomo III. Labor. p. 558. ISBN 9788433594235.
Ávila, María Luisa; Marín, Manuela (1997). Biografías y género biográfico en el Occidente Islámico. publisher CSIC – CSIC Press. p. 460. ISBN 9788400076450.
Bariani, Laura (2003). Almanzor. Nerea. p. 298. ISBN 9788489569850.
Baró Pazos, Juan; Serna Vallejo, Margarita (2002). El Fuero de Laredo en el octavo centenario de su concesión. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria. p. 605. ISBN 9788481023039.
Beladiez Navarro, Emilio (1959). Almanzor: un César andaluz. Madrid: Escelicer. p. 182.
De Bordejé Morencos, Federico Fernando (1992). "El Islam, la España musulmana y la mar". Revista de historia naval (39): 97–114. ISSN0212-467X.
Cardaillac, Louis (2002). Santiago Apóstol: El santo de los dos mundos. El Colegio de Jalisco. p. 371. ISBN 9789686255683.
Castellanos Gómez, Juan (2002). Geoestrategia en la España musulmana: las campañas militares de Almanzor. Ministerio de Defensa. p. 199. ISBN 9788478239672.
Colmeiro y Penido, Manuel (1863). Historia de la economía política en España. Tomo I. Madrid: Imprenta de Cipriano López. p. 508.
Cruz Hernández, Miguel (1992). El islam de Al-Ándalus: historia y estructura de su realidad social. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe. p. 654. ISBN 9788472326354.
Fletcher, Richard A. (1999). El Cid. Nerea. Traducido por Javier Sánchez García-Gutiérrez. p. 248. ISBN 9788489569294.
Fletcher, Richard (2000). La España mora. Translated by Julio Rodríguez Puértolas. Nerea. p. 213. ISBN 9788489569409.
Frers, Ernesto (2008). Más allá del legado pirata. Historia y leyenda de la piratería. La fabulosa aventura de los bandoleros del mar. Barcelona: Ediciones Robinbook. ISBN 978-84-7927-963-9.
Isla Frez, Amancio (2010). Ejército, sociedad y política en la Península Ibérica entre los siglos VII y XI (in Spanish). Madrid: Editorial CSIC. p. 245. ISBN 978-84-9781-574-1.
Jiménez Losantos, Federico (1999). Los nuestros: cien vidas en la historia de España. Barcelona: Planeta. p. 437. ISBN 978-84-08-03304-2.
Kennedy, Hugh (1996). Muslim Spain and Portugal: a political history of al-Andalus. Longman. p. 342. ISBN 978-0-582-49515-9.
Lirola Delgado, Jorge (1993). El poder naval de Al-Ándalus en la época del califato omeya. Granada: Universidad de Granada. p. 498. ISBN 978-84-338-1797-6.
Manzano Moreno, Eduardo (2018). Épocas medievales. Vol. 2 de la Historia de España, dirigida por Josep Fontana y Ramón Villares. Barcelona-Madrid: Crítica/Marcial Pons. ISBN 978-84-9892-808-2.
Martínez Enamorado, Virgilio; Torremocha Silva, Antonio (2001). Almanzor y su época: al-Ándalus en la segunda mitad del siglo X. Málaga: publisher Sarriá. p. 197. ISBN 978-84-95129-55-0.
Marín Guzmán, Roberto (2006). Sociedad, política y protesta popular en la España musulmana. publisher Universidad de Costa Rica. p. 611. ISBN 9789968936965.
Martínez Enamorado, Virgilio; Torremocha Silva, Antonio (2003). Almanzor y su época: al-Ándalus en la segunda mitad del siglo X. publisher Sarrià. p. 197. ISBN 9788495129550.
Matés Baco, Juan Manuel; Agustín González, Enciso (2006). Historia económica de España. Barcelona: publisher Ariel. p. 1020. ISBN 9788434445345.
Menéndez Bueyes, Luis Ramón (2006). Reflexiones críticas sobre el origen del reino de Asturias. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. p. 271. ISBN 9788478009336.
Mitre Fernández, Emilio (1979). La España medieval: sociedades, estados, culturas. Ediciones Akal. p. 392. ISBN 9788470900945.
Montaner Frutos, Alberto; Boix Jovaní, Alfredo (2005). Guerra en Šarq Al'andalus: las batallas cidianas de Morella (1084) y Cuarte (1094). Instituto de Estudios Islámicos y del Oriente Próximo. p. 342. ISBN 9788495736048.
Morales Romero, Eduardo (2004). Historia de los vikingos en España: ataques e incursiones contra los reinos cristianos y musulmanes de la Península Ibérica en los siglos IX-XI. Madrid: Miraguano Ediciones. p. 238. ISBN 978-84-7813-270-6.
Ríu Ríu, Manuel (1988). Historia de España: Edad Media (711–1500). Tomo II. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. Edición de José María Blázquez. p. 630. ISBN 978-84-239-5090-4.
Russell, Peter Edward; Carr, Raymond (1982). Introducción a la cultura hispánica: Historia, arte, música. Barcelona: publisher Crítica. p. 361. ISBN 978-84-7423-186-1.
Sánchez Candeira, Alfonso (1999). Rosa Montero Tejada (ed.). Castilla y León en el siglo XI, estudio del reinado de Fernando I (in Spanish). Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia. ISBN 978-84-8951241-2.
Suárez Fernández, Luis (1976). Historia de España: Antigua y Media. Tomo I. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp. p. 729. ISBN 978-84-321-1882-1.
Tapia Garrido, José Ángel (1976). Almería musulmana: hasta la conquista de Almería por Alfonso VII (711-1147 de J. C.). Tomo II. Almería: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Almería. p. 512.
Vallvé Bermejo, Joaquín (1992). El Califato de Córdoba. Madrid: publisher Mapfre. Edición de Elena Romero. p. 351. ISBN 978-8-47100-406-2.
Vara, Carlos (2012). Las Navas de Tolosa. Barcelona; Buenos Aires: Parkstone International. ISBN 978-84-350-4582-7.
Vernet Ginés, Juan (1979). Estudios sobre la historia de la ciencia medieval. Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. p. 508.
Weiner, Jack (2001). El Poema de mio Cid: el patriarca Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar trasmite sus genes. Kassel: Reichenberger. p. 172. ISBN 978-3-935004-38-1.
Manzano Moreno 2018, p. 245"Nuestro hombre no realizó su escalada hacia el poder en solitario, sino apoyado por una compleja red de relaciones familiares y políticas en las que se agrupaban algunas de las grandes familias de dignatarios que durante generaciones habían ostentado los principales cargos de la administración omeya. (…) Tan pronto como desapareció al-Halkam II, las grandes familias de la administración cordobesa decidieron resarcirse apoyando el encumbramiento de Almanzor. Su dominio puso fin a la influencia que los funcionarios eunucos y eslavos habían desarrollado hasta entonces" ↩
The abundance of place names derived from Arabic Turrux in Andalusia- mainly in the provinces of Málaga and Granada – has led several cities to mistakenly be designated as the birthplace of the Al-Andalus general.24↩
According to the law, the goods of those who died intestate and lacking a male relative or clear heir passed to the public treasury. The position held by Ibn Abi ʿĀmir had responsibility for supervising this. Given the complexity of Islamic inheritance law, it required detailed knowledge.53↩
His charge was the 'middle police' (as-surta al-wusta), probably responsible for the punishment of crimes that did not have a clear penalty in the Quran and the sunnah, as well as the spy service.58↩
Bariani places the death of the Caliph on the night of 30 September.72 The difference may be due to the fact that the Muslim day lasts from one evening to the next and thus does not coincide with the solar day.73↩
Castellanos Gómez disagrees with the identification of the targets of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's first two campaigns and indicates that the first attacked Baños de Montemayor and the second, La Muela, near Calatañazor.124↩
Ballestín Navarro indicates that the dismissal took place on March 26, 978, ten days after Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's wedding.140 Lévi Provençal gives a similar date, March 29.141↩
Vallvé Bermejo 1992, p. 125: "Normalmente participaban en sus aceifas doce mil hombres de a caballo, inscritos en la escalilla militar y a los que, además de la acostumbrada soldada, se les proporcionaban una caballería con sus arreos, armas, alojamiento, pagas y gratificaciones para diversos gastos, y forraje para las caballerías, según su categoría." ↩↩2
He did disrupt, albeit temporarily, the Leonese repopulation effort south of the Duero. In the Portuguese portion, the Leonese lost Viseu, Lamego and Coimbra and further east, the repopulated land around the Tormes. At the eastern end of the Duero, Almanzor seized a series of important fortresses such as Gormaz, Osma, Clunia (San Esteban) and finally the Castilian outpost of Sepúlveda. ↩
Maíllo Salgado, Felipe (1993). "Sobre la presencia de los muslimes en Castilla la Vieja en las Edades Medias". Seminario, repoblación y reconquista: actas del III Curso de Cultura Medieval. Aguilar de Campoo: Centro de Estudios del Románico, septiembre de 1991. Coordinación por José Luis Hernando Garrido & Miguel Ángel García Guinea, pp. 17–22, ISBN 84-600-8664-X. ↩
García Fitz, Francisco (2014). "La batalla de Las Navas de Tolosa: el impacto de un acontecimiento extraordinario"". In Patrice Cressier; Vicente Salvatierra Cuenca (eds.). Las Navas de Tolosa 1212–2012: miradas cruzadas. Universidad de Jaén. pp. 11–36. ISBN 978-84-8439-830-1. ↩
Montaner Frutos & Boix Jovaní 2005, p. 143: "La media más frecuente parece haber sido un caballero por cada dos o tres jinetes auxiliares (escuderos y otros) y de uno de estos por cada dos o tres peones." ↩
Montaner Frutos & Boix Jovaní 2005, p. 144: "Un ejército de diez o quince mil hombres se considera de todo punto excepcional y pocos historiadores estarían dispuestos a admitir que en alguna ocasión ese número fuera realmente alcanzado por una hueste durante una batalla." ↩↩2
Vallvé Bermejo 1992, p. 61: ". . . surtían los gineceos de la familia real y de la aristocracia como concubinas y esposas legítimas." ↩↩2↩3↩4
Holgado Cristeto, Belén (2010). "Tras las huellas de las mujeres cristianas de al-Ándalus". En Actas del Congreso Conocer Al-Ándalus: perspectivas desde el siglo XXI. Edición de María Mercedes Delgado Pérez & Gracia López Anguita. Sevilla: Alfar, pp. 110. ISBN 978-84-7898-338-4. ". . . la predilección que tenían por las rubias y pelirrojas gallegas, vasconas y francas." ↩
Bellido Bello, Juan Félix (2006). "El cuerpo de la mujer en la literatura andalusí". En Sin carne: representaciones y simulacros del cuerpo femenino: tecnología, comunicación y poder. Barcelona: ArCiBel, pp. 342. Edición de Mercedes Arriaga Flórez, Rodrigo Browne Sartori, José Manuel Estévez Saá y Víctor Silva Echeto. ISBN 978-84-935374-2-5. ↩
Martínez Díez 2005, p. 581Pero, al fin, la divina piedad se compadeció de tanta ruina y permitió alzar cabeza a los cristianos pues, en el año decimotercero de su reino, después de muchas y horribles matanzas de cristianos, fue arrebatado en Medinaceli, gran ciudad, por el demonio, que le había poseído en vida, y sepultado en el infierno. ↩