The Battle of Calabria (Battaglia di Punta Stilo) on 9 July 1940, was a naval battle during the Battle of the Mediterranean in the Second World War between ships of the Regia Marina and those of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Start Jul 9, 1940Last edited Oct 15, 2026, 4:07 PM
Both fleets went to sea to protect convoys that reached their destinations and both had signals intelligence giving them notice of their opponent's intentions and both had air support, the Italians from land-based aircraft and the British from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle.
The battle involved many ships on both sides but it was indecisive and the ships returned to base; it was the first battleship engagement between the Italians and the British.
Background
Convoy TCM
When Italy entered the Second World War, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, commander of the Italian forces in Libya demanded reinforcements and supplies. Graziani also wanted to wait for spring before invading Egypt, much to the disgust of Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, who wanted a victory to match that of Germany over France. Graziani claimed another 13,000 troops and 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) of supplies but since the declaration of war on 10 June, the Regia Marina had delivered little of this in solo ship voyages and submarine deliveries. Plans were made to run a convoy from Naples with 2,190 troops, 72 Fiat M11/39 tanks, 232 other vehicles, 10,445 long tons (10,613 t) of supplies and 5,720 long tons (5,810 t) of fuel to sail on 6 July.1
A close escort was provided by the 5th, 6th and 14th Torpedo Boat Squadrons with Orione, , and . The four ships from Naples would rendezvous with the freighter from , escorted by and . The 2nd Light Cruiser Division with the 6-inch cruisers and and the 10th Destroyer Squadron comprising , , and would also join the escorts.
This page is based on “Battle of Calabria” from English Wikipedia, (r1373165736) CC BY-SA 4.0 used under the license. The original authors are listed in its page history.
A reconnaissance sortie by the Regia Aeronautica mistakenly reported on 7 July that British cruisers had arrived in Malta, having seen the destroyers HMS Diamond and Jervis and this prompted Supermarina to prepare a much larger escort effort in case of action with the Mediterranean Fleet.3 A second group sailed 35 mi (56 km) to the east consisting of six heavy cruisers and another four destroyers. The main battle group consisted of the battleships (Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour), eight light cruisers and another 16 destroyers.4
Operation MA 5
The British were involved in a similar convoy action. The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound for Malta where the destroyers would deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements. Two convoys from Malta to Alexandria were waiting to bring back fleet stores and civilians from Malta to Alexandria. The fast Convoy MF 1 with three ships at 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph) and the slow Convoy MS 1 with five ships at 9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph) were waiting to depart Malta. The destroyers Diamond and Jervis had been sent to Malta to join HMAS Vendetta to escort the convoys. Distant cover was provided by the Mediterranean Fleet (Admiral Andrew Cunningham) in three groups of ships, Force A, with five cruisers and a destroyer; Force B, with the battleship Warspite and five destroyers and Force C, the main battle group, with the battleships HMS Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrierHMS Eagle and eleven destroyers. Imperial, had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam pipe on the early hours of 8 July.5
Prelude
8 July
At 14:40 on 8 July two Italian Cant Z.506 seaplanes from Tobruk spotted the British fleet and shadowed it for nearly four hours. Campioni ordered his fleet to defend the convoy by turning eastwards and preparing for action. Comando Supremo (supreme command of the armed forces) was reluctant to risk its warships in a night action and they ordered the fleet to avoid contact.6 The Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two light cruisers that, with several additional destroyers, were detached to refuel in Sicily. To make up for the detachments another destroyer group was summoned from Taranto. The Italian fleet had 16 destroyers available.7
From 10:00 to 18:40, 72 land-based bombers of the Regia Aeronautica (the Italian Royal Air Force) attacked the British. Unlike the dive-bombers favoured by the Germans, Italian bombers operated in formations from about 12,000 ft (3,700 m). Scores of bombs were dropped by the Italians and hit HMS Gloucester on its compass platform. The captain, six officers and eleven ratings were killed, three officers and six ratings were wounded. The forward fire control and the steering equipment was destroyed and command was moved to the emergency station.8
8/9 July
At 15:10 on 8 July, Cunningham's fleet steamed toward Taranto, to cut the Italians' return route. At dusk, Cunningham changed course from 310° to 260° and slowed the fleet speed. During the first hours of 9 July, they took a 305° course, to avoid the Italian air reconnaissance while keeping their fleet between the Italian squadron and the Gulf of Taranto.9 By 12:30, the Italian Supreme Command was unaware of the situation of the British fleet. Campioni told his fleet to scramble by 14:00 about 60 nautical miles (110 km; 69 mi) south east of Cape Spartivento in search of the British. Campioni eventually received reports of the British position at 13:30, and six Ro.43 floatplanes launched shortly after by the Italian cruisers spotted the British warships 30 miles closer than supposed. By late evening of 8 July, the Italian convoy had arrived in Benghazi unscathed.10
Battle
9 July
Afternoon
At noon on 9 July the two fleets were 90 mi (140 km) apart. Cunningham could not close the distance to engage with the further back formation of Malaya and the significantly slower Royal Sovereign (18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) vs 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph)) and advanced with Warspite. At 13:15, Eagle launched several unsuccessful sorties by Swordfish torpedo-bombers against the Italian heavy cruisers, which they mistook for battleships. At 13:10, Comando Supremo had instructed Campioni to engage one of the two forces facing him but they had planned to keep the action close to Italy and were deliberately moving north to draw the British closer to their airbases. By 14:00 Cunningham had cut off the Italian fleet from Taranto.11
The British cruiser group was spread out in front of Warspite and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian main battle force. The two groups opened fire at 70,500 ft (21,500 m). Italian range finding was better than the British and within three minutes they had found the distance even though they were firing at extreme range. Although British range finding was not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short, British gun laying was better and they were able to place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes the range was down to 66,000 ft (20,000 m) and British gunnery improved. By 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to the British cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to disengage.12 At this point splinters from a 6 in (152 mm) shell fired by the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi hit HMS Neptune, damaging her catapult and the Fairey Seafox reconnaissance aircraft beyond repair. The cruisers continued to open the range and by 15:30 fire ceased.12
One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the heavy cruisers of the Zara class, was on the British side of the battle line and was soon within range of Warspite. Once again the British fire fell short and neither target, Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, were hit in the initial salvos. By this time Warspite was also out of position and circled to allow Malaya to catch up. Royal Sovereign was still well to the rear.13 The Italian commander decided to take on Warspite, and started moving his two battleships into position. At 15:52 Giulio Cesare opened fire at a range of 86,600 ft (26,400 m). Conte di Cavour held her fire, as Italian doctrine was for battleships to fight one-on-one. It had been discovered during the Battle of Jutland that more than one ship firing at a single target made it very difficult to identify the fall of shot. Conte di Cavour had been assigned to Malaya and Royal Sovereign, which did not enter the engagement.14
Warspite, not aware of the Italian firing patterns, split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of Giulio Cesare's rounds fell long and caused splinter damage to Warspite's escorting destroyers Hereward and Decoy, which had formed up on the far side of the action.15 At 15:54 Malaya opened fire, well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian ships. The Italian heavy cruisers came into action and started firing on Warspite at 15:55 but had to break off as the British cruisers returned.12
At 15:59 two shells from Giulio Cesare fell very close to Warspite, then one of Warspite's 15 in (381 mm) rounds hit the rear deck of Giulio Cesare, exploding in the funnel, and setting off the stored ammunition for one of her 37 mm (1.5 in) anti-aircraft guns. Two seamen were killed and several wounded.13 The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half of the boilers. Giulio Cesare's speed quickly fell off to 18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) and Conte di Cavour took over. Giulio Cesare and Warspite were well over 79,000 feet (24,000 m) apart and the hit was one of the longest-range naval gunfire successes in history.16
It would appear that Warspite was in an excellent position to deal some serious blows to the slowing Giulio Cesare but she once again executed a tight turn to allow Malaya to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during the turn, rangefinders on Malaya discovered what the Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling 2,700 yd (2,500 m) short of Giulio Cesare.17 At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the battleships got under cover.18
Evening
At 15:58 Fiume re-opened fire on her counterpart in the British line, Liverpool and soon two groups of Italian cruisers (Zara, Bolzano and Pola, closely followed by Gorizia and Trento) came into range with the main British cruiser group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to form up and at 16:07 Bolzano was hit three times by 6-inch shells from Neptune, temporarily locking her rudder and causing two fatalities in the torpedo room. A near miss on the destroyer Vittorio Alfieri caused minor damage.19 Two of the four damaged boilers in Giulio Cesare were repaired, allowing the battleship to reach 22 kn (41 km/h; 25 mph).20 Admiral Campioni, considering the possibility of his remaining battleship, Conte di Cavour, having to face three enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the battleships towards Messina.21
Over the next hour both fleets made long-range torpedo runs with their destroyers, without success. At 16:40, Italian aircraft made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on Eagle, Warspite and Malaya; because of a misunderstanding, fifty of the Italian aircraft attacked the Italian ships for six hours, without damage. The battle ended at 16:50 with both sides withdrawing.22 The destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sent to Augusta in Sicily, was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next day and sank in shallow water. She was refloated and returned to service in December 1941.23
Aftermath
Analysis
After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya.24 The British ships also reached Alexandria along with their escort. Although the battle was indecisive, British sources claimed that the Royal Navy asserted an important "moral ascendancy" over their Italian counterpart.25
Other sources dispute those claims, pointing out that, in the aftermath of the battle, the moods of the two commanders were quite different. Campioni wrote that, even having been able to employ only two old refurbished battleships, the battle gave to every man in the fleet, from the senior officers to the seamen, the impression of being able to cope with the British on equal terms. Cunningham was dismayed by the performance of his two older units, whose lack of speed permitted the Italians to dictate the course of the action and whose guns were out-ranged by those of the two Italian battleships and those of the heavy cruisers. Cunningham dismissed the Royal Sovereign as a "constant source of anxiety", and asked the Admiralty for two or three more Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, possibly equipped with radar, a new carrier with an armoured deck, the heavy cruisers York and Exeter and enough smaller ships to cover the major units.2627
The Italian Littorio class battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto at Taranto, both almost ready for action were only a few hours from the scene. The ships were still undergoing trials, and Littorio had suffered an electrical fault on one of her main turrets. The battleships would have tipped the balance of firepower well onto the Italian side.28 Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. Despite Italian superiority in aircraft, due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica, the attacks proved ineffective, achieving little apart from the damage to Gloucester. Despite this, the battle reports of the airmen were exaggerated to the point of claiming damage to half of the British fleet.29 British gunnery proved superior, while the Italian salvos were too widely dispersed due to technical reasons.30
Bibliography
Giorgerini, Giorgio (1977). La battaglia dei convogli in Mediterraneo [The Battle of the Convoys in the Mediterranean]. Biblioteca del mare, 150, 23 (in Italian). Milano: Mursia. OCLC5137647.
Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943. London: Chatham. ISBN 1-885119-61-5.
Greene, J.; Massignani, A. (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (pbk. ed.). Rochester: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-190-3.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-019-9.
Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan (2002). The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-860527-7.
Ireland, Bernard (1993). The War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943. ISBN 978-1-84-415047-2.
Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN 978-1-86176-293-1.
Jordan, John (2008). Warship 2008. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 1-84486-062-0.
Knox, MacGregor (1986). Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-33835-2.
O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
Sadkovich, James (1990). Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II. New York: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-26149-0.
Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Malta: The Hurricane Years 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-06-2.
Smith, Peter C. (2011). Critical Conflict: The Royal Navy's Mediterranean Campaign in 1940. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-84884-513-8. First published as Action Imminent: Three Studies of the Naval War in the Mediterranean Theatre during 1940 (1980) William Kimber, London. ISBN 978-0-7183-0277-1
Brown, David (1995) [1990]. Warship Losses of World War Two (2nd rev. ed.). London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-278-6.
Cull, Brian; Galea, Frederick (2001). Hurricanes over Malta June 1940 – April 1942 (rev. ed.). London: Grub Street. ISBN 1-902304-91-8.
Giorgerini, Giorgio (2002). La guerra italiana sul mare. La marina tra vittoria e sconfitta, 1940–1943 [The Italian War at Sea. The Navy between Victory and Defeat, 1940–1943]. Collezione Le Scie (in Italian). Milano: Mondadori. ISBN 978-88-04-50150-3.
Miller, Nathan (1995). War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II (pbk. ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-511038-2.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
The German battleship Scharnhorst had achieved a hit on the British aircraft carrier HMS Glorious at approximately the same range the previous month. ↩
Both fleets went to sea to protect convoys that reached their destinations and both had signals intelligence giving them notice of their opponent's intentions and both had air support, the Italians from land-based aircraft and the British from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle.
The battle involved many ships on both sides but it was indecisive and the ships returned to base; it was the first battleship engagement between the Italians and the British.
Background
Convoy TCM
When Italy entered the Second World War, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, commander of the Italian forces in Libya demanded reinforcements and supplies. Graziani also wanted to wait for spring before invading Egypt, much to the disgust of Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, who wanted a victory to match that of Germany over France. Graziani claimed another 13,000 troops and 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) of supplies but since the declaration of war on 10 June, the Regia Marina had delivered little of this in solo ship voyages and submarine deliveries. Plans were made to run a convoy from Naples with 2,190 troops, 72 Fiat M11/39 tanks, 232 other vehicles, 10,445 long tons (10,613 t) of supplies and 5,720 long tons (5,810 t) of fuel to sail on 6 July.1
A close escort was provided by the 5th, 6th and 14th Torpedo Boat Squadrons with , , and . The four ships from Naples would rendezvous with the freighter from , escorted by and . The 2nd Light Cruiser Division with the 6-inch cruisers and and the 10th Destroyer Squadron comprising , , and would also join the escorts.
A reconnaissance sortie by the Regia Aeronautica mistakenly reported on 7 July that British cruisers had arrived in Malta, having seen the destroyers HMS Diamond and Jervis and this prompted Supermarina to prepare a much larger escort effort in case of action with the Mediterranean Fleet.3 A second group sailed 35 mi (56 km) to the east consisting of six heavy cruisers and another four destroyers. The main battle group consisted of the battleships (Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour), eight light cruisers and another 16 destroyers.4
Operation MA 5
The British were involved in a similar convoy action. The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound for Malta where the destroyers would deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements. Two convoys from Malta to Alexandria were waiting to bring back fleet stores and civilians from Malta to Alexandria. The fast Convoy MF 1 with three ships at 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph) and the slow Convoy MS 1 with five ships at 9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph) were waiting to depart Malta. The destroyers Diamond and Jervis had been sent to Malta to join HMAS Vendetta to escort the convoys. Distant cover was provided by the Mediterranean Fleet (Admiral Andrew Cunningham) in three groups of ships, Force A, with five cruisers and a destroyer; Force B, with the battleship Warspite and five destroyers and Force C, the main battle group, with the battleships HMS Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrierHMS Eagle and eleven destroyers. Imperial, had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam pipe on the early hours of 8 July.5
Prelude
8 July
At 14:40 on 8 July two Italian Cant Z.506 seaplanes from Tobruk spotted the British fleet and shadowed it for nearly four hours. Campioni ordered his fleet to defend the convoy by turning eastwards and preparing for action. Comando Supremo (supreme command of the armed forces) was reluctant to risk its warships in a night action and they ordered the fleet to avoid contact.6 The Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two light cruisers that, with several additional destroyers, were detached to refuel in Sicily. To make up for the detachments another destroyer group was summoned from Taranto. The Italian fleet had 16 destroyers available.7
From 10:00 to 18:40, 72 land-based bombers of the Regia Aeronautica (the Italian Royal Air Force) attacked the British. Unlike the dive-bombers favoured by the Germans, Italian bombers operated in formations from about 12,000 ft (3,700 m). Scores of bombs were dropped by the Italians and hit HMS Gloucester on its compass platform. The captain, six officers and eleven ratings were killed, three officers and six ratings were wounded. The forward fire control and the steering equipment was destroyed and command was moved to the emergency station.8
8/9 July
At 15:10 on 8 July, Cunningham's fleet steamed toward Taranto, to cut the Italians' return route. At dusk, Cunningham changed course from 310° to 260° and slowed the fleet speed. During the first hours of 9 July, they took a 305° course, to avoid the Italian air reconnaissance while keeping their fleet between the Italian squadron and the Gulf of Taranto.9 By 12:30, the Italian Supreme Command was unaware of the situation of the British fleet. Campioni told his fleet to scramble by 14:00 about 60 nautical miles (110 km; 69 mi) south east of Cape Spartivento in search of the British. Campioni eventually received reports of the British position at 13:30, and six Ro.43 floatplanes launched shortly after by the Italian cruisers spotted the British warships 30 miles closer than supposed. By late evening of 8 July, the Italian convoy had arrived in Benghazi unscathed.10
Battle
9 July
Afternoon
At noon on 9 July the two fleets were 90 mi (140 km) apart. Cunningham could not close the distance to engage with the further back formation of Malaya and the significantly slower Royal Sovereign (18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) vs 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph)) and advanced with Warspite. At 13:15, Eagle launched several unsuccessful sorties by Swordfish torpedo-bombers against the Italian heavy cruisers, which they mistook for battleships. At 13:10, Comando Supremo had instructed Campioni to engage one of the two forces facing him but they had planned to keep the action close to Italy and were deliberately moving north to draw the British closer to their airbases. By 14:00 Cunningham had cut off the Italian fleet from Taranto.11
The British cruiser group was spread out in front of Warspite and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian main battle force. The two groups opened fire at 70,500 ft (21,500 m). Italian range finding was better than the British and within three minutes they had found the distance even though they were firing at extreme range. Although British range finding was not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short, British gun laying was better and they were able to place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes the range was down to 66,000 ft (20,000 m) and British gunnery improved. By 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to the British cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to disengage.12 At this point splinters from a 6 in (152 mm) shell fired by the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi hit HMS Neptune, damaging her catapult and the Fairey Seafox reconnaissance aircraft beyond repair. The cruisers continued to open the range and by 15:30 fire ceased.12
One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the heavy cruisers of the Zara class, was on the British side of the battle line and was soon within range of Warspite. Once again the British fire fell short and neither target, Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, were hit in the initial salvos. By this time Warspite was also out of position and circled to allow Malaya to catch up. Royal Sovereign was still well to the rear.13 The Italian commander decided to take on Warspite, and started moving his two battleships into position. At 15:52 Giulio Cesare opened fire at a range of 86,600 ft (26,400 m). Conte di Cavour held her fire, as Italian doctrine was for battleships to fight one-on-one. It had been discovered during the Battle of Jutland that more than one ship firing at a single target made it very difficult to identify the fall of shot. Conte di Cavour had been assigned to Malaya and Royal Sovereign, which did not enter the engagement.14
Warspite, not aware of the Italian firing patterns, split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of Giulio Cesare's rounds fell long and caused splinter damage to Warspite's escorting destroyers Hereward and Decoy, which had formed up on the far side of the action.15 At 15:54 Malaya opened fire, well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian ships. The Italian heavy cruisers came into action and started firing on Warspite at 15:55 but had to break off as the British cruisers returned.12
At 15:59 two shells from Giulio Cesare fell very close to Warspite, then one of Warspite's 15 in (381 mm) rounds hit the rear deck of Giulio Cesare, exploding in the funnel, and setting off the stored ammunition for one of her 37 mm (1.5 in) anti-aircraft guns. Two seamen were killed and several wounded.13 The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half of the boilers. Giulio Cesare's speed quickly fell off to 18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) and Conte di Cavour took over. Giulio Cesare and Warspite were well over 79,000 feet (24,000 m) apart and the hit was one of the longest-range naval gunfire successes in history.16
It would appear that Warspite was in an excellent position to deal some serious blows to the slowing Giulio Cesare but she once again executed a tight turn to allow Malaya to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during the turn, rangefinders on Malaya discovered what the Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling 2,700 yd (2,500 m) short of Giulio Cesare.17 At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the battleships got under cover.18
Evening
At 15:58 Fiume re-opened fire on her counterpart in the British line, Liverpool and soon two groups of Italian cruisers (Zara, Bolzano and Pola, closely followed by Gorizia and Trento) came into range with the main British cruiser group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to form up and at 16:07 Bolzano was hit three times by 6-inch shells from Neptune, temporarily locking her rudder and causing two fatalities in the torpedo room. A near miss on the destroyer Vittorio Alfieri caused minor damage.19 Two of the four damaged boilers in Giulio Cesare were repaired, allowing the battleship to reach 22 kn (41 km/h; 25 mph).20 Admiral Campioni, considering the possibility of his remaining battleship, Conte di Cavour, having to face three enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the battleships towards Messina.21
Over the next hour both fleets made long-range torpedo runs with their destroyers, without success. At 16:40, Italian aircraft made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on Eagle, Warspite and Malaya; because of a misunderstanding, fifty of the Italian aircraft attacked the Italian ships for six hours, without damage. The battle ended at 16:50 with both sides withdrawing.22 The destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sent to Augusta in Sicily, was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next day and sank in shallow water. She was refloated and returned to service in December 1941.23
Aftermath
Analysis
After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya.24 The British ships also reached Alexandria along with their escort. Although the battle was indecisive, British sources claimed that the Royal Navy asserted an important "moral ascendancy" over their Italian counterpart.25
Other sources dispute those claims, pointing out that, in the aftermath of the battle, the moods of the two commanders were quite different. Campioni wrote that, even having been able to employ only two old refurbished battleships, the battle gave to every man in the fleet, from the senior officers to the seamen, the impression of being able to cope with the British on equal terms. Cunningham was dismayed by the performance of his two older units, whose lack of speed permitted the Italians to dictate the course of the action and whose guns were out-ranged by those of the two Italian battleships and those of the heavy cruisers. Cunningham dismissed the Royal Sovereign as a "constant source of anxiety", and asked the Admiralty for two or three more Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, possibly equipped with radar, a new carrier with an armoured deck, the heavy cruisers York and Exeter and enough smaller ships to cover the major units.2627
The Italian Littorio class battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto at Taranto, both almost ready for action were only a few hours from the scene. The ships were still undergoing trials, and Littorio had suffered an electrical fault on one of her main turrets. The battleships would have tipped the balance of firepower well onto the Italian side.28 Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. Despite Italian superiority in aircraft, due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica, the attacks proved ineffective, achieving little apart from the damage to Gloucester. Despite this, the battle reports of the airmen were exaggerated to the point of claiming damage to half of the British fleet.29 British gunnery proved superior, while the Italian salvos were too widely dispersed due to technical reasons.30
Bibliography
Giorgerini, Giorgio (1977). La battaglia dei convogli in Mediterraneo [The Battle of the Convoys in the Mediterranean]. Biblioteca del mare, 150, 23 (in Italian). Milano: Mursia. OCLC5137647.
Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943. London: Chatham. ISBN 1-885119-61-5.
Greene, J.; Massignani, A. (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (pbk. ed.). Rochester: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-190-3.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-019-9.
Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan (2002). The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-860527-7.
Ireland, Bernard (1993). The War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943. ISBN 978-1-84-415047-2.
Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN 978-1-86176-293-1.
Jordan, John (2008). Warship 2008. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 1-84486-062-0.
Knox, MacGregor (1986). Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-33835-2.
O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
Sadkovich, James (1990). Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II. New York: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-26149-0.
Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Malta: The Hurricane Years 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-06-2.
Smith, Peter C. (2011). Critical Conflict: The Royal Navy's Mediterranean Campaign in 1940. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-84884-513-8. First published as Action Imminent: Three Studies of the Naval War in the Mediterranean Theatre during 1940 (1980) William Kimber, London. ISBN 978-0-7183-0277-1
Brown, David (1995) [1990]. Warship Losses of World War Two (2nd rev. ed.). London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-278-6.
Cull, Brian; Galea, Frederick (2001). Hurricanes over Malta June 1940 – April 1942 (rev. ed.). London: Grub Street. ISBN 1-902304-91-8.
Giorgerini, Giorgio (2002). La guerra italiana sul mare. La marina tra vittoria e sconfitta, 1940–1943 [The Italian War at Sea. The Navy between Victory and Defeat, 1940–1943]. Collezione Le Scie (in Italian). Milano: Mondadori. ISBN 978-88-04-50150-3.
Miller, Nathan (1995). War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II (pbk. ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-511038-2.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
The German battleship Scharnhorst had achieved a hit on the British aircraft carrier HMS Glorious at approximately the same range the previous month. ↩