A nationwide opposition movement, centred on the provisional government led by Kim Gu, that arose in December 1945 after news broke that the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three powers had decided on a trusteeship plan for Korea of up to five years. Left-wing forces soon reversed to s
Start~End Dec 28, 1945 ~ Jan 1946Last edited Oct 15, 2026, 2:51 PM
The Anti-trusteeship Movement (信託統治反對運動, Sinteak tongchi pandae undong) or Anti-Trusteeship Movement (反託運動, Pantak undong) was a national movement that arose in opposition to Trusteeship when the results of the Moscow Three-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference of December 1945 became known. After liberation, the South Korean region in 1946 was politically in great turmoil, with the left and right divided into pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship camps respectively. The provisional government faction of Kim Gu regarded the anti-trusteeship movement as a "second independence movement" and issued an order for total national mobilisation. However, the anti-trusteeship movement, which regarded trusteeship as treason, provided a pretext for the assassination of Song Jin-woo and for other widespread white terror.
Origins
In March 1943, the London correspondent of the Chicago newspaper "Sun" reported that BritishForeign Secretary Anthony Eden had exchanged views with President Roosevelt on the possibility of a Soviet annexation of Korea.1 According to the memoirs of Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, on 27 March 1943 President Roosevelt suggested to him that Korea be made an international trusteeship under the administration of one or two of China, the United States and other participating powers in the war.1
The first report in the domestic press of the American plan for trusteeship over the Korean peninsula after liberation was in the Maeil Sinbo on 23 October 1945. It was an article quoting the words of Vincent, Director of the Far Eastern Bureau of the U.S. State Department, and at the time both the left and the right expressed opposition.2
On 27 December 1945, at the Moscow Conference of Three Powers, the foreign ministers of the , and met to discuss the handling of various issues after the end of the Second World War. At this meeting they also discussed a trusteeship plan for Korea, and as a result concluded that a joint U.S.–Soviet commission would be formed and trusteeship carried out. When this became known in Korea, the anti-trusteeship movement arose in opposition.
🤖 This page was machine-translated by AI from 한국어 “신탁통치 반대 운동”. Please fix any mistakes.
This page is based on “신탁 통치 반대 운동” from 한국어 위키백과, (r41665816) CC BY-SA 4.0 used under the license. The original authors are listed in its page history.
At this time, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes presented a solution to the Korean question centred on a five-year trusteeship plan with limited Korean participation, and in response the Soviet Union proposed an amendment centred on establishing a democratic provisional government to grant Korea independence and limiting trusteeship to within five years. The U.S. side then revised this Soviet amendment again and on 28 December published the "Decision of the Moscow Three-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference".3
Meanwhile, the provisional government, which had received news of liberation in Shanghai and returned home without any preparation, had established an "Administrative Research Committee" under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, absorbing officials who had passed the higher civil service examination of the Government-General of Korea and had served as senior officials of the Government-General, and was moving to take over power from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.
Announcement of Trusteeship and the False Report Incident
Anti-trusteeship Movement and the False Report
Originally the agenda of the Moscow Three-Power Conference was officially to be announced on the 28th, but on 25 December the AP and UP news agencies published speculative articles based on Washington dispatches.4 Among domestic news agencies, the right-wing Hapdong News received this article from AP, and the left-wing Chosun News Agency received it from UP on the night of the 26th. Left-wing media, flustered by the news that the Soviet Union had called for trusteeship, did not report it, but most newspapers that received the news from Hapdong reported it prominently on the front page the next day. It is commonly misunderstood as the "Dong-A Ilbo false report incident", because the Dong-A Ilbo at the time was continuously writing inflammatory articles from a right-wing standpoint, and the interpretation that it was an intentional false report became the accepted view. However, almost all media except the left-wing ones gave this news prominent coverage, and there is also a case of overseas media that, at that time, received a breaking report with the same content from AP.
Park Heon-yong, who was known from the start as having supported trusteeship, was branded by the Korean Democratic Party faction as a supporter of trusteeship from December 1945. Contrary to the claims of the Korean Democratic Party and the Dong-A Ilbo, until around 16 January 1946 he did not support trusteeship.
Immediately after the trusteeship decision at the end of December 1945, Park Heon-yong opposed trusteeship. On 5 January 1946 he was interviewed by a group of domestic and foreign journalists including Johnston of the American New York Times.5 In the interview Park said that Korea was not at a stage of being sovietised, and criticised the U.S. Army Military Government for supporting and encouraging the anti-trusteeship movement, such as permitting the use of radio for it, and for mass arrests of democratic forces such as the People's Committees.5 He then answered, "I do not know when a Soviet Korea will come about, but even if it does, a Soviet Korea will always be an independent state." However, Johnston skilfully stitched this together and wrote a false article with the content: "Park Heon-yong does not oppose Soviet trusteeship over Korea. He also expressed the view that Korea would be incorporated into the Soviet Union in a few decades."6
Park Heon-yong and the Trusteeship Controversy
Park Heon-yong, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Korea, was confused on hearing the news of the Three-Power Conference and went to the Soviet consulate. However, the Soviet consul Polyanski had gone to Moscow, and the consulate said there were no instructions from the home country. Moreover, TASS, which had been indirectly relaying instructions from the Kremlin, did not even report on the Three-Power Conference. In the end, Park crossed the 38th parallel on the night of 28 December. On the afternoon of the 29th he met Kim Il-sung for a second time, and two days later, on the 31st, he attended the executive committee of the North Korean Communist Party, which was attended by Deputy Commander Romanenko, in charge of civil administration, who had returned from Moscow, and Polyanski, the Soviet consul-general in Seoul. Park reported that the anti-trusteeship sentiment in Seoul was fierce, but the Soviet guideline was pro-trusteeship. The argument was that the forces in North Korea were unified, so if the left forces in South Korea were combined they could achieve absolute superiority over the remaining forces in the South. The Soviet instruction was that even if a joint commission were held, only parties and social organisations supporting trusteeship would be allowed to take part in forming the provisional government, which would put the communist camp in numerical superiority. Park attended the New Year's gathering on 1 January and then crossed the 38th parallel again.
At that time the Communist Party of Korea had not officially stated its position, but on 2 January Park Heon-yong expressed the official attitude through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Korea. He declared that the Moscow Three-Power Conference was a step forward in the development of world democracy, and that establishing a democratic provisional government in Korea was the most legitimate thing for the good of Korea. He went on to argue that the five-year limit on trusteeship was the fault of our own people, and that to place the responsibility on the three powers and to reject and oppose it (the so-called anti-trusteeship movement of the Kim Gu faction) would produce extremely dangerous results for Korea. He then concluded the statement by emphasising the importance of the national unified front. It was his call to concentrate all efforts on completing the Korean national unified front on democratic principles, excluding pro-Japanese collaborators, traitors to the nation and ultranationalists.
The left-wing organisations had already mobilised all their forces for a citizens' rally against trusteeship scheduled for 3 January. The Central Committee of the Communist Party hastily issued a further explanatory statement on 3 January in the name of its propaganda department. In the end, the Seoul Citizens' Rally against Trusteeship, jointly sponsored by the Seoul City People's Committee and the Joint Committee for the Anti-Fascist United Struggle, was held at the Seoul Stadium at 1 p.m. However, citizens who had come out to oppose trusteeship were bewildered. From the very name of the rally, it had been changed to the "Citizens' Rally for Promoting National Unity and Independence", and citizens who came carrying placards reading "Absolutely Oppose Trusteeship" clashed with the organisers. The organisers, instead of the planned speeches against trusteeship, conducted an explanatory session on the purpose of the Three-Power Conference, and communist party members mobilised by the organisers led a march through the streets shouting slogans such as "Absolutely Support the Foreign Ministers' Conference", "Protect the People's Republic", "Down with Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee" and "Immediately End the Market Strike". Thereupon many citizens who had participated in order to oppose trusteeship dispersed, cursing.
At the time, as the heat of anti-trusteeship sentiment was too intense, on Soviet instructions the Communist Party of Korea stopped using the word "trusteeship" and instead called it "guardianship" (후견). However, on 5 January 1946, a false report incident broke out when Johnston of the American New York Times and other domestic and foreign journalists interviewed Park Heon-yong about his position on trusteeship.5 In the interview Park said that Korea was not at a stage of being sovietised, and criticised the U.S. Army Military Government for supporting and encouraging the anti-trusteeship movement, such as permitting the use of radio for it, and for mass arrests of democratic forces such as the People's Committees.5 He then answered, "I do not know when a Soviet Korea will come about, but even if it does, a Soviet Korea will always be an independent state." However, Johnston skilfully stitched this together and wrote a false article with the content: "Park Heon-yong does not oppose Soviet trusteeship over Korea. He also expressed the view that Korea would be incorporated into the Soviet Union in a few decades."6
Course of Events
Preparations
When it became known that the Soviet Union was calling for trusteeship, the Communist Party of Korea did not state an official position, but since the anti-trusteeship fervour across the country was intense from the moment the reports appeared, even left-wing groups expressed anti-trusteeship positions in a private capacity or informally. Park Heon-yong, since TASS had also not reported this content, inquired with the Soviet consulate in Seoul, but the Soviet consul had gone to Moscow and the consulate received only the answer that no instructions had come down from Moscow. Park, before the year was out, crossed the 38th parallel on 28 December and went to Pyongyang, where he met Soviet military government officials and a Soviet consul who had come down with instructions from Moscow, as well as Kim Il-sung, and was instructed on the pro-trusteeship line. As soon as the year changed, he returned to Seoul, and on the evening of 2 January the Communist Party of Korea settled on the pro-trusteeship line and changed the anti-trusteeship event for Seoul citizens planned for 3 January into a pro-trusteeship event.
By contrast, from 27 December, representatives of right-wing and centrist parties and social organisations (including some left-wing figures) gathered at the Kyungkyo-jang where Kim Gu was staying. Syngman Rhee, confined at home with a severe cold, could not attend. Kim Gu and the provisional government faction set up a national mobilisation committee against trusteeship and had the provisional government's State Council guide it, aiming to take the initiative in the political situation. Going a step further, with a hard-line position that "those who comply with trusteeship will be punished as traitors", they ordered a nationwide strike and promulgated a decree (國字, 포고령) ordering Korean officials, including the police under the U.S. Army Military Government, to obey the orders of the provisional government. From the standpoint of the U.S. Army Military Government this was a clear attempt at a coup, and Hodge considered forcibly arresting Kim Gu and other provisional government personnel and deporting them to China, but stopped at calling Kim Gu in and warning him personally. After meeting Hodge, Kim Gu had his propaganda director Eum Hang-seop broadcast on the radio that the anti-trusteeship movement's aim was opposition to trusteeship, not opposition to the military government or making the daily lives of compatriots difficult, and that he hoped everyone would return to normal.
Mediation and the Assassination of Song Jin-woo
The U.S. Army Military Government only received relevant instructions from home on 29 December, and Hodge called in Song Jin-woo and others and asked them to refrain from violent opposition, saying that trusteeship was by no means entirely bad. Song Jin-woo attended the Kyungkyo-jang meeting on the night of 29 December, and when the discussion turned toward the provisional government mobilising public opinion to seize the U.S. Army Military Government and take power, he judged this to be a reckless attempt and urged calm. "I know that all of your thinking comes from patriotism, but we as leaders guiding the nation must not be rash. Has anyone here properly read the original text of the protocol decided at the Moscow Three-Power Conference? As I understand it, after a joint U.S.–Soviet commission is established, the content provides for consultation with Korean parties and social organisations, the establishment of a unified provisional government for the north and south, and trusteeship for no more than five years. If what I know is correct, we could establish our own unified independent government within five years at most, so is there any reason to oppose it by such extreme means? In any case, even if we ourselves try to form a government by our own strength, we are in a situation of divided rule like this, and while the postwar questions among the great powers remain unresolved we cannot do as we please without their agreement. Since trusteeship is at most five years, it could even be three, so what reason is there to oppose it so nationally? Of course I too oppose trusteeship. But let us think again calmly, with some room to spare, about how to oppose it."
As soon as these words ended, violent backlash erupted. Song Jin-woo, returning home after making this statement, was shot at dawn at his residence by Han Hyeon-woo and others, and died. Although the backing has still not been clearly established, it is true that from immediately after Song's assassination rumours circulated in the Kim Gu provisional government camp (Korean Independence Party) that they had killed him. At least from the standpoint of those supporting the provisional government line, Song's calm and cool statement seemed to throw cold water on their "second independence movement", and they resented it.
Failure of the Anti-trusteeship General Strike
The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea issued a decree on 30 December ordering a nationwide strike. From the morning of 30 December, anti-trusteeship strikes broke out across the country. All Korean staff of the U.S. Army Military Government went on general strike, and the Korean secretaries of General Hodge also joined the strike. As anti-trusteeship demonstrations were organised and nationwide strikes continued, the provisional government issued Kukja No. 1 (國字第一號), demanding that the U.S. Army Military Government transfer power and attempting to take over the government. Kukja No. 1 contained provisions such as placing all Korean staff working in the police apparatus under the U.S. Army Military Government under the command of the provisional government. Kukja Nos. 1 and 2 were issued in the name of Shin Ik-hee, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, but were drafted by Choe Ha-yeong (Japanese name: 香山夏永), who had served as Director of the Investigation Section under the Government-General of Korea, and Han Dong-seok (Japanese name: 朝川東錫), who had served as a Superintendent in the Security Section of the South Hamgyong Province Police Department under the Government-General and as an official of the Industry Bureau of the Government-General of Korea.
However, after the reckless coup attempt of the provisional government came to nothing, Kim Kyu-sik and Ahn Jae-hong, who within the right wing also judged trusteeship to be unavoidable, turned from opposing trusteeship to supporting it. Initially they opposed trusteeship, but after Kim Kyu-sik obtained the result document of the Moscow Three-Power Conference of 27 December 1945, he turned from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship. Afterwards an assassination squad was organised to kill Kim Kyu-sik, and the squad, while climbing over the wall of Samcheong-jang, Kim Kyu-sik's residence, was caught and also fled. Afterwards Kim Kyu-sik had to move his residence frequently, and had to change his sleeping place several times even at night.
The Pro-trusteeship Argument
Park Heon-yong, who had been branded a pro-trusteeship advocate by the false report, later turned into a pro-trusteeship advocate. Fanatics who believed that "trusteeship is a method of colonial rule, and those who support it are traitors who must be eliminated" made Park Heon-yong, who had switched to pro-trusteeship, and Lyuh Woon-hyung7 their targets for assassination.8
Within the right wing too, a pro-trusteeship line emerged. Song Jin-woo was critical of the strongly anti-trusteeship campaigns of Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee. Song Jin-woo opposed Kim Gu on the view that if they made the United States an enemy, the communists would gain the advantage.8 On the evening of 29 December, at the meeting of provisional government officials and right-wing figures held at the Kyungkyo-jang from 10 p.m., Song explained the inevitability of trusteeship. Mistaking Song's argument for support of trusteeship, Han Hyeon-woo, a serving police officer, and five other followers of Kim Gu shot and killed him at his residence in Wonseo-dong, Seoul, at 6 a.m. on 30 December 1945.8
Results
On 15 January 1946, a broadcast from San Francisco, United States, reported that Park Heon-yong had told Johnston that he supported a one-power trusteeship and that Korea should be annexed to the Soviet Union within 10 to 20 years. The U.S. Army Military Government incorporated this into a "press release",9 and Korean newspapers reported it prominently, causing a sensation. Park issued a statement denying support for trusteeship, and the Chosun Ilbo published both the broadcast report and Park's denial statement together.5
Park Heon-yong demanded that the Dong-A Ilbo correct and apologise for the article that had reported falsely that he supported trusteeship. However, the Dong-A Ilbo refused to apologise for the false report that he had supported trusteeship. The Korean Democratic Party also framed Park with the accusation that, following the false report that he "supported trusteeship", he had argued that "Korea should become a vassal state of the Soviet Union" and "Korea should become one state of the Soviet Union federation".
In addition, in the Dong-A Ilbo article of 27 December 1945 it published the report, the exact opposite of the facts, under the headline "The Soviet Union Advocates Trusteeship, the United States Advocates Immediate Independence, the Soviet Pretext Is the Division and Occupation at the 38th Parallel",10 which was taken from the U.S.-originated AP and UP wire stories of 25 December. The original UP article from that time survives and can be verified.4 At that time the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out trusteeship, and only wanted the Korean peninsula to supply resources for its postwar reconstruction. This aim was sufficiently served by North Korean territory alone, and the Soviet Union devoted itself only to building a firm foundation for it. By contrast, trusteeship over Korea was a consistent policy of the United States, which consistently pursued that policy out of concern that the Soviet Union would take the Korean peninsula alone.11
In the issues of 16 January 1946 they carried the article "Korea as a Vassal of the Soviet Union – Park Heon-yong's Hopes as Relayed by the San Francisco Broadcast" and the article "Park Heon-yong's Treasonous Words, Korean Democratic Party Resolves to Reject Them", and on the 17th devoted a large part of the page to report "Great Uproar over the Words of Park Heon-yong of the Communist Party, Nationwide Movement to Reject Him, Each Party and 50 Organisations Rise in Indignation".5 On 18 January the Dong-A Ilbo again wrote an editorial based on this. The anti-trusteeship organisations resolved to overthrow Park Heon-yong as the Dong-A Ilbo had reported, and organised and formed the "Emergency Council of Organisations for the Punishment of Treason to the Nation". Park soon issued a denial statement, and the foreign journalists who had attended the joint press conference of 5 January issued a joint statement that Park's account was correct.5 However, Johnston again insisted that his account was correct, and the Dong-A Ilbo carried an article under the heading "No False Report in the New York Times. The Circumstances of the Talks between Mr. Johnston and Mr. Park Heon-yong".5 Thereafter Park Heon-yong continued to be known as having supported trusteeship and became the target of denunciations by anti-trusteeship groups.
In the end, Park Heon-yong, branded as a pro-trusteeship advocate and pro-Soviet, turned to support trusteeship in February 1946, and became a pro-trusteeship advocate when the Soviet Union issued pro-trusteeship instructions to the Communist Party of Korea. In Seoul he also became a target of terror by right-wing groups. Right-wing youth group members, believing that trusteeship was a method of colonial rule and that those who supported it were traitors who must be eliminated, made Park Heon-yong, who had switched to pro-trusteeship, and Lyuh Woon-hyung their targets for assassination.8Kim Won-bong and Hur Hun also became targets, and beyond the factional lines, Kim Kyu-sik, Ahn Jae-hong, Bae Eun-hee, Myung Je-se, Jang Deok-su and others also became targets for assassination.
Criticism
Kim Won-bong, an independence activist, leader of the Uiyeoldan and an activist in the left-wing organisation the Nationalist Democratic Front, criticised the anti-trusteeship movement by comparing it to the isolationist policy of Heungseon Daewongun. According to Kim Won-bong, regarding the anti-trusteeship movement, comparing it to Heungseon Daewongun's isolationism and anti-Western policy, "the Byeongin Yangyo (1866) and Sinmi Yangyo (1871), in which the French fleet and the American fleet were repelled, were in their own way gratifying from a national and ultranationalist perspective, but viewed from the perspective of world affairs they were foolish acts that ruined the future of the nation."12
The problem is that Kim Won-bong himself had actively advocated anti-trusteeship at the end of 1945,13 and in early January, together with other leftists, abruptly changed his attitude to pro-trusteeship, so his argument too is merely a story concocted by bringing in an unrelated example to rationalise his own change of stance.
When the trusteeship plan was first reported at the end of 1945, the whole nation, regardless of left or right, shouted against trusteeship, and this was a natural expression of national sentiment.14 However, from around 2 January the left-wing camp abruptly turned to pro-trusteeship, and as revealed by the fact that on 3 January the anti-trusteeship rally scheduled for that day was turned on that very day into a pro-trusteeship rally, it appears that the will of other forces was involved behind them. The U.S. Army Military Government authorities also judged that the will of the Soviet Union was involved in the abrupt change of attitude in the left-wing camp.15
However, the change in the left's position came after the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference had been conveyed, and it is difficult to denounce it as a change resulting from a unilateral Soviet instruction. Moreover, the official position of the left was not confined to support or opposition to trusteeship but was overall support for the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference, and this should be taken into account in approaching the matter.
It is well known that the subjects of the Moscow Three-Power Conference were not only the Soviet Union but also the United States, and that the object of the "overall support for the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference" cannot be limited to the Soviet Union alone.
Miscellaneous
Meanwhile, the anti-trusteeship movement provided a rationale for the elimination of left-wing and pro-trusteeship figures, and for terror and attempted-assassination incidents, by ultra-right groups that arose in the liberation period.
여운형 argued that "a provisional government should be established first, and anti-trusteeship opposition should be pursued afterward, and that extreme anti-trusteeship movements should be avoided." ↩
On January 8, U.S. Army Military Governor John R. Hodge summoned the relevant officers and addressed this issue. Based on testimony he had heard from a U.S. Army officer who attended the press conference, Military Advisor Albert Kipp reported that Johnston had completely distorted Pak Hon-yong's remarks. Colonel Newman of the Office of Public Information was also suspicious of Johnston's article and checked with journalist Edgar Snow, who firmly answered that he had not attended the press conference himself but that Pak Hon-yong could not have said such a thing. However, John R. Hodge argued that the South Korean press had treated this content considerably more mildly than it actually was and that it should be properly covered again. This amounted to Hodge putting pressure on the press to publish Johnston's article. ↩
Telegram from CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, January 25, 1946: General John Hodge's telegram dated January 25, 1946, documenting the process by which the leftist camp suddenly shifted from opposing trusteeship in late 1945 to supporting it in early 1946. ↩
The Anti-trusteeship Movement (信託統治反對運動, Sinteak tongchi pandae undong) or Anti-Trusteeship Movement (反託運動, Pantak undong) was a national movement that arose in opposition to Trusteeship when the results of the Moscow Three-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference of December 1945 became known. After liberation, the South Korean region in 1946 was politically in great turmoil, with the left and right divided into pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship camps respectively. The provisional government faction of Kim Gu regarded the anti-trusteeship movement as a "second independence movement" and issued an order for total national mobilisation. However, the anti-trusteeship movement, which regarded trusteeship as treason, provided a pretext for the assassination of Song Jin-woo and for other widespread white terror.
Origins
In March 1943, the London correspondent of the Chicago newspaper "Sun" reported that BritishForeign Secretary Anthony Eden had exchanged views with President Roosevelt on the possibility of a Soviet annexation of Korea.1 According to the memoirs of Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, on 27 March 1943 President Roosevelt suggested to him that Korea be made an international trusteeship under the administration of one or two of China, the United States and other participating powers in the war.1
The first report in the domestic press of the American plan for trusteeship over the Korean peninsula after liberation was in the Maeil Sinbo on 23 October 1945. It was an article quoting the words of Vincent, Director of the Far Eastern Bureau of the U.S. State Department, and at the time both the left and the right expressed opposition.2
On 27 December 1945, at the Moscow Conference of Three Powers, the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union met to discuss the handling of various issues after the end of the Second World War. At this meeting they also discussed a trusteeship plan for Korea, and as a result concluded that a joint U.S.–Soviet commission would be formed and trusteeship carried out. When this became known in Korea, the anti-trusteeship movement arose in opposition.
At this time, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes presented a solution to the Korean question centred on a five-year trusteeship plan with limited Korean participation, and in response the Soviet Union proposed an amendment centred on establishing a democratic provisional government to grant Korea independence and limiting trusteeship to within five years. The U.S. side then revised this Soviet amendment again and on 28 December published the "Decision of the Moscow Three-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference".3
Meanwhile, the provisional government, which had received news of liberation in Shanghai and returned home without any preparation, had established an "Administrative Research Committee" under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, absorbing officials who had passed the higher civil service examination of the Government-General of Korea and had served as senior officials of the Government-General, and was moving to take over power from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.
Announcement of Trusteeship and the False Report Incident
Anti-trusteeship Movement and the False Report
Originally the agenda of the Moscow Three-Power Conference was officially to be announced on the 28th, but on 25 December the AP and UP news agencies published speculative articles based on Washington dispatches.4 Among domestic news agencies, the right-wing Hapdong News received this article from AP, and the left-wing Chosun News Agency received it from UP on the night of the 26th. Left-wing media, flustered by the news that the Soviet Union had called for trusteeship, did not report it, but most newspapers that received the news from Hapdong reported it prominently on the front page the next day. It is commonly misunderstood as the "Dong-A Ilbo false report incident", because the Dong-A Ilbo at the time was continuously writing inflammatory articles from a right-wing standpoint, and the interpretation that it was an intentional false report became the accepted view. However, almost all media except the left-wing ones gave this news prominent coverage, and there is also a case of overseas media that, at that time, received a breaking report with the same content from AP.
Park Heon-yong, who was known from the start as having supported trusteeship, was branded by the Korean Democratic Party faction as a supporter of trusteeship from December 1945. Contrary to the claims of the Korean Democratic Party and the Dong-A Ilbo, until around 16 January 1946 he did not support trusteeship.
Immediately after the trusteeship decision at the end of December 1945, Park Heon-yong opposed trusteeship. On 5 January 1946 he was interviewed by a group of domestic and foreign journalists including Johnston of the American New York Times.5 In the interview Park said that Korea was not at a stage of being sovietised, and criticised the U.S. Army Military Government for supporting and encouraging the anti-trusteeship movement, such as permitting the use of radio for it, and for mass arrests of democratic forces such as the People's Committees.5 He then answered, "I do not know when a Soviet Korea will come about, but even if it does, a Soviet Korea will always be an independent state." However, Johnston skilfully stitched this together and wrote a false article with the content: "Park Heon-yong does not oppose Soviet trusteeship over Korea. He also expressed the view that Korea would be incorporated into the Soviet Union in a few decades."6
Park Heon-yong and the Trusteeship Controversy
Park Heon-yong, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Korea, was confused on hearing the news of the Three-Power Conference and went to the Soviet consulate. However, the Soviet consul Polyanski had gone to Moscow, and the consulate said there were no instructions from the home country. Moreover, TASS, which had been indirectly relaying instructions from the Kremlin, did not even report on the Three-Power Conference. In the end, Park crossed the 38th parallel on the night of 28 December. On the afternoon of the 29th he met Kim Il-sung for a second time, and two days later, on the 31st, he attended the executive committee of the North Korean Communist Party, which was attended by Deputy Commander Romanenko, in charge of civil administration, who had returned from Moscow, and Polyanski, the Soviet consul-general in Seoul. Park reported that the anti-trusteeship sentiment in Seoul was fierce, but the Soviet guideline was pro-trusteeship. The argument was that the forces in North Korea were unified, so if the left forces in South Korea were combined they could achieve absolute superiority over the remaining forces in the South. The Soviet instruction was that even if a joint commission were held, only parties and social organisations supporting trusteeship would be allowed to take part in forming the provisional government, which would put the communist camp in numerical superiority. Park attended the New Year's gathering on 1 January and then crossed the 38th parallel again.
At that time the Communist Party of Korea had not officially stated its position, but on 2 January Park Heon-yong expressed the official attitude through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Korea. He declared that the Moscow Three-Power Conference was a step forward in the development of world democracy, and that establishing a democratic provisional government in Korea was the most legitimate thing for the good of Korea. He went on to argue that the five-year limit on trusteeship was the fault of our own people, and that to place the responsibility on the three powers and to reject and oppose it (the so-called anti-trusteeship movement of the Kim Gu faction) would produce extremely dangerous results for Korea. He then concluded the statement by emphasising the importance of the national unified front. It was his call to concentrate all efforts on completing the Korean national unified front on democratic principles, excluding pro-Japanese collaborators, traitors to the nation and ultranationalists.
The left-wing organisations had already mobilised all their forces for a citizens' rally against trusteeship scheduled for 3 January. The Central Committee of the Communist Party hastily issued a further explanatory statement on 3 January in the name of its propaganda department. In the end, the Seoul Citizens' Rally against Trusteeship, jointly sponsored by the Seoul City People's Committee and the Joint Committee for the Anti-Fascist United Struggle, was held at the Seoul Stadium at 1 p.m. However, citizens who had come out to oppose trusteeship were bewildered. From the very name of the rally, it had been changed to the "Citizens' Rally for Promoting National Unity and Independence", and citizens who came carrying placards reading "Absolutely Oppose Trusteeship" clashed with the organisers. The organisers, instead of the planned speeches against trusteeship, conducted an explanatory session on the purpose of the Three-Power Conference, and communist party members mobilised by the organisers led a march through the streets shouting slogans such as "Absolutely Support the Foreign Ministers' Conference", "Protect the People's Republic", "Down with Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee" and "Immediately End the Market Strike". Thereupon many citizens who had participated in order to oppose trusteeship dispersed, cursing.
At the time, as the heat of anti-trusteeship sentiment was too intense, on Soviet instructions the Communist Party of Korea stopped using the word "trusteeship" and instead called it "guardianship" (후견). However, on 5 January 1946, a false report incident broke out when Johnston of the American New York Times and other domestic and foreign journalists interviewed Park Heon-yong about his position on trusteeship.5 In the interview Park said that Korea was not at a stage of being sovietised, and criticised the U.S. Army Military Government for supporting and encouraging the anti-trusteeship movement, such as permitting the use of radio for it, and for mass arrests of democratic forces such as the People's Committees.5 He then answered, "I do not know when a Soviet Korea will come about, but even if it does, a Soviet Korea will always be an independent state." However, Johnston skilfully stitched this together and wrote a false article with the content: "Park Heon-yong does not oppose Soviet trusteeship over Korea. He also expressed the view that Korea would be incorporated into the Soviet Union in a few decades."6
Course of Events
Preparations
When it became known that the Soviet Union was calling for trusteeship, the Communist Party of Korea did not state an official position, but since the anti-trusteeship fervour across the country was intense from the moment the reports appeared, even left-wing groups expressed anti-trusteeship positions in a private capacity or informally. Park Heon-yong, since TASS had also not reported this content, inquired with the Soviet consulate in Seoul, but the Soviet consul had gone to Moscow and the consulate received only the answer that no instructions had come down from Moscow. Park, before the year was out, crossed the 38th parallel on 28 December and went to Pyongyang, where he met Soviet military government officials and a Soviet consul who had come down with instructions from Moscow, as well as Kim Il-sung, and was instructed on the pro-trusteeship line. As soon as the year changed, he returned to Seoul, and on the evening of 2 January the Communist Party of Korea settled on the pro-trusteeship line and changed the anti-trusteeship event for Seoul citizens planned for 3 January into a pro-trusteeship event.
By contrast, from 27 December, representatives of right-wing and centrist parties and social organisations (including some left-wing figures) gathered at the Kyungkyo-jang where Kim Gu was staying. Syngman Rhee, confined at home with a severe cold, could not attend. Kim Gu and the provisional government faction set up a national mobilisation committee against trusteeship and had the provisional government's State Council guide it, aiming to take the initiative in the political situation. Going a step further, with a hard-line position that "those who comply with trusteeship will be punished as traitors", they ordered a nationwide strike and promulgated a decree (國字, 포고령) ordering Korean officials, including the police under the U.S. Army Military Government, to obey the orders of the provisional government. From the standpoint of the U.S. Army Military Government this was a clear attempt at a coup, and Hodge considered forcibly arresting Kim Gu and other provisional government personnel and deporting them to China, but stopped at calling Kim Gu in and warning him personally. After meeting Hodge, Kim Gu had his propaganda director Eum Hang-seop broadcast on the radio that the anti-trusteeship movement's aim was opposition to trusteeship, not opposition to the military government or making the daily lives of compatriots difficult, and that he hoped everyone would return to normal.
Mediation and the Assassination of Song Jin-woo
The U.S. Army Military Government only received relevant instructions from home on 29 December, and Hodge called in Song Jin-woo and others and asked them to refrain from violent opposition, saying that trusteeship was by no means entirely bad. Song Jin-woo attended the Kyungkyo-jang meeting on the night of 29 December, and when the discussion turned toward the provisional government mobilising public opinion to seize the U.S. Army Military Government and take power, he judged this to be a reckless attempt and urged calm. "I know that all of your thinking comes from patriotism, but we as leaders guiding the nation must not be rash. Has anyone here properly read the original text of the protocol decided at the Moscow Three-Power Conference? As I understand it, after a joint U.S.–Soviet commission is established, the content provides for consultation with Korean parties and social organisations, the establishment of a unified provisional government for the north and south, and trusteeship for no more than five years. If what I know is correct, we could establish our own unified independent government within five years at most, so is there any reason to oppose it by such extreme means? In any case, even if we ourselves try to form a government by our own strength, we are in a situation of divided rule like this, and while the postwar questions among the great powers remain unresolved we cannot do as we please without their agreement. Since trusteeship is at most five years, it could even be three, so what reason is there to oppose it so nationally? Of course I too oppose trusteeship. But let us think again calmly, with some room to spare, about how to oppose it."
As soon as these words ended, violent backlash erupted. Song Jin-woo, returning home after making this statement, was shot at dawn at his residence by Han Hyeon-woo and others, and died. Although the backing has still not been clearly established, it is true that from immediately after Song's assassination rumours circulated in the Kim Gu provisional government camp (Korean Independence Party) that they had killed him. At least from the standpoint of those supporting the provisional government line, Song's calm and cool statement seemed to throw cold water on their "second independence movement", and they resented it.
Failure of the Anti-trusteeship General Strike
The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea issued a decree on 30 December ordering a nationwide strike. From the morning of 30 December, anti-trusteeship strikes broke out across the country. All Korean staff of the U.S. Army Military Government went on general strike, and the Korean secretaries of General Hodge also joined the strike. As anti-trusteeship demonstrations were organised and nationwide strikes continued, the provisional government issued Kukja No. 1 (國字第一號), demanding that the U.S. Army Military Government transfer power and attempting to take over the government. Kukja No. 1 contained provisions such as placing all Korean staff working in the police apparatus under the U.S. Army Military Government under the command of the provisional government. Kukja Nos. 1 and 2 were issued in the name of Shin Ik-hee, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, but were drafted by Choe Ha-yeong (Japanese name: 香山夏永), who had served as Director of the Investigation Section under the Government-General of Korea, and Han Dong-seok (Japanese name: 朝川東錫), who had served as a Superintendent in the Security Section of the South Hamgyong Province Police Department under the Government-General and as an official of the Industry Bureau of the Government-General of Korea.
However, after the reckless coup attempt of the provisional government came to nothing, Kim Kyu-sik and Ahn Jae-hong, who within the right wing also judged trusteeship to be unavoidable, turned from opposing trusteeship to supporting it. Initially they opposed trusteeship, but after Kim Kyu-sik obtained the result document of the Moscow Three-Power Conference of 27 December 1945, he turned from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship. Afterwards an assassination squad was organised to kill Kim Kyu-sik, and the squad, while climbing over the wall of Samcheong-jang, Kim Kyu-sik's residence, was caught and also fled. Afterwards Kim Kyu-sik had to move his residence frequently, and had to change his sleeping place several times even at night.
The Pro-trusteeship Argument
Park Heon-yong, who had been branded a pro-trusteeship advocate by the false report, later turned into a pro-trusteeship advocate. Fanatics who believed that "trusteeship is a method of colonial rule, and those who support it are traitors who must be eliminated" made Park Heon-yong, who had switched to pro-trusteeship, and Lyuh Woon-hyung7 their targets for assassination.8
Within the right wing too, a pro-trusteeship line emerged. Song Jin-woo was critical of the strongly anti-trusteeship campaigns of Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee. Song Jin-woo opposed Kim Gu on the view that if they made the United States an enemy, the communists would gain the advantage.8 On the evening of 29 December, at the meeting of provisional government officials and right-wing figures held at the Kyungkyo-jang from 10 p.m., Song explained the inevitability of trusteeship. Mistaking Song's argument for support of trusteeship, Han Hyeon-woo, a serving police officer, and five other followers of Kim Gu shot and killed him at his residence in Wonseo-dong, Seoul, at 6 a.m. on 30 December 1945.8
Results
On 15 January 1946, a broadcast from San Francisco, United States, reported that Park Heon-yong had told Johnston that he supported a one-power trusteeship and that Korea should be annexed to the Soviet Union within 10 to 20 years. The U.S. Army Military Government incorporated this into a "press release",9 and Korean newspapers reported it prominently, causing a sensation. Park issued a statement denying support for trusteeship, and the Chosun Ilbo published both the broadcast report and Park's denial statement together.5
Park Heon-yong demanded that the Dong-A Ilbo correct and apologise for the article that had reported falsely that he supported trusteeship. However, the Dong-A Ilbo refused to apologise for the false report that he had supported trusteeship. The Korean Democratic Party also framed Park with the accusation that, following the false report that he "supported trusteeship", he had argued that "Korea should become a vassal state of the Soviet Union" and "Korea should become one state of the Soviet Union federation".
In addition, in the Dong-A Ilbo article of 27 December 1945 it published the report, the exact opposite of the facts, under the headline "The Soviet Union Advocates Trusteeship, the United States Advocates Immediate Independence, the Soviet Pretext Is the Division and Occupation at the 38th Parallel",10 which was taken from the U.S.-originated AP and UP wire stories of 25 December. The original UP article from that time survives and can be verified.4 At that time the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out trusteeship, and only wanted the Korean peninsula to supply resources for its postwar reconstruction. This aim was sufficiently served by North Korean territory alone, and the Soviet Union devoted itself only to building a firm foundation for it. By contrast, trusteeship over Korea was a consistent policy of the United States, which consistently pursued that policy out of concern that the Soviet Union would take the Korean peninsula alone.11
In the issues of 16 January 1946 they carried the article "Korea as a Vassal of the Soviet Union – Park Heon-yong's Hopes as Relayed by the San Francisco Broadcast" and the article "Park Heon-yong's Treasonous Words, Korean Democratic Party Resolves to Reject Them", and on the 17th devoted a large part of the page to report "Great Uproar over the Words of Park Heon-yong of the Communist Party, Nationwide Movement to Reject Him, Each Party and 50 Organisations Rise in Indignation".5 On 18 January the Dong-A Ilbo again wrote an editorial based on this. The anti-trusteeship organisations resolved to overthrow Park Heon-yong as the Dong-A Ilbo had reported, and organised and formed the "Emergency Council of Organisations for the Punishment of Treason to the Nation". Park soon issued a denial statement, and the foreign journalists who had attended the joint press conference of 5 January issued a joint statement that Park's account was correct.5 However, Johnston again insisted that his account was correct, and the Dong-A Ilbo carried an article under the heading "No False Report in the New York Times. The Circumstances of the Talks between Mr. Johnston and Mr. Park Heon-yong".5 Thereafter Park Heon-yong continued to be known as having supported trusteeship and became the target of denunciations by anti-trusteeship groups.
In the end, Park Heon-yong, branded as a pro-trusteeship advocate and pro-Soviet, turned to support trusteeship in February 1946, and became a pro-trusteeship advocate when the Soviet Union issued pro-trusteeship instructions to the Communist Party of Korea. In Seoul he also became a target of terror by right-wing groups. Right-wing youth group members, believing that trusteeship was a method of colonial rule and that those who supported it were traitors who must be eliminated, made Park Heon-yong, who had switched to pro-trusteeship, and Lyuh Woon-hyung their targets for assassination.8Kim Won-bong and Hur Hun also became targets, and beyond the factional lines, Kim Kyu-sik, Ahn Jae-hong, Bae Eun-hee, Myung Je-se, Jang Deok-su and others also became targets for assassination.
Criticism
Kim Won-bong, an independence activist, leader of the Uiyeoldan and an activist in the left-wing organisation the Nationalist Democratic Front, criticised the anti-trusteeship movement by comparing it to the isolationist policy of Heungseon Daewongun. According to Kim Won-bong, regarding the anti-trusteeship movement, comparing it to Heungseon Daewongun's isolationism and anti-Western policy, "the Byeongin Yangyo (1866) and Sinmi Yangyo (1871), in which the French fleet and the American fleet were repelled, were in their own way gratifying from a national and ultranationalist perspective, but viewed from the perspective of world affairs they were foolish acts that ruined the future of the nation."12
The problem is that Kim Won-bong himself had actively advocated anti-trusteeship at the end of 1945,13 and in early January, together with other leftists, abruptly changed his attitude to pro-trusteeship, so his argument too is merely a story concocted by bringing in an unrelated example to rationalise his own change of stance.
When the trusteeship plan was first reported at the end of 1945, the whole nation, regardless of left or right, shouted against trusteeship, and this was a natural expression of national sentiment.14 However, from around 2 January the left-wing camp abruptly turned to pro-trusteeship, and as revealed by the fact that on 3 January the anti-trusteeship rally scheduled for that day was turned on that very day into a pro-trusteeship rally, it appears that the will of other forces was involved behind them. The U.S. Army Military Government authorities also judged that the will of the Soviet Union was involved in the abrupt change of attitude in the left-wing camp.15
However, the change in the left's position came after the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference had been conveyed, and it is difficult to denounce it as a change resulting from a unilateral Soviet instruction. Moreover, the official position of the left was not confined to support or opposition to trusteeship but was overall support for the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference, and this should be taken into account in approaching the matter.
It is well known that the subjects of the Moscow Three-Power Conference were not only the Soviet Union but also the United States, and that the object of the "overall support for the content of the Moscow Three-Power Conference" cannot be limited to the Soviet Union alone.
Miscellaneous
Meanwhile, the anti-trusteeship movement provided a rationale for the elimination of left-wing and pro-trusteeship figures, and for terror and attempted-assassination incidents, by ultra-right groups that arose in the liberation period.
여운형 argued that "a provisional government should be established first, and anti-trusteeship opposition should be pursued afterward, and that extreme anti-trusteeship movements should be avoided." ↩
On January 8, U.S. Army Military Governor John R. Hodge summoned the relevant officers and addressed this issue. Based on testimony he had heard from a U.S. Army officer who attended the press conference, Military Advisor Albert Kipp reported that Johnston had completely distorted Pak Hon-yong's remarks. Colonel Newman of the Office of Public Information was also suspicious of Johnston's article and checked with journalist Edgar Snow, who firmly answered that he had not attended the press conference himself but that Pak Hon-yong could not have said such a thing. However, John R. Hodge argued that the South Korean press had treated this content considerably more mildly than it actually was and that it should be properly covered again. This amounted to Hodge putting pressure on the press to publish Johnston's article. ↩
Telegram from CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, January 25, 1946: General John Hodge's telegram dated January 25, 1946, documenting the process by which the leftist camp suddenly shifted from opposing trusteeship in late 1945 to supporting it in early 1946. ↩